When the oath is administered by a notary public, the signature and notarial seal of the notary constitute a sufficient authentication. When not accompanied by such seal, the signature and official character of the notary must be authenticated in the usual manner. Ibid.

It is not necessary or proper that resort should be had to the formal and plenary proceedings common to suits in equity in the circuit court. A petition stating the facts relied on for relief, and praying for the order, relief, or proceeding sought for, is sufficient. In re Wallace, 2 B. R. 134; 8. c. 1 Deady, 433; in re J. O. Smith, 2 B. R. 297.

When the district court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the question at issue, and both parties submit themselves to its exercise and invoke it in the form of a summary proceeding, the court is not called upon to consider whether the determination of the question should have been sought by a summary proceeding or by a proceeding more formally commenced. Samson v. Blake, 6 B. R. 410; s. c. 9 Blatch. 379. If the adverse party goes to a hearing without objecting to the right or interest of the petitioner, this is a waiver of the form of filing a new petition to set up an interest subsequently acquired. In re Robert Morris. Crabbe, 70.

A summary petition is not like a suit at common law, in which the party must have his right of action when he commences it. If he subsequently acquires an interest, he may file a new petition. Ibid

If the assignee is not chargeable with a personal knowledge of the subject, his omission to deny an averment will not enable the petitioner to use it as if admitted. In re George W. Snow, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 264; 8. c. 5 Law Rep. 369.

A party who acquiesces in a reference to an auditor, and appears before him and contests the claim, waives the right to a jury trial. Kelly v. Smith, 1 Blatch. 290.

If the district judge shall be satisfied, in conducting such a proceeding, that justice will be subserved by a jury trial, he can direct the issue to be so tried. Bill v. Beckwith, 2 B. R. 241.

When a petition is filed claiming rent for possession of premises by the assignee after the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. a jury trial may be allowed. Buckner v. Jewell, 14 B. R. 286; s. c. 2 Woods, 220.

The testimony may be taken ore tenus at the hearing. Wilson v. Stoddard, 4 B. R. 254; s. c. 2 C. L. N. 161.

If the mortgagee is dead, the mortgagor can not testify in favor of his assignee in a proceeding against the executors of the mortgagee. Bromley v. Smith, 5 B. R. 152; s. c. 2 Biss. 511.

The declarations of the bankrupt in aid and in partial execution of a transfer which is impeached, are admissible as the declarations of a coconspirator and as a part of the res gestae. Samson v. Clarke, 6 B. R. 410; s. c. 9 Blatch. 379.

Even in a formal suit in equity the court may qualify the decree so that it shall not operate to prevent a new sult, and nothing is more common in disposing of motions than to give leave to renew or apply upon new

and further evidence for additional relief. The highly equitable and remedial powers conferred upon the court in bankruptcy are not less free from restriction, nor are they hampered by such technical rules as will prevent the doing of what is just and for the protection of the estate, even if it required the revocation of an order once made. An order dismissing a petition with leave to renew the application upon the discovery of additional facts, is not final and conclusive as res adjudicata. Samson v. Clarke, 6 B. R. 403; s. c. 9 Blatch. 372.

Where property has been delivered to the plaintiff in a replevin suit brought in a State court, and has been subsequently taken from the possession of the plaintiff by the marshal, there is no conflict or interference on the part of the marshal with the officers of the State court. In re Geo. J. G. Davidson, 2 B. R. 114; s. c. 2 Ben. 506.

Where a petition assumes the form of a regular suit or proceeding, and testimony is introduced as upon an ordinary trial, a docket fee of twenty dollars may be taxed in favor of the attorney for the assignee when the petition is dismissed. In re Bank of Madison, 9 B. R. 184; s. c. 5 Biss. 515.

Jurisdiction of State Courts over Suits by Assignees.-The jurisdiction of the district court is not exclusive over the entire execution of the law. Lucas v. Morris, 1 Paine, 396.

Congress has no right to require that the State courts shall entertain suits for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the bankruptcy law. The States in providing their own judicial tribunals have a right to limit, control and restrict their judicial functions and jurisdiction according to their own mere pleasure. Mitchell v. Manuf. Co., 2 Story, 648; Buckingham v. McLean, 3 McLean, 185; s. c. 13 How. 151.

An assignee under the bankruptcy law of the United States may sue in his own name in the State courts to enforce the rights of property vested in him by the assignment in bankruptcy, and the courts of the United States have not exclusive jurisdiction of such actions. Stevens v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 101 Mass. 109; Peiper v. Harmer, 5 B. R. 252; s. c. 8 Phila. 100; s. c. 4 L. T. B. (C. R.) 166; Boone v. Hall, 7 Bush, 66; State v. Trustees, 5 B. R. 466; in re Central Bank, 6 B. R. 207; Cogdell v. Exum, 10 B. R. 327; s. c. 69 N. C. 464; Hoover v. Robinson, 3 Neb. 437; Mitchell v. Manuf. Co., 2 Story, 648; Hastings v. Fowler, 2 Ind. 216; Ward v. Jenkins, 51 Mass. 583; Russell v. Owen, 15 B. R. 322; s. c. 61 Mo. 185. Contra, Frost v. Hotchkiss, 14 B. R. 443; s. c. 1 Abb. N. C. 27.

