Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and AnalysisCambridge University Press, 1990 - Počet stran: 265 Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. |
Obsah
the marriage model | 15 |
The structure of the set of stable matchings | 54 |
Strategic questions | 78 |
888 | 87 |
models in which firms | 123 |
Discrete models with money and more complex | 171 |
Models of onetoone matching with money | 187 |
The assignment game | 202 |
A generalization of the assignment model | 222 |
Epilogue | 241 |
Bibliography | 249 |
| 259 | |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-theoretic Modeling and Analysis Alvin E. Roth,Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor Náhled není k dispozici. - 1990 |
Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a sousloví
agents assignment game assumption auction bidder blocking pair buyer C₁ Chapter choice coalition college admissions model college admissions problem computational consider Corollary corresponding deferred acceptance algorithm defined denote dominant strategy equilibrium erences example exists firm game theory hospital implies incentives incomplete information individually rational kind labor market lattice lattice theorem least Lemma list of acceptable M-optimal stable matching m₁ m₂ marriage market marriage model marriage problem matching µ mate medical interns NIMP algorithm nonempty Note P-agents P(w₁ pairwise Pareto optimal players pref preference list preferences are strict preferences over individuals procedure proof of Theorem proposed Proposition quota rank rejected reservation price revelation game revelation principle Roth salaries Section seller set of stable Shapley stable marriage problem stable matching mechanism stable outcomes stable payoff strict preferences subset Suppose tion true preferences truth telling two-sided matching unmatched unstable w₁ w₂ woman women