Under the repealed aw, a refusal by the register to proceed further with the examination of the debtor without payment of his fees or security, full opportunity having been given to make such payment or deposit security before closing the examination, affords no ground upon which a creditor can base an opposition to the recording of composition. In re Tifft, 18 B. R. 227.

As this section is a part of a general system of statutory regulation, it must be read and applied in connection with every other section appertaining to the same features of the general system, so that each and every other section of the act may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency. New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 13 B. R. 385; s. c. 10 B. R. 355; s. c. 64 Barb. 435; s. c. 53 N. Y. 123; s. c. 91 U. S. 656.

The provision in regard to debts proved must be construed in connection with the clause of section 5117. So much of this section as imposes a penalty for proving a debt, can not be construed as applying to a debt which, by section 5117, is not dischargeable. Such a debt is not surrendered or discharged by proof thereof. In re W. E. Robinson, 2 B. R. 342; s. c. 6 Blatch. 253; s. c. 36 How. Pr. 176; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 18; in re M. Rosenberg, 2 B. R. 236; s. c. 3 Ben. 14; in re J. S. Wright, 2 B. R. 142; s. c. 36 How. Pr. 167; s. c. 2 Ben. 509; in re Migel, 2 B. R. 481.

The proof of the debt does not extinguish, but simply suspends the right of action. Hoyt v. Freel, 4 B. R. 131; s. c. 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 220; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 144; Smith v. Dispatch Co., 37 N. J. 60; Hamlin v. Hamlin, 3 Jones Eq. 191; Haxtun v. Corse, 4 Edw. Ch. 585; s. c. 2 Barb. Ch. 506; Brandon Manuf. Co. v. Frazer, 13 B. R. 362; s. c. 47 Vt. 88; Cook v. Coyle, 113 Mass. 252. Contra, Bennett v. Goldthwaite, 109 Mass. 494; Commercial Bank v. Buckner, 20 How. 108; Pray v. Torr, 18 N. H. 188.

The proof of a claim only prevents future proceedings against the bankrupt or his estate. Ansonia B. & C. Co. v. Babbitt, 15 N. Y. Supr. 157. Creditors who have proved their claims are temporarily barred from pursuing their claims against the bankrupt in any other forum. By submitting themselves to the jurisdiction, and becoming parties to the proceedings, they preclude themselves from proceeding against the bankrupt in any other manner, without the leave of the court which has acquired jurisdiction of their claims. They must await the result of the bankrupt's application for his discharge. If it is refused, they are then free to pursue their claims by other means and in other tribunals. If the bankrupt unreasonably delays his application for a discharge, or is guilty of laches in his efforts to bring it to a conclusion, the creditor who has proved his debt is still incapable of proceeding elsewhere, without the permission of the court of bankruptcy. In such a case he must expedite the proceedings in bankruptcy or obtain leave of the bankruptcy court to proceed to collect his debt by due course of law. Dingee v. Becker, 9 B. R. 508; s. c. 9 Phila. 196.

If a judgment creditor who has proved his debt issues a fi. fa. on his judgment, without first obtaining leave of the bankruptcy court, the fi. fa.

will be set aside. Dingee v. Becker, 9 B. R. 508; s. c. 9 Phila. 196; Frazier v. Banks, 11 La. An. 31.

If a creditor proves his claim and receives a dividend, a fi. fa. on a judgment subsequently obtained may be set aside if the proceedings in bankruptcy are still pending. Beckler v. Hambrecht, 2 W. N. 353.

If a creditor proves his debt, he can not institute an action in a State court while there are funds in the hands of the assignee and before the bankrupt has applied for a discharge. Wood v. Hazen, 15 B. R. 491.

If a creditor, who has proved his debt, proceeds subsequently in the State court to obtain an arrest of the debtor, the proceeding may be stayed without affecting the arrest or releasing the bankrupt therefrom. In re Isidor Goldstein, 52 How. Pr. 426.

The act of the creditor in proving his debt can not be pleaded in bar of a subsequent action to enforce the claim. Smith v. Dispatch Co., 37 N. J. 60; Buckner v. Calcote, 28 Miss. 432. Contra, Wilson v. Capuro, 4 B, R. 714; s. c. 41 Cal. 545.

The proof of a debt against a corporation does not bar a subsequent action thereon in a State court. Ansonia Co. v. New Lamp Chimney Co., 10 B. R. 355; s. c. 13 B. R. 385; s. c. 64 Barb. 435; s. c. 53 N. Y. 123; s. c. 91 U. S. 656; Chamberlain v. Huguenot Manuf. Co., 118 Mass. 532.

