are vacated by an allowance of the appeal. Thornhill v. Bank, 5 B. R. 377; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 287.

The object of a citation is to give notice of the removal of the cause, and such notice may be waived by entering a general appearance by counsel. Where an appearance is entered, the objection that notice has not been given is a mere technicality, and the party availing himself of it should, at the first term as he appears, give notice of the motion to dismiss, and that his appearance is entered for that purpose. After the lapse of the term the motion is too late. Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 151; s. c. 3 McLean, 185.

Want of notice of an appeal comes too late after a general appearance. Smith v. Mason, 6 B. R. 1; s. c. 14 Wall. 419; s. c. 5 L. T. B. 7.

No appeal lies unless the decree is final, and a decree which directs an account to be taken of certain rents and profits is not final. Crawford v. Points, 13 How. 11.

A case can not be properly taken to the supreme court until a final decree is entered as between all the parties. Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 151; s. c. 3 McLean, 185.

Where a portion of the evidence has been lost, and is not inserted in the record, the supreme court will decide the case upon what remains. Ibid.

If the circuit court renders a judgment or decree in favor of the party instituting the suit, in a case where it is without jurisdiction, the supreme court will reverse the judgment or decree and remand the cause with directions to dismiss the suit. Stickney v. Wilt, 11 B. R. 97; s. c. 23 Wall. 150.

If the circuit court dismiss a writ of error for want of jurisdiction, a writ of error will not lie from the supreme court to the circuit court. Appellate courts under such circumstances do not determine the questions presented in the bill of exceptions filed in the district court, as those questions have not been re-examined in the circuit court, and the supreme court is not inclined to re-examine any such questions coming up from the district court until they have first been passed upon by the circuit court. Consequently the question whether a writ of error will lie from the supreme court to the circuit court to examine the rulings of the circuit court, in a case removed into that court from the district court, does not arise, as the record shows that the circuit court never passed upon the questions as to the correctness or incorrectness of the rulings of the district court. Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 8 B. R. 145; s. c. 16 Wall. 258.

If the circuit court dismisses a writ of error for want of jurisdiction, a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and a writ of error will not lie. Ibid.

A defendant may appeal, although he has complied with the decree, by executing a deed as he was thereby directed to do. O'Hara v. MacConnell, 93 U. S. 150.

A deed executed after a decree and apart from it, is no bar to an appeal, although it gives the appellee the same right as the decree. Ibid.

If no order, decree or action is had on a petition and answer filed after

the decree, but before the entry of the appeal, they can not be considered on appeal.

Ibid.

ACT OF 1898, CH. 4, § 30. Rules, Forms, and Orders.— (a) All necessary rules, forms, and orders as to procedure and for carrying this Act into force and effect shall be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court of the United States.

ACT OF 1867, § 4990. The general orders in bankruptcy heretofore adopted by the justices of the supreme court, as now existing, may be followed in proceedings under this Title; and the justices may, from time to time, subject to the provisions of this Title, rescind and vary any of those general orders, and may frame, rescind, or vary other general orders for the following purposes:

First. For regulating the practice and procedure of the district courts in bankruptcy, and the forms of petitions, orders, and other proceedings to be used in such courts in all matters under this Title. Second. For regulating the duties of the various officers of such

courts.

Third. For regulating the fees payable and the charges and costs to be allowed,1 with respect to all proceedings in bankruptcy before such courts, not exceeding the rate of fees now allowed by law for similar services in other proceedings.

Fourth. For regulating the practice and procedure upon appeals. Fifth. For regulating the filing, custody and inspection of records. Sixth. And generally for carrying the provisions of this Title into effect.

All such general orders shall from time to time be reported to Congress, with such suggestions as the justices may think proper.

And said justices shall have power under said sections, by general regulations, to simplify, and so far as in their judgment will conduce to the benefit of creditors, to consolidate the duties of the register, assignee, marshal, and clerk, and to reduce fees, costs, and charges, to the end that prolixity, delay, and unnecessary expense may be avoided.

Statute revised March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 10, 14 Stat. 521. Prior Statute August 19, 1841. ch. 9, § 6, 5 Stat. 445.

