signees, and the circuit courts will decline to interfere with them. Woods v. Buckwell, 7 B. R. 405; s. c. 2 Dillon, 38; in re Adler Brothers, 2 Woods, 571.

The action of the district court in removing an assignee or consenting to a removal by a vote of the creditors is not subject to review under this section. In re Adler Brothers, 2 Woods, 571.

The circuit court has jurisdiction to revise the proceedings of the district court for the middle district of Alabama. Alabama R. R. Co. v. Jones, 5 B. R. 97.

Decrees of the district court are final, in the constitutional sense, although they are rendered under an act of Congress which makes them subject to revision by the circuit court, and consequently the right of such revision is not inconsistent with the interest which the opposite party acquires in the decree. Rendered as the decree is, subject to revision in the circuit court, no party acquires or can acquire any interest in the decree to defeat the right of such revision. Littlefield v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 4 B. R. 257.

The superintendence and jurisdiction conferred by this clause are revisory of cases and questions arising in the district court, and contemplate a review of what is presented to that court for consideration and decision. They may include the power which, in a special and perhaps more restricted form, was given in the sixth section of the bankruptcy act of 1841, wherein authority was given to adjourn any point or question arising in any case in bankruptcy, into the circuit court, to be there heard and determined; and it may be that, under the present act, the presentation of such questions, and the jurisdiction of the circuit court over them, does not, as in the former, depend upon the discretion of the district court. But, in either view, the question, or cases presenting such questions, must arise in the district court; and their determination in the circuit court is either for the guidance or control of the district court. This is not a jurisdiction to assume the conduct of the proceedings, or to specifically enforce or execute the orders or decrees of that court. For that purpose the district court has ample and exclusive power. The act does not blend or confound the two courts in the administration of the bankruptcy law. The courts are distinct under that act, as under all others, and exercise a separate jurisdiction, each in its own sphere. The proceedings for a review of the decree of the district court bring the decree, and whatever orders are involved therein, before the circuit court; but do not operate to transfer the entire proceedings in bankruptcy into the circuit court, to be there continued as in a court of first instance. If the decree is affirmed, it stands as the decree of the district court, and not of the circuit court; and is to be carried into due execution by the former, and not the latter. In re Binninger et al., 3 B. R. 487; s. c. 7 Blatch. 159; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 183; in re Binninger et al., 3 B. R. 489; s. c. 7 Blatch. 165; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 186.

The exercise of this jurisdiction is not placed by the act under specific regulations and restrictions like the proceeding by appeal or writ of error, nor has the supreme court prescribed any rule concerning it. It must

depend on the sound discretion of the court. Unreasonable delay in invoking the superintending jurisdiction should not be allowed, nor should such excessive rigor be exercised that the ends of justice will probably be defeated. In re John Alexander, 3 B. R. 29; s. c. Chase, 295; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 81; Littlefield v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 4 B. R. 257; Sutherland v. Kellogg, 2 Biss. 405; in re Work, McCough & Co., 30 Leg. Int. 361; Bank v. Cooper, 9 B. R. 529; s. c. 20 Wall. 171.

What is a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of each case. Generally it should be fixed in analogy to the period desiguated within which appeals must be taken. Bank v. Cooper, 9 B. R. 529; s. c. 20 Wall, 171.

A review may be applied for at any time before the supposed erroneous order is carried into execution. In re Edward A. Casey, 8 B. R. 71; s. c. 10 Blatch. 376.

If a party delays unreasonably to file the petition for a review, he may be required to pay the costs which have been incurred in executing the decree. Thames v. Miller, 2 Woods, 564.

Power to make rules for the orderly conducting of business in court is vested in the circuit court as well as in the supreme court, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States, and are not inconsistent with the rules relating to the same subject established by the supreme court. Sweatt v. Boston R. R. Co., 5 B. R. 234; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 273.

The jurisdiction conferred by this clause can only be exercised within and for the district" where the proceedings in bankruptcy shall be pending." Shearman v. Bingham, 5 B. R. 34; s. c. 7 B. R. 490; s. c. 3 C. L. N. 258.

If the judge was a creditor at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and has since assigned his claim, he is not legally disqualified to act in the case, and, being qualified, he is not at liberty, upon a matter of mere personal feeling or preference, to decline the responsibility thrown upon him by official position. In re Sime & Co., 7 B. R. 407; s. c. 5 Pac. L. R. 217.

