Papers in Experimental EconomicsCambridge University Press, 29. 11. 1991 - Počet stran: 812 Vernon L. Smith is the main creator of the burgeoning discipline of experimental economics. This collection of his papers from 1962 to 1988 surveys major developments in the field from early attempts to simulate economic behavior in now classic double oral auction markets through recent studies of industrial organization and decision making. Topics covered include monopoly and oligopoly supply and demand theory under posted pricing, uniform pricing, double continuous auction, and sealed bid-offer auction; hypothetical valuation and market pricing; asset price bubbles; predatory pricing; market contestability and natural monopoly; and the methodology of experimental economics. Taken together, the papers form a history of the study of economics under controlled conditions. Vernon Smith is Regents Professor of Economics at the University of Arizona, and is the author of over 100 articles and books on capital theory, finance, natural resource economics, and experimental economics. He is president of the Public Choice Society and past founding president of the Economic Science Association. |
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Part II Institutions and Market Performance | 159 |
Part III Public Goods | 373 |
Part IV Auctions and Institutional Design | 507 |
Part V Industrial Organization | 703 |
Part VI Perspectives on Economics | 781 |
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accepted bid agents allocation asset Auction Mechanism B₁ Bid and Cost bid function bid offer bidder bidding behavior buyers and sellers Chart commodity competitive equilibrium consistent contestable markets contract prices convergence Cost Share CRRAM deviations double auction double-auction duopoly Dutch auction effect efficiency English auction equilibrium bid exchange experienced subjects experimental design Experimental Economics experiments Figure first-price auction Free-Rider incentive increase individual institution laboratory Lindahl Equilibrium marginal mean price ments monopoly Nash equilibrium null hypothesis observed optimal outcomes parameters payoff pipeline PLATO Plott posted-offer predatory pricing predicted price auction procedure profit proposition purchase Quantity Proposed rejected replications reported resale risk averse risk neutral rule sealed-bid auction second-price second-price auction sequence sessions Smith supply and demand surplus Table theoretical theory tion trading period trial unit valuations variance Vernon L Vickrey yield