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Běžně se vyskytující výrazy a souslovíaction actors aggregation alternatives American Political Science Amos Tversky analysis argument Arrow assumptions Becker behavior bounded rationality boundedly rational Buchanan Calculus of Consent Cambridge University Press Chicago coalition cognitive competition constitutional constraints corruption decision decisionmakers democracy distribution Economic Theory economists edited efficient empirical equilibrium essay evolutionary example experimental game theory Gordon Tullock groups Herbert Simon heuristics human ideology important individual institutions interaction interest interpersonal capital James Kahneman Kazakh Kenneth legislative logic majority Margaret Levi maximize Nash equilibria neoclassical nomics normative North organizations Ostrom outcomes Pareto party personal capital Political Economy political science Political Science Review political scientists predictions preferences privatization problem Public Choice regimes Reinhard Selten role rules Russian speakers Selten Simon situation social capital social choice society strategies structure theoretical tion transaction costs Tversky utility function voters voting welfare York Odkazy na tuto knihuZ jiných knih
Ze služby Google ScholarChallenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary ...ELINOR OSTROM - 2007 - Journal of Institutional Economics The Analysis of Contemporary Institutional Change: Making Theories ...Markus Hanisch - Institutionen in Naturschutz und Ressourcenmanagement–Beiträge der Neuen Institutionenökonomik Bibliografické údaje
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