This section does not declare in terms that the party aggrieved, or any party, shall have the right to invoke that superintendence and jurisdiction; but that is necessarily implied. A court of justice is not at liberty to disown its jurisdiction, or to refuse to entertain parties who apply in due form for its exercise. Where the jurisdiction is itself discretionary, it may be declined; and where parties do not apply in the legal or prescribed manner, or in due season, or are otherwise in fault in the matter of the review sought, doubtless the court may dismiss their application. And the control of the court over frivolous and vexatious appeals of any kind is not questionable. But the court can not impose compulsory dismissal as a penalty or consequence of alleged or supposed misconduct elsewhere, which has no effect to delay or impede the exercise of the power of the court in the matter of the relief sought. It will not compel a party to elect whether he will further prosecute his petition of review or an action commenced in a State court against the appellee to restrain

him from prosecuting the proceedings in bankruptcy. In re Binninger et al., 3 B. R. 489; s. c. 7 Blatch. 168; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 187.

There is one class of cases where, by the provisions of the bankruptcy act, issues may be framed and tried by a jury, to-wit, where the debtor opposes the petition that he may be adjudged a bankrupt. Such cases, when tried by a jury, if the circuit court has any jurisdiction upon the subject, must be removed into the circuit court by a writ of error, as they, when tried by a jury, are excluded from the special jurisdiction conferred under this clause by the very words of the clause. Where "special provision is otherwise made," the case is excluded from the general superintendence and jurisdiction of the circuit court by the exception introduced as a parenthesis into the body of this part of the section. Special provision is made in such cases within the meaning of that exception when the case is tried by a jury, and there is not a word in the act having the slightest tendency to show that Congress intended that a fact found by a jury in a district court should be re-examined in a summary way by the circuit court. Such cases may be tried by the district court without a jury, and in that event no doubt is entertained that the case is within the supervisory jurisdiction of the circuit court. Morgan v. Thornhill, 5 B. R. 1; s. c. 11 Wall. 65.

Special provision is not otherwise made for the re-examination by the circuit court of the decision of the district court in granting or refusing a discharge, and hence it can only be done under the power conferred by this clause. Coit v. Robinson, 9 B. R. 289; s. c. 19 Wall. 274.

If a claim is allowed in spite of the opposition of a contesting creditor, he may take the question to the circuit court by a revisory petition. In re Adolph Joseph, 2 Woods, 390. Contra, in re Troy Woolen Co., 9 B. R. 329; s. c. 9 Blatch. 191.

If an assignee appeals from the allowance of a claim and an opposing creditor files a petition of review, the circuit court may determine which form of proceeding shall be retained. In re Adolph Joseph, 2 Woods, 390. If a fund recovered in an action instituted before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy is deposited in the registry of the district court, an order upon a petition of the bankrupt, praying that a certain part thereof be awarded to him and his attorney, is reviewable by a supervisory petition. Maybin v. Raymond, 15 B. R. 353; 4 A. L. T. (N. S.) 21.

Even if the circuit court can review an interlocutory order made by the district court in a suit in equity before a final decree has been made in the cause, the review can only be had by means of an appeal, and not by means of a petition of review. Warren v. Tenth Nat'l Bank, 9 Blatch. 193. Questions of law which arise in the progress of a proceeding in involuntary bankruptcy, where a jury trial has been demanded, can only be reviewed by a writ of error after a final adjudication. In re Oregon B. P. & P. Co., 14 B. R. 394; s. c. 3 Saw. 529.

The granting or refusing of a motion for a new trial is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the district court, under all the circumstances of the case, and can not be revised by the circuit court, and the statute intended to provide for the revision of questions of law and not questions of discretion. In re Daniel Marsh, 6 Law Rep. 67.

The circuit court will not decide whether a new trial ought to be granted or not, unless all the evidence which was given at the trial and all the circumstances of the whole case are brought before it by a complete report. Ibid.

It has been decided that the following proceedings may be reviewed in this way, to-wit:

Proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy to have a debtor declared a bankrupt, where there is no trial by a jury. Perry v. Langley, 2 B. R. 596; s. c. 8 A. L. Reg. 427; Farrin v. Crawford, 2 B. R. 602; in re Craft, 1 B. R. 378; s. c. 2 B. R. 111; s. c. 6 Blatch. 177; s. c. 2 Ben. 214; Sutherland v. Kellogg, 2 Biss. 405; Thornhill v. Bank, 5 B. R. 367; s. c. 1 Woods, 1; in re Picton, 11 B. R. 420; s. c. 2 Dillon, 548.

Proceedings on the bankrupt's application for a discharge. In re J. M. Reed, 2 B. R. 9; Ruddick v. Billings, 3 B. R. 61; s. c. 1 Wool. 330; Littlefield v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 4 B. R. 257; Coit v. Robinson, 9 B. R. 289; s. c. 19 Wall. 274.

A decision refusing to stay proceedings on a suit in a State court against the bankrupt. In re W. E. Robinson, 2 B. R. 342; s. c. 6 Blatch. 253; s. c. 36 How. Pr. 176; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 18.