The power of the State courts to proceed with pending suits in cases where creditors have provable debts, but which they do not prove under the proceedings in bankruptcy, is, under certain prescribed limitations, recognized by the bankruptcy act. The jurisdiction of the State courts is not extinguished except in those cases where a creditor proves his debt. Actions pending therein, which were brought by creditors who do not prove their debts, are under the authority of the State courts. They have jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matters, and must determine all questions as they arise, according to law, subject to the final judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, in case any right or claim is set up under any statute of the United States, and such right or claim is denied by the State tribunals. In no other way can their decisions be reversed or revised. The district court has no control over such suits. Samson v. Burton, 4 B. R. 1; s. c. 5 Ben. 325.

There is a distinction between persons and corporations and members thereof, because no discharge can be granted to any corporation or jointstock company, or any person or officer or other member thereof. The proof of a debt, therefore, does not, per se, prevent the continuance of an action against it. The effect of granting a stay upon an action against a corporation before execution returned, or setting aside an execution issued thereon, the stockholders of which are personally responsible, would be to discharge "a person or officer or member thereof," where such liability must be predicated of a judgment and execution returned unsatisfied, and thus indirectly accomplish what the bankruptcy act declares shall not be attained. Allen v. Soldiers' Business Messenger & Dispatch Co.. 4 B. R. 537; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 158; Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371; Ansonia Co. v. New Lamp Chimney Co., 10 B. R. 355; s. c. 13 B. R. 385; s. c. 64 Barb. 435; s. c. 53 N. Y. 123; s. c. 91 U. S. 656.

The proof of the debt against the corporation does not bar an action against a stockholder upon his contingent liability. Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371; Allen v. Ward, 36 N. Y. Supr. 296.

The proof of the debt against the corporation is partially equivalent to the commencement and prosecution of an action, and a proximate compliance with such a condition imposed by statute to the liability of the stockholder, if not a substitute for a literal compliance with such condition. Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371.

When a firm has proved their debt, the resident members may be restrained from further prosecution of a suit in a foreign country. In re Schepeler & Co., 4 Ben. 68.

The court may allow a proof of a debt provisionally, and authorize the continuance of a pending suit for the purpose of liquidation, although the question involved is whether the bankrupt is liable at all upon the contract alleged to have been broken. In re Jay Cooke & Co., 1 W. N. 30.

ACT OF 1867, § 5106. (See ante, Act of 1898, ch. 3, § 11, p. 628.) -No creditor whose debt is provable shall be allowed to prosecute to final judgment any suit at law or in equity therefor against the bankrupt, until the question of the debtor's discharge shall have been determined; and any such suit or proceedings shall, upon the application of the bankrupt, be stayed to await the determination of the court in bankruptcy on the question of the discharge, provided there is no unreasonable delay on the part of the bankrupt in endeavoring to obtain his discharge, and provided, also, that if the amount due the creditor is in dispute, the suit, by leave of the court in bankruptcy, may proceed to judgment for the purpose of ascertaining the amount due, which amount may be proved in bankruptcy, but execution shall be stayed.

Statute revised

- March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 21, 14 Stat. 526.

The object of this section is to prevent a race of diligence between creditors, and to prevent the bankrupt from being harassed with suits while he is proceeding in good faith to obtain his discharge, and until the question of his discharge is determined, and he either obtains it or is refused it. It applies to all cases where the personal liability of the debtor is sought to be fixed or ascertained by a final judgment, pending the determination of the question of his discharge. In re M. Rosenberg, 2 B. R. 236; s. c. 3 Ben. 14; in re Metcalf & Duncan, 1 B. R. 201; s. c. 2 Ben. 78.

An action to recover a provable debt is to be stayed until a determination is had as to the discharge, whether the debt be one that will be discharged or one that will not be discharged. There is no good reason why the bankruptcy court should enter into the inquiry whether a discharge will operate to discharge any particular debt. The inquiry is one properly to be made only by the court in which a direct suit on the debt is pending,

and whose determination will be a binding judgment on the question between the parties. In re M. Rosenberg, 2 B. R. 236; s. c. 3 Ben. 14; in re Migel, 2 B. R. 481; in re Seymour, 1 B. R. 29; s. c. 1 Ben. 348; in re W. B. Duncan, 14 B. R. 18; in re Henry Schwarz, 15 B. R. 330; s. c. 52 How. Pr. 513.

Whether a discharge will release a particular debt is a question that can only be determined properly when the discharge is pleaded in an action brought to enforce it. The attempt to determine in advance what the effect will be, when as yet it is not known whether any discharge will be granted, is premature and unnecessary. The act does not in terms prohibit the commencement of a suit to enforce a provable debt. Whenever it appears that the suit is one to which a discharge would be no bar, and that, if not commenced forthwith, the statute of limitations might run against it, or that service might not be obtained upon the bankrupt, or that testimony might be lost, the court may permit the suit to commence for the purpose of saving the statute, effecting a service, or securing testimony. When these objects are attained, the suit can be stayed to await the determination of the question of the debtor's discharge, or the expiration of a reasonable time therefor. But in order to obtain such permission, the creditor must show special reasons; and leave to prosecute will be granted only so far as may be absolutely necessary to secure his rights. In re Ghiradelli & Co., 4 B. R. 164; s. c. 1 Saw. 343; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 135.

