Repeated Games with Incomplete InformationMIT Press, 1995 - Počet stran: 342 During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected in this text, with the addition of postscripts describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others. |
Obsah
Disarmament | 1 |
5678 | 22 |
Postscripts | 41 |
d | 53 |
12 | 65 |
Lack of Information on One SideStage Games | 70 |
Lack of Information on Both Sides | 91 |
Incomplete Knowledge of Moves | 110 |
with Incomplete Information | 155 |
Chapter Four | 173 |
6 | 188 |
Postscripts | 206 |
Games Without a Recursive Structure | 219 |
Equilibrium Points and Equilibrium Payoffs | 226 |
Postscripts | 233 |
d | 296 |
Další vydání - Zobrazit všechny
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Robert J. Aumann,Michael Maschler Náhled není k dispozici. - 1995 |
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Robert J. Aumann,Michael Maschler Náhled není k dispozici. - 1995 |
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1-shot game assume Aumann average expected payoff average payoff cav u(p cav vex chance chooses Chapter choice of chance chooses left chosen column compute conditional probability convex convex hull defined denote deviation Dick diconvex equilibrium pair equilibrium payoffs error term example exists Figure finite follows function G₁ Game Theory games with incomplete guarantee Harsanyi incomplete information joint plan Lemma lim vn martingale matrix minimax theorem mixed strategy n-stage optimal strategy outcome p₁ pair of strategies payoff matrix payoff vector Player 1 chooses Player 1 Player Player 1 plays Player 2 knows playing optimally positive probability Postscript prisoner's dilemma Prob probability distribution probability vector proof pure strategy random variable repeated game result reveal Section sequence situation stochastic games strategy for Player T₁ Theorem N1 tion true game true stage game vector payoff vex cav yields Zamir