Proceedings instituted by an assignee to sell property belonging to the bankrupt's estate. In re John Alexander, 3 B. R. 29; s. c. Chase, 295; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 81; Markson v. Heaney, 1 Dillon, 511, note.

Proceedings on a summary petition filed in the cause in bankruptcy to recover property held contrary to the bankruptcy act. Bill v. Beckwith, 2 B. R. 241; in re Kerosene Oil Co., 3 B. R. 125; s. c. 6 Blatch. 521. Froceedings upon a petition for release from arrest. In re J. H. Kim

ball, 2 B. R. 354; s. c. 6 Blatch. 292; s. c. 2 Ben. 554. Proceedings for the purpose of ascertaining and liquidating liens. In re York & Hoover, 4 B. R. 479; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 503; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 290.

But a decision allowing or disallowing a claim can not be reviewed. In re Place et al., 4 B. R. 541; s. c. 8 Blatch. 302.

When the proceedings in the district court are founded on a bill in equity, they can only be reviewed and revised by an appeal under section 4980, and not by a petition under this section. In re Bonesteel, 3 B. R. 517; s. c. 7 Blatch. 175.

The circuit court will not issue a writ of prohibition to a State court, prohibiting it from entertaining suits instituted by persons who are parties to the proceedings in bankruptcy when such suits do not interfere with the exercise of its own jurisdiction. In re Binninger et al., 3 B. R. 487; s. c. 7 Blatch. 159; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 183.

The circuit court will not, during the pendency of proceedings to review the decree of the district court, direct the marshal to take possession of the property of the bankrupt, nor proceed to ascertain and liquidate the assets. The circuit court can not assume the primary exercise of the summary jurisdiction conferred upon the district court. Clark et al., 3 B. R. 489; s. c. 7 Blatch. 165; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 186.

Proceedings for Review. The only way in which the circuit court can

exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in such cases is by a petition addressed to the circuit court, stating clearly and specifically the point or question decided in the district court, charging that the petitioner is aggrieved thereby, and praying the circuit court to review and reverse the decision of the court below. The adverse party should be duly notified of the pendency and prayer of the petition, and of the day assigned for hearing the same. The circuit court will hear and act upon such petition in chambers or elsewhere. In re J. M. Reed, 2 B. R. 9; Ruddick v. Billings, 3 B. R. 61; s. c. 1 Wool. 330; in re Edward A. Casey, 8 B. R. 71; s. c. 10 Blatch. 376.

The revisory jurisdiction of the circuit court may be exercised by bill as well as by petition. If a regular bill in equity seeks to review the proceedings and decision of the district court, it is a proper proceeding, and ought to be entertained by the circuit court. Marshall v. Knox, 8 B. R. 97; s. c. 16 Wall. 551.

A bill of review may be treated as a petition for review. Hurst v. Teft, 13 B. R. 108; s. c. 12 Blatch. 217.

A notice of appeal is not a proper process for invoking a review of a summary proceeding. In re Edward A. Casey, 8 B. R. 71; s. c. 10 Blatch. 376. A creditor may file a bill to revise an adjudication of bankruptcy rendered upon the petition of another creditor. Sweatt v. Boston R. R. Co., 5 B. R. 234; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 273. Contra, Ala. & Chat. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 7 B. R. 145.

Commissioners appointed by a State court in a proceeding to forfeit the charter of a corporation do not represent the corporation, and have no right or authority to interfere in a proceeding against the corporation. Thornhill v. Bank, 5 B. R. 367; s. c. 1 Woods, 1.

An allegation by the petitioner that he is aggrieved is not sufficient, unless it is also alleged in what the error consists, whether of law or of fact, and the nature of the error should be distinctly stated for the information of the appellate court, and as a matter of notice to the opposite party. Appellate courts, even in appeals, proceed upon the ground that the decree in the subordinate court was correct, and the burden to show error is upon the appellant. Matters of fact, as well as matters of law, may, doubtless, be revised in the circuit court, but it was not the intention of Congress in this form of proceeding to give a party a second trial merely as such, but to secure to him an appellate tribunal for the re-examination and revision of the rulings, orders, and decrees of the district courts, and for the reversal of the same in case they are found to be erroneous. Littlefield v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 4 B. R. 257; Sutherland v. Kellogg, 2 Biss. 405; Samson v. Blake, 6 B. R. 410; s. c. 9 Blatch. 379; in re Edward A. Casey, 8 B. R. 71; s. c. 10 Blatch. 376.

In ordinary cases, it may be sufficient if a statement is made by counsel, under the direction of the judge of the district court, setting forth the order or ruling complained of, and sufficient facts to enable the appellate court to form an opinion upon the point. This, verified by the judge or clerk, would form the basis of the petition or bill in the circuit court. The