When a creditor applies for leave to institute suit against the bankrupt, the court will direct personal service of notice of the application on the bankrupt. In re George R. Magee, 1 W. N. 21.

Where there is an unreasonable delay in obtaining a discharge, the court may allow a creditor to institute a suit against the bankrupt, provided that no execution is levied upon any property which belonged to the bankrupt at the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. In re Chester M. Whiting, 1 W. N. 30; in re Samuel S. Scott, 1 W. N. 30. The granting of leave to institute a suit by the bankruptcy court is conclusive evidence in a State court that the bankrupt has lost his immunity from suit by misconduct or delay. Williams v. Whiting, 1 W. N. 94.

The provisions of this section and the preceding section are addressed quite as much to the State courts as to the bankruptcy tribunals, and are to be applied and enforced by the former quite as much as by the latter. In re M. Rosenberg, 2 B. R. 236; s. c. 3 Ben. 14; in re Metcalf & Duncan, 1 B. R. 201; s. c. 2 Ben. 78; Samson v. Burton, 4 B. R. 1; s. c. 5 Ben. 325; Delavergne v. Farrard, 1 Mich. N. P. 90; Nat'l. Bank v. Taylor, 120 Mass. 124. Contra, Garrett v. Carow, 3 Houst. 352; Givens v. Robbins, 5 Ala. 676.

The discharge when granted relates back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and protects all the subsequent acquisitions from coercive appropriation to the satisfaction of antecedent debts. The State courts may, therefore, grant an injunction to protect the bankrupt's property until he can obtain a discharge. Turner v. Gatewood, 8 B. Mon. 613; Mosby v. Steele, 7 Ala. 299.

If a creditor obtains a judgment after the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, the bankrupt may obtain an injunction restraining proceedings under an execution issued thereon until the question in relation to a discharge is determined. Keating v. Arthur, 27 La. An. 570. In cases of voluntary bankruptcy, an application for a stay may be made as soon as the petition is filed; but no application can be made in cases of involuntary bankruptcy until the order of adjudication is passed. Maxwell v. Faxton, 4 B. R. 210; s. c. 18 Pitts. L. J. 107. Contra, in re Bromley & Co., 3 B. R. 686.

The objects and purposes of this section are: 1st. That the already acquired property of the bankrupt shall not be subjected to the payment of his debts by means of a judgment recovered after the filing of the petition, or of proceedings had on such judgment. 2d. That the bankrupt shall not be needlessly subjected to actions and suits. 3d. And, perhaps, to enable the bankrupt to claim protection as against such actions and suits through his discharge, if he obtains it. These are the only purposes and objects which the provisions for a stay can, by any possibility, be supposed designed to carry out. But such provisions must be construed in connection with the clause in section 5117, which provides that "no discharge granted under this act shall release, discharge, or affect any person liable for the same debt for or with the bankrupt, either as partner, joint contractor, indorser, surety, or otherwise." Since it is necessary, in cases of partners and joint contractors, that an action shall be brought against all the partners and all the joint contractors, to proceed against them all, and that the judgment to be rendered shall be a joint judgment against all, unless one or more of them shall have died, or been discharged from the obligation of the contract or indebtedness by operation of law, an action against the bankrupt and certain other parties, upon a joint contract made by them, will not be stayed, but may be prosecuted to judgment, and an order entered staying all proceedings against the bankrupt upon the judgment. This course does not interfere with the attainment of the objects sought by the bankruptcy law. Nor will a stay of the proceedings against the other joint defendants be granted, since the filing of the petition in bankruptcy can not have a greater effect than the discharge. Hoyt v. Freel, 4 B. R. 131; s. c. 8 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 220; s. c. 2 L. T. B. 144; Givens v. Robbins, 5 Ala. 676. Contra, Tinkum v. O'Neale, 5 Nev. 93.

If one of two partners become bankrupt while an action for the conversion of property is pending, the suit may be prosecuted against the other partner, although it is stayed as to the bankrupt. Hogendobler v. Lyon, 12 Kans. 276.

Where one partner is bankrupt, the proceedings may be stayed as to him, and a judgment may be entered against the other partner, to be enforced against the partnership property and the property of the solvent partner. Loome v. Kintzing, 1 Mont. 290.

This clause contemplates application by the debtor for a stay under its provision, unless the creditor proves his debt, which operates as a stay, and in strictness he should apply for such a stay. But where he has