In an action brought by an assignee, the defendant may deny the jurisdiction of the district court over the bankrupt in the proceedings in which the assignee was appointed. Stuart v. Aumueller, 8 B. R. 541.

The State courts have jurisdiction of questions arising between persons within their jurisdiction, whether they arise under the laws of any other State or any foreign nation. If they arise under the law of the United States, they have the same jurisdiction, unless deprived of it by some competent authority. The fact that the Federal courts may have jurisdiction of the same question, does not deprive the State courts of Jurisdiction. The Federal and State courts may and do have concurrent

Jurisdiction of various questions. When, however, the right of action is created by an act of Congress, it being a matter within the power conferred upon the Federal government, Congress may prescribe, in the exercise of its rightful powers, the manner and the tribunal in which alone that right may be enforced. Congress may confer exclusive jurisdiction in these cases upon the Federal courts; but when it does not prescribe the tribunal in which alone they are to be prosecuted, the Federal and State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over them. The fact that Congress confers jurisdiction upon the Federal courts, is no evidence that Congress intended to clothe them with exclusive jurisdiction, because they have no jurisdiction except such as is conferred upon them by Congress. Cook v. Whipple, 9 B. R. 155; s. c. 55 N. Y. 150; Gilbert v. Priest, 8 B. R. 159; s. c. 63 Barb. 339; s. c. 65 Barb. 444; s. c. 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 165; Gilbert v. Crawford, 46 How. Pr. 222; Jordan v. Downey, 12 B. R. 427; s. c. 40 Md. 401; Lewis v. Sloan, 68 N. C. 557; Dambmann v. White, 12 B. R. 438; s. c. 48 Cal. 439; Kemmerer v. Tool, 12 B. R. 334; s. c. 78 Penn. 147; Otis v. Hadley, 112 Mass. 100; Rison v. Powell, 28 Ark. 427; Claflin v. Houseman, 15 B. R. 49; s. c. 93 U. S. 130; Goodrich v. Wilson, 14 B. R. 555; s. c. 119 Mass. 429; McKiernan v. King, 2 Mont. 72. Contra, Bromley v. Goodrich, 15 B. R. 289; s. c. 40 Wis. 131; Voorhees v. Frisbie, 8 B. R. 152; s. c. 25 Mich. 476; s. c. 6 L. T. B. 85; Brigham v. Claflin, 7 B. R. 412; s. c. 31 Wis. 607; Fenlon v. Lonergan, 29 Penn. 471.

If the State courts have jurisdiction, it is not in their discretion whether or not to exercise it. It is their duty to do so when called upon in the mode prescribed by law. Cook v. Whipple, 9 B. R. 155; s. c. 55 N. Y. 150. If Congress had intended by this section of the act to make the jurisdiction of the district courts exclusive in the collection of assets, and to deprive all other courts of jurisdiction over any action by or against assignees in bankruptcy, it would have been as easy as it would have been natural to employ language to express this purpose. But it will be observed that the word exclusive, as descriptive of the jurisdiction, is not only not used, but seems to have been carefully avoided. Payson v. Dietz, 8 B. R. 193; s. c. 2 Dillon, 504.

A bankrupt is not a necessary party to a suit brought to enjoin a judgment fraudulently recovered by him. Weakly v. Miller, 1 Tenn. Ch. 523. The assignee can properly institute a suit in a State court only under the direction of the district court. Chemung Canal Bank v. Judson, 8 N. Y. 254.

The jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts over controversies with a debtor of the bankrupt or a person who disputes the right to real or personal property with him is concurrent with and does not divest that of the State courts. Eyster v. Gaff, 13 B. R. 546; s. c. 91 U. S. 521; s. c. 2 Col. 28. Vide in re Geo. W. Anderson, 9 B. R. 360.

A person whose property has been seized under a warrant, may sue the marshal in a State court. Marsh v. Armstrong, 11 B. R. 125; s. c. 20 Minn. 81; in re Isaac Marks, 2 B. R. 575; s. c. 1 C. L. N. 245; s. c. 16 Pitts. I. J. 12.

Whenever State courts have jurisdiction over controversies between the assignee and third parties, the circuit courts have it independent of the

bankruptcy law if the proper citizenship of the parties exist. Burbank v. Bigelow, 14 B. R. 445; s. c, 92 U. S. 179.