Practice in Bankruptcy.- A court of bankruptcy is sui generis in its nature, and its practice is controlled by the laws which created it, aided

1 So amended by act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 18, 18 Stat. 184.

by such light as may be thrown upon them by the reported decisions under similar statutes. In re Strauss, 2 B. R. 48; in re Julius L. Adams, 2 B. R. 95; s. c. 36 How. Pr. 51; s. c. 2 Ben. 503.

Proceedings in the bankruptcy case proper are regarded as proceedings in equity, and are to be governed by the rules and analogies of equity jurisprudence. In re Schuyler, 2 B. R. 549; s. c. 3 Ben. 200; s. c. 2 L. T. B.

85.

The justices of the supreme court are required, subject to the provisions of the act, to frame general orders for carrying the provisions of the act into effect, but they are not authorized to extend their operation beyond the limits prescribed by the act itself. In re L. Glaser, 1 B. R. 336; s. c. 2 Ben. 180; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 57.

This section does not confer on the justices the power to create or cause to be created a new office and to confer upon such officer powers which by the letter of the act are expressly conferred upon officers created thereby. In re Philip Rein, 49 How. Pr. 301.

Establishment of Fees. The justices can not allow larger fees than those now given for similar services in other proceedings. In re John W. Dean, 1 B. R. 249; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 9; in re J. H. Robinson, 1 B. R. 285; s. c. 2 Ben. 145; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 25.

The power of the justices of the supreme court to prescribe fees, commissions, charges, and allowances for the officers, agents, marshals, messengers, assignees, and registers in cases of bankruptcy is plenary, with the limitation that the fees can not exceed the rate allowed by law at the time of the enactment of the revised statutes for similar service in other proceedings. In re Johnson & Hall, 12 B. R. 345.

The supreme court can not regulate the reasonable compensation to be allowed to the assignee for his services. In re Colwell, 15 B. R. 92.

ACT OF 1898, CH. 1, § 1. Commencement of Proceedings.- (10) "Date of bankruptcy," or "time of bankruptcy," or "commencement of proceedings," or "bankruptcy," with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition was filed.

ACT OF 1867, § 4991. The filing of the petition for an adjudication in bankruptcy, either by a debtor in his own behalf, or by any creditor against a debtor, shall be deemed to be the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy.

Statute revised March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 38, 14 Stat. 535.

The order referred to in this provision must mean the order adjudicating the debtor a bankrupt. In re Patterson, 1 B. R. 125; s. c. 1 Ben. 508. The filing of the petition is the commencement of the proceedings. The deposit of $50 to secure the register's fees, is merely an act preliminary to the issue of the warrant. In re C. H. Preston, 6 B. R. 545.

The proceedings in bankruptcy are not commenced until the petition is actually filed, although it was previously made, signed, and verified.

Wells v. Brackett, 30 Me. 61; in re Hill & Van Valkenberg, 5 Law Rep. 326.

Where the petition in involuntary bankruptcy is presented to the judge, and the orders signed by him on one day, but are not actually deposited in the clerk's office until the following day, when the papers are marked as filed upon the preceding day, it will be deemed to have been filed on such preceding day. Frank v. Houston, 9 Kans. 406.

It is not the filing of every petition that is deemed the commencement of proceedings, but the filing of a petition upon which an order of adjudication may be made by the court. In re Davis Rogers, 10 B. R. 444; s. c. 1 Cent. L. J. 470.

The filing of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy, unsupported by any proof of the act of bankruptcy or of the creditor's claim, does not constitute the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy. Ibid.

§4992. The proceedings in all cases of bankruptcy shall be deemed matters of record, but the same shall not be required to be recorded at large, but shall be carefully filed, kept, and numbered in the office of the clerk of the court, and a docket only, or short memorandum thereof, kept in books to be provided for that purpose, which shall be open to public inspection. Copies of such records, duly certified under the seal of the court, shall in all cases be presumptive evidence of the facts stated therein.

