The filing of a petition in bankruptcy is an attempt to sell within the meaning of a clause giving the mortgagee the right to take possession in case of an attempt to sell. Moore v. Young, 4 Biss. 128.

If a deed is dated prior to the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, the bare fact that the acknowledgment is dated after that time is not sufficient to defeat the grantee's title. The deed vested the legal title in the grantee at the time of its delivery. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption of law is that it was delivered on the day of its date, and the subsequent date of the certificate of acknowledgment can not overcome this presumption. Hardin v. Osborne, 60 Ill. 93.

A deed of the bankrupt without any certificate of acknowledgment is good against the assignee, for he is a grantee with full notice, and takes no greater interest or right than the bankrupt had. In re Kansas City Manuf. Co., 9 B. R. 76.

The doctrine that ratification relates back to the inception of the transactions and renders the ratified act the same as if it had been originally authorized by the principal, is a fiction of the law, for the act of one can not be made the act of another; but by relation the law gives to the act of one the effect of an act of another. The law, however, will not feign a fiction to do a wrong, to make valid an invalid act, or to defeat the rights of others. Hence this doctrine can not be extended to the prejudice of strangers to the transaction. The act of ratification, in order to have a retroactive effect, must take place at a time and under circumstances when the ratifying party may himself lawfully do the act which he ratifies. The validity of an unauthorized deed of a corporation must be determined according to the circumstances which exist at the time when it is ratified. Ibid.

Where a party purchased from the bankrupt a part of certain bonds to which the latter was entitled upon complying with certain conditions, he obtained a right that may be enforced against the assignee if the conditions were performed, although the bonds were not separated from the others if they were all alike. Hamilton v. National Loan Bank, 3 Dillon, 230.

If the bankrupt proved and filed his claim in the probate court and then transferred it, the dividends should be paid to the assignee, and not to the transferee, irrespective of any question of fraud on the bankruptcy law. Miller v. Parker, 47 Ala. 312.

If a deed of trust to secure the payment of a note contains a power authorizing the creditor, his agent, attorney or assignee, to sell the property in default of payment of the note, the assignee of the creditor may sell under the power, and his deed will convey a legal estate. Wood v. Boyd, 28 Ark. 75.

A claim for compensation for the destruction of a vessel by a Confederate cruiser, equipped and sent out in England through the negligence of the British Government, is susceptible of a transfer that may be sustained in equity. Williamson v. Colcord, 13 B. R. 319.

A mere agreement to give what may be realized from a claim is a promissory arrangement, and does not constitute a complete and perfect gift. Ibid.

An agreement by a guardian to discharge one mortgage and take a new one, although he transcends his power in making it, is not absolutely void but is voidable only at the election of the infant on coming of age, and until so avoided, is valid as against the assignee of the mortgagor. Burdick v. Jackson, 15 B. R. 318; s. c. 14 N. Y. Supr. 488.

If the bankrupt, being the holder of a mortgage pledged to secure a loan, and then for a valuable consideration promised the mortgagor to redeem and cancel it, the assignee, if he redeems it, may enforce it. McLean v. Cadwallader, 15 B. R. 383; s. c. 34 Leg. Int. 140.

If an attorney institutes a suit under an agreement with the bankrupt for a certain portion of what may be recovered, he is entitled to that share although the recovery took place after the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Maybin v. Raymond, 15 B. R. 353; 4 A. L. T. (N. S.) 21.

Where goods are obtained through a misrepresentation by a firm composed of three members, a return of the goods or their proceeds to the creditor will be valid as against the assignee of two of the partners, if they have not lost their identity so as to form a part of the property of the bankrupts. Montgomery v. Bucyrus Machine Co., 14 B. R. 193; s. c. 92 U. S. 257.

The creditor who holds collaterals as securities need not sell them at public auction, but may sell them at the stock exchange or brokers' board. Sparhawk v. Drexel, 12 B. R. 450.

Where an insolvent debtor acquiesces in a sale of securities, the assignee is bound by his acquiescence, although the securities are sacrificed. Ibid.

A creditor who is vested with the power to sell securities holds it in trust for the debtor's benefit as well as his own, and can not sacrifice the securities. Ibid.

A voluntary agreement between certain persons to which the debtor is in no wise a party, to make a contribution to him, does not create an indebtedness to him. In re Oregon B. Printing Co., 13 B. R. 503; s. c. 11 Pac. L. R. 233; s. c. 3 Cent. L. J. 515.

