Designing Economic MechanismsCambridge University Press, 22. 5. 2006 A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied. |
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A-set a₁ agent algorithm axiom of choice b₁ b₂ Chapter coarsening condensation construction contour set coordinates covering correspondence covering Cy decentralized mechanism defined denoted differentiable manifolds dimension encoded revelation mechanism environment equilibrium message equivalence relation equivalent Euclidean space F-cc finite flagpole follows Forester function F game form given goal function Hence informational efficiency informationally efficient inner product Jacobian K₁ left-RM level sets matrix maximally coarse mechanism design mechanism that realizes message correspondence message space minimal Nash equilibrium notation outcome function p-functions parameter point parameter space parameter transfer partition procedure proof quotient object rank realize a given realizes F realizes the goal rectangle rectangles method rectangular covering reflexive RM rRM covering satisfy Section self-belonging correspondence subset Suppose Theorem transversal variables vector verify