Statute revised March 2, 1867, ch, 176, § 38, 14 Stat. 535. Prior Statutes April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 51, 2 Stat. 34; Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 13,

5 Stat. 448.

A copy of an order of adjudication certified to by a register is not properly authenticated, and is not admissible as evidence in a collateral action. Adams v. Wait, 42 Vt. 16.

A copy of the record is only prima facie and not conclusive evidence of a fact, and may be contradicted by parol or any other competent testimony. Fehley v. Barr, 66 Penn. 196; Rugan v. West, 1 Binn. 263; Blythe v. Johns, 5 Binn. 247. Vide Wood v. Grundy, 3 H. & J. 13; Barney v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 182.

The original papers in proceedings in bankruptcy are admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the declarations of the bankrupt. Clayton v. Siebert, Brewst. 176.

The certificate may be made by the clerk of the court. Clayton v. Hamilton. 37 Tex. 269.

Where all the papers given in evidence during the trial of the cause, except depositions, are sent out with the jury, the record of the proceedings in bankruptcy may be sent out, although it contains depositions, for the record can not be divided. Shomo v. Zeigler, 78 Penn. 357.

A duly certified copy of the inventory is competent evidence against the bankrupt, without the production of the entire record. Dupuy v. Harris, 6 B. Mon. 534.

The transcript of the proceedings in bankruptcy, under the seal of the district court and attested by the clerk, and accompanied by a certificate of the district judge that the attestation is in due form, is admissible as evidence in the courts of another State. Redman v. Gould, 7 Blackf. 361. A copy of the docket entries is competent evidence, for the short memorandum is the recording required by the statute, and, consequently, is the documentary evidence of the proceedings. Berghaus v. Alter, 5 Penn. 507. A copy of the record which purports to give a full record of everything which had transpired in the court up to its date, is admissible in evidence, although the proceedings are not finished, where the only object of the record is to prove the time of the filing of the petition. State v. Rollins, 13 Mo. 179.

If a fraudulent vendee sells the goods to a third person, his subsequent petition and adjudication are not competent evidence against such purchaser. Haskins v. Warren, 115 Mass. 514.

The record of the proceedings in bankruptcy, attested by the clerk of the district court, without any certificate of the presiding judge, is sufficient. Murray v. Marsh, 2 Hay (N. C.), 290.

In actions depending upon the bankruptcy of a stranger, there must be proof of the proceedings in bankruptcy, the act of bankruptcy, and the petitioning creditor's debt. Waterman v. Robinson, 5 Mass. 303; Belden v. Edwards, 2 Day, 246; Farrington v. Farrington, 4 Mass. 237.

The proceedings in bankruptcy do not constitute an integral record, but a copy of any portion thereof, duly authenticated as a separate record, is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Michener v. Payson, 13 B. R. 49; s. c. 8 C. L. N. 17; s. c. 2 W. N. 339.

A copy of part of the record is not competent evidence against a person who was not a party to the record. Wilson v. Harper, 5 Rich. (N. S.) 294. To prove an order in a particular proceeding in a bankruptcy case, it is not necessary to produce the whole record of that case, but only the whole record of that particular proceeding. Payson v. Brooke, 1 W. N. 89.

A copy of a bankrupt's schedule containing an admission of his liability on a note is not competent evidence against a joint obligor. Wilson v. Harper, 5 Rich. (N. S.) 294.

To establish the bankruptcy of the debtor, the production of the proceedings against him as a bankrupt is not alone sufficient. Proof of his being a trader, of the act of bankruptcy, and of the petitioning creditor's debt is also necessary. Hart v. Strode, 2 A. K. Marsh. 115; Den v. Wright, Pet. C. C. 64.

When an adjudication of bankruptcy is proved, the party who alleges that the proceedings have been dismissed, must prove the time of dismissal. Wills v. Claflin, 13 B. R. 437; s. c. 92 U'. S. 135.

If several papers are attached to the clerk's certificate by ordinary tape, without any mark by which their identity can be established, the transcript is not admissible. Pike v. Crehore, 40 Me. 503.

ACT OF 1898, CH. 5, § 33. Creation of Two Offices. (a) The offices of referee and trustee are hereby created.