Game-Theoretic Models of BargainingAlvin E. Roth Cambridge University Press, 29. 11. 1985 - Počet stran: 390 Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games. |
Obsah
Chapter 1 Editors introduction and overview | 1 |
Models with incomplete information | 9 |
Chapter 3 Reputations in games and markets | 27 |
Chapter 4 An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining ... | 63 |
Chapter 5 Infinitehorizon models of bargaining with onesided incomplete information | 73 |
Chapter 6 Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information | 99 |
Chapter 7 Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information | 115 |
Chapter 8 Sequential bargaining mechanisms | 149 |
Chapter 10 Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions | 215 |
A survey of recent results | 233 |
Chapter 12 Toward a focalpoint theory of bargaining | 259 |
Chapter 13 Bargaining and coalitions | 269 |
Chapter 14 Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining | 305 |
Chapter 15 A comment on the Coase theorem | 321 |
Who should bear the burden of proof? | 341 |
Chapter 17 The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives | 363 |
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