An order passed in proceedings supplemental to an execution restraining a bank from paying money to the bankrupt is no defense to any action brought by an assignee subsequently appointed in proceedings instituted before that time. Morris v. First Nat'l. Bank, 15 B. R. 281.

Title Subject to Equities. The assignee takes the property of the bankrupt, subject to all legal and equitable claims of others. He is affected by all the equities which can be urged against the bankrupt. Cook v. Tullis, 9 B. R. 433; s. c. 18 Wall. 332; Kelly v. Scott, 49 N. Y. 595; Parker v. Muggridge, 2 Story, 334; Fletcher v. Morey, 2 Story, 555; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Winsor v. McLellan, 2 Story, 492; Talcott v. Dudley, 5 Ill. 427.

If the bank is estopped, his assignee is also estopped. Kelly v. Scott, 49

N. Y. 595; Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. McKay & Aldus, 3 B. R. 50; s. c. Lowell, 345; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 133.

When the bankrupt has contracted to manufacture an engine, and on the representation that it had been finished and delivered to a company for transportation to the purchaser, has obtained payment therefor, but the engine in fact was not finished or delivered for transportation, remaining in the possession of the bankrupt, and being designated as belonging to the purchaser, it belongs to the purchaser, and not to the assignee. The bankrupt and the assignee are estopped to say that the engine was not set apart, or that it was not in esse when the representations were made. Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. McKay & Aldus, 3 B. R. 50; s. c. Lowell, 345; s. c. 1 L. T. B. 133.

If the resolution of the directors of the bankrupt corporation approving of a deed of trust previously executed by its officers, and purporting to be passed by a proper quorum, was shown to the creditor before he discounted the note thus secured, the assignee is estopped from proving that it is untrue, and that a quorum was not present. In re Kansas City Manuf. Co., 9 B. R. 76.

An agreement to sign a bond to a person to indemnify him for his liability in becoming surety for the bankrupt confers a right to an assignment which may be enforced in a court of equity and binds the assignee. Tucker v. Daly, 7 Gratt. 330.

If a bill of sale is recorded in the clerk's office at one place, upon a representation by the bankrupt that he resided there, it will bind the assignee although the bankrupt actually resided in another place. Allen v. Whittemore, 14 B. R. 189.

Rights under Statutes. The assignee has no larger interests in regard to usurious contracts than the bankrupt had, although they are void in law. Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 4 B. R. 601; s. c. 9 B. R. 245; s. c. 1 Dillon, 14; s. c. 18 Wall. 376.

The assignee has no power to institute proceedings for the recovery of a statutory forfeiture claimed by the bankrupt, either prior or subsequent to proceedings against him in bankruptcy. The power to institute proceedings for a forfeiture under the laws of Wisconsin against usury, is a privilege conferred upon the borrower alone, and the assignee is not the borrower in the sense of the law, but a purchaser. Bromley v. Smith, 5 B. R. 152; s. c. 2 Biss. 511.

Section 5198 only forfeits the interest for usury, but does not affect the principal. First Nat'l. Bank of Mount Joy v. Wilson, 72 Penn. 13.

Mere accommodation paper can have no effective or legal existence until it is transferred to a bona fide holder. The discounting of such paper at a higher rate of interest than the law allows is usurious, and not defensible as a purchase of the paper. Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst., 4 B. R. 601; s. c. 9 B. R. 245; s. c. 1 Dillon, 14; s. c. 18 Wall. 376.

If a party purchase a negotiable note at a discount greater than the legal rate of interest from a broker in the usual course of business, and without any notice that the broker is acting for the maker, the assignee

of the maker can not recover the excess above the legal rate of Interest as usury. Sparhawk v. Cochran, 30 Leg. Int. 232.

Where the right to recover usurious interest is a redress for a personal wrong, it does not pass to the assignee. Nichols v. Bellows, 22 Vt. 581. Where the statute gives to the party paying usurious interest the right to recover it back, that right passes to the assignee. Moore v. Jones, 23 Vt. 739; Wheelock v. Lee, 10 B. R. 363; s. c. 64 N. Y. 242.

The assignee has all the rights and powers which are given to the whole body of creditors, or to the whole of any one class of creditors whether at law or in equity. Wilkins v. Davis, 15 B. R. 60.

An assignee of a general partner may maintain an action to recover a division of profits made to a special partner in reduction of the capital. Ibid.

The assignee of a bankrupt corporation can not maintain an action to enforce the collateral liability of the stockholders for the debts of the corporation. Dutcher v. Marine Nat'l. Bank, 11 B. R. 457; s. c. 12 Blatch.