An assignee who is a citizen of one State may maintain an action in the circuit court of another State against a party who is a citizen of that State, to enforce a right which may be enforced at common law or in equity. The jurisdiction is conferred by the judiciary act, and is not taken away by mere affirmative legislation conferring like jurisdiction upon another court. The mere grant of jurisdiction to a particular court has never been held to oust any other court of the powers which it before possessed. Payson v. Dietz, 8 B. R. 193; s. c. 2 Dillon, 504; Spaulding v. McGovern, 10 B. R. 188; Burbank v. Bigelow, 14 B. R. 445; s. c. 92 U. S. 179; Post v. Rouse, 1 W. N. 39.

If an assignee appears in a State court in an action brought to enforce a lien against the bankrupt's estate, execution may be stayed in order to give the parties an opportunity to apply to the district court. Rowe v. Page, 13 B. R. 366; s. c. 54 N. H. 190.

ACT OF 1898, CH. 2, § 2. Courts' Jurisdiction in Chambers and Term. Courts of bankruptcy are invested within their respective territorial limits as now established or as may be hereafter changed with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings in vacation in chambers and during their respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter held.

ACT OF 1867, § 4973. The district courts shall be always open for the transaction of business in the exercise of their jurisdiction as courts of bankruptcy; and their powers and jurisdiction as such courts shall be exercised as well in vacation as in term time; and a judge sitting at chambers shall have the same powers and jurisdiction, including the power of keeping order and of punishing any contempt of his authority, as when sitting in court.

Statute revised - March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517. Prior Statute Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 445.

A proceeding in bankruptcy, from the time of its commencement until the final settlement of the estate, is but one suit. Sandusky v. First Nat'l Bank, 12 B. R. 176; s. c. 23 Wall, 289; in re York & Hoover, 4 B. R. 479; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 503; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 290; Alabama R. R. Co. v. Jones, 5 B. R. 97.

The district court, for all the purposes of its bankruptcy jurisdiction, is always open. It has no separate terms. The statute provides that "the courts shall be always open for the transaction of business," so that from the beginning of a proceeding in bankruptcy to its termination there is but one term. Sandusky v. Nat'l. Bank, 12 B. R. 176; s. c. 23 Wall. 289; Ala. & Chat. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 7 B. R. 145.

Its proceedings in any pending suit are at all times open for re-examination upon application therefor in an appropriate form. Any order made in the progress of the cause may be subsequently set aside and vacated upon proper showing made, provided rights have not become vested under it which will be disturbed by its vacation. Application for such re-examination may be made by motion or petition, according to the circumstances of the case. Such a motion or petition will not have the effect of a new suit, but of a proceeding in the old one. Sandusky v. Nat'l. Bank, 12 B. R. 176; s. c. 23 Wall. 289.

Every court has power to alter and amend its records so as to conform to the truth, during the term to which the record relates. During the pendency of proceedings in a particular case, the court, upon the representation of the clerk that he had omitted to file-mark a particular paper, or had filed it of a wrong date, and upon being satisfied of the truth of the representation, may order him to file the paper as of the date when lodged in his office. Ala. & Chat. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 7 B. R. 145.

The bankruptcy court may be a movable court. It is said the clerk's office and the clerk follow the court, but for the transaction of other than bankruptcy business, the clerk's office is stationary at the place desigrated by law. But the holding of court necessitates the filing of papers and the issue of process. The one can make little progress without the other. Hence it appears that Congress contemplated the necessity of filing papers otherwise than by delivering them to the clerk at his stationary office, although it provided that such office should be their final place of custody. A petition presented to the judge at chambers, and acted upon by him, will be deemed to be filed on the day of its presentation, although not actually deposited in the clerk's office until a subsequent day. Frank v. Houston, 9 Kans. 406.

District courts, in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction, may act in administrative matters, or matters of mere discretion, as well in vacation as in term time, and a judge sitting at chambers in such matters has the same power and jurisdiction as when sitting in court. Shearman v. Bingham, 5 B. R. 34; s. c. 7 B. R. 490; s. c. 3 C. L. N. 258; Goodall v. Tuttle, 7 B. R. 193; s. c. 3 Biss. 219.

Actions at law or suits in equity can not be heard and determined by the district court at chambers, or in vacation. Shearman v. Bingham,

5 B. R. 34; s. c. 7 B. R. 490; s. c. 3 C. L. N. 258.

§ 4974. A district court may sit for the transaction of business in bankruptcy, at any place within the district, of which place and of the time of commencing session the court shall have given notice, as well as at the places designated by law for holding sessions of such court.

Statute revised March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 1, 14 Stat. 517.

ACT OF 1898, CH. 2, § 2. Contempts.- Courts of bankruptcy may (13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers and other persons