435.

An assignee can not under the laws of New York recover money paid by an insolvent bank in the usual and ordinary course of its business to a creditor who was ignorant of its insolvency. Dutcher v. Importers' & Traders' Nat. Bank, 59 N. Y. 5; s. c. 1 N. Y. Supr. 400.

The Property of the Bankrupt's Wife and Children.- Marriage is a qualified gift to the husband of the wife's choses in action, upon condition that he reduces them to possession during its continuance. The assignment in bankruptcy vests in the assignee all the rights of the husband of the choses in action of the wife, and, as a consequence, the assignee may do all that the husband could do prior to the assignment, and this embraces the right to sue for, recover and receive them. It makes no difference in regard to the rights of the assignee, whether the choses in action have or have not been placed upon the schedules by the bankrupt. In re Boyd, 5 B. R. 199; Butler v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 8 Ala. 146.

The husband's interest in his wife's choses in action is not ownership but power, and does not pass to his assignee. If they have not been reduced to possession by him at the time of the bankruptcy, they do not pass to the assignee. Wickham v. Valle, 11 B. R. 83.

If the distributive share of the bankrupt's wife in her father's estate remains in the hands of the administrator or executor at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, it does not pass to the assignee. Shaw v. Mitchell, 2 Ware, 220; Shay v. Sessaman, 10 Penn. 432; Wickham v. Valle, 11 B. R. 83.

The wife's distributive share will not vest in the assignee, although the husband is administrator, for he holds the property in his representative and not in his personal character. Shaw v. Mitchell, 2 Ware, 220.

A conveyance by the bankrupt to his wife of his interest in her choses in action is inoperative and void, and they pass to the assignee. Butler v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 8 Ala. 146.

PROPERTY OF BANKRUPT'S WIFE AND CHILDREN.

355

If the bankrupt's wife has no other means of support, she may be allowed a portion of the income derived from real estate owned by her. In re Ernst Brandt, 5 Biss. 217.

If the husband at the time of joining with his wife in a mortgage on her real estate, received a sum of money equal to the value of his estate by courtesy, the assignee will not be entitled to any part of the residue on a sale under the mortgage. Shippen's Appeal, 15 B. R. 553.

If the wife, without the knowledge of her husband, takes a note payable to her husband or bearer for a debt due to her before marriage, and the husband asserts no title to it or authority over it, but allows her to keep possession of it and collect the interest, she is entitled to it as against the assignee. In re George W. Snow, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 264; s. c. 5 Law Rep. 369.

A possibility which is held under a will by the bankrupt's wife, and made dependent upon her surviving another legatee, does not pass to the assignee. Krumbaar v. Burt, 2 Wash. C. C. 406.

Articles of jewelry given to the wife previous to marriage, and continuing in her use since, do not pass to the assignee. In re Edward H. Ludlow, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 322; in re Chester S. Kasson, 4 Law Rep. 489. Gifts from the husband to the wife of personal ornaments or attire, compatible in value and character with his circumstances at the time, are her sole property as paraphernalia, and do not pass to the assignee. In re Edward H. Ludlow, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 322; in re Chester S. Kasson, 4 Law Rep. 489. Contra, in re Benjamin B. Grant, 2 Story, 312.

Mourning rings given to the bankrupt's wife since her marriage are from their very nature and character purely personal and for her sole and separate use, and do not pass to the assignee. In re Benjamin B. Grant, 2 Story, 312.

The legal title to an insurance policy on the life of the bankrupt for the benefit of his wife, belongs to the wife, and, if he is solvent when the premiums are paid, the policy can not be assigned by him. In re Bear & Steinberg, 11 B. R. 46; s. c. 1 Cent. L. J. 607.

If the husband pays premiums on a policy upon his life for the benefit of his wife after he becomes insolvent, the assignee may recover from the wife the amount so advanced, with interest, to be taken out of the policy when that shall be paid. Ibid.

Gifts made by a bankrupt to his children which were proper and suitable to him in his circumstances and condition, may be retained by them. In re Benjamin B. Grant, 2 Story, 312.

The children of the bankrupt may retain watches given to them by persons other than their parents. Ibid.

If the bankrupt, when insolvent, paid only part of the money to purchase a watch for his child, the assignee is only entitled to the amount so paid. Ibid.

Where the bankrupt has, in good faith, made an agreement with his minor children that they shall have a certain share of their earnings, and such share has always been kept by them in their own name, separate