ligations to our ancient friend and allyPortugal. The first, to which I shall advert, is that concluded in 1666, at the time of the marriage of Charles the Second with the Infanta of Portugal. The obligations of that treaty, after reciting the delivering of Bombay, Tangier, and other places, some of which still remained, and some not, to the Government to whom they were delivered, it was stated, that, in consideration of those grants, which were of so much benefit to the King of Great Britain, he professed, and declared himself, by and with the consent and advice of his Privy Council, that he would take upon him the defence of Portugal, that he would aid and defend her by sea and by land, with all his power, and in all other manner and respect, even as he would defend England itself. By that treaty it was further conditioned, that, in case of necessity, or any foreign attack, he should send and transport, at his own proper cost and expense, two regiments of horse, of 500 men, and two regiments of foot, of 1000 men each.

There were other various stipula tions, amounting to the same effect, which render it unnecessary for me to go farther into it at present. The next treaty, to which I beg the attention of the House, is that of 1703; it was a tripartite treaty, made between the States-General of Holland, Great Britain, and Portugal: it was also a treaty contemporaneous with the famous commercial treaty of Methuen, whose provisions still continue to be in full force and effect. By the second article of the treaty of 1703, it was conditioned, that if at any time, and whenever it happened, the Kings of Spain or France, or both, or either of them, should make war on Portugal, or give reason to suspect they had jointly or separately any intention to make war on her or her colonial possessions beyond the seas; then it goes on to state, that her Majesty shall use her good offices to persuade those powers not to make war; but, in case those offices should not succeed, the third article states, that provided such interference should not be successful, and that war should actually have been made on Portugal, then the above-named contracting Powers declare, that they shall make war on the Kings of Spain or France, or both or either of them; and that, while hostile arms shall be borne against Portugal,they shall provide twelve thousand men, armed and equipped, and leave them there while their presence may be deemed necessary. From these articles, the House will erceive the nature, if not the extent, of our

ancient obligations to our ally. I am ready to admit, Sir, that either of these treaties might be, by time and circumstances, supposed to have relaxed in their force; or it might be asked, why one party having withdrawn itself from the responsibility, say Holland for instance, the other should be still considered as bound to adhere to it? It might be said, the language of these Treaties was so loose and prodigal, that they could only have originated in good feeling, and that it was out of nature to suppose any one nation would engage to defend another as she would herself. It might be said, there was something so exaggerated in these treaties, as that they were never intended to be carried into effect. But with regard to this very treaty of 1703, even if I stood upon it alone; even though the circumstances of Holland had changed; even if her sentiments had changed; if her obligations were either altered or become obsolete; I need not raise the question whether, the Government and sentiments of England not changing, she is now liable or not to perform her obligation? This is not the time to do so, even if I admitted that such a question could have been raised. The objections, if any, should have been taken at the Congress of Vienna, when the eyes of the whole world were open to our relative situation with Portugal; when we had proclaimed the existence of our ancient treaties of friendship and alliance, so long subsisting with her; and when they were acknowledged to be of full force and effect. That was the time to object, if objection was thought necessary; and it is not so much on the specific articles of the treaties of 1661 and 1703 that we have acted and continue to act, as on the general spirit of all the treaties, admitted and recognized at the Congress of Vienna. I say Portugal has a right to claim the assistance of Great Britain, as an ally, and call upon her to defend the integrity of her territory. This is the state of the case as to our moral and political obligations towards Portugal; and I am not ashamed to say---I have a right to say---that when Portugal, in the apprehension of a coming storm, applied for our assistance; while we had no hesitation in acknowledging our obligation to afford it, if the casus faderis had once arisen; yet I say that we were bound to wait till we ascertained the fact upon sufficient authority. Whether delay or difficulty interposed, it was not as to the existence of an admitted obligation, but as to the knowledge of the fact having actually taken

place, which justified the call for our assistance. In this stage of our proceedings, I beg to answer incidentally to some charge of delay which has been made against his Majesty's Government on this very important subject. But, in few words, I can state to the House, there is not the shadow of foundation for any such charge. It was only on Sunday, the 3d of December, that I received from the Portuguese Ambassador the direct and formal demand of assistance from this country. True, long before that time, rumours were afloat of an unauthorized description---rumours, finding their way from Madrid, where every thing was distorted, through the channels of the French press, where every thing was again disfigured and perverted, to serve party purposes: but, until the 8th of December, we had not received that accurate information on which alone we could found a communication to Parliament. That precise information, on which we could act, only arrived on Friday last. On Saturday, the decision of the Government was taken ---on Sunday we obtained the sanction of his Majesty--on Monday we came down to Parliament---and at this very hour, while I have now the honor of addressing the House, British troops are on their march for Portugal. (Cheers.) I trust, therefore, that we are not in justice to be charged with any unseemly delay; but, on the other hand, while we felt the claim of Portugal to be so clear, our obligation to assist her so binding, and the possible consequences of interference so spreading, it was our duty not to give any credit to hearsay or to rumour; but, while admitting the full force of our obligation, we were bound to have the full knowledge of the facts of the case, before we took a step whose con sequences no man could precisely calculatę. Rumours and reports, as I have just said, were long afloat, of incursions made by Spain upon our Ally; but, then, they reached us through channels upon which no man in his senses would found any grave proceeding. In one case, at Madrid, they were put forth to deceive; in others, to conceal; and, coming through the French newspaper press---these rumours, I say, coming through such sources, were not to be relied on by his Majesty's Government, and we therefore waited for authenticated facts, in order to come before Parliament with what we might call the truth. In former instances, when Parliament was called upon to assist Portugal, the regular and constitutional power of the monarchy was lodged in the breast of the

King---the signification of his wish---the expression of his desire---the putting forward his individual claim for assistance--would have been enough; but when it was stated to me that matters had changed--that the Constitution was modified and altered---it became my duty to inquire--first, whether the Constitution of Portugal authorized the claim; next, if it were competent to the authorities making it to do so, and whether the Chambers had given their sanction to the reception of our troops, such as we were to expect for the troops of an old and faithful ally. We were bound to take care, before a single soldier left England, or set his foot upon the shore of Portugal, that the sanction of the Executive---of all the proper authorities---should be obtained; and I beg leave again to state, with reference to the charge of delay, which has somewhere or other been brought against his Majesty's Ministers, that it was only this morning I received the sanction of the Chambers assembled at Lisbon. So far, then, from any charge of delay being justifiably brought against the Government, I can boldly say, had we proceeded faster, we would have acted precipitately, and every caution was necessary to be used, before we involved this country in proceedings, which might be proved to be unnecessary by the result, or might expose us to the unpleasant reception of our troops in Portugal. The account which I received to-day, of the proceedings of the Chambers at Lisbon, is contained in a dispatch from Sir W. A'Court, dated the 29th of November. It states, that the day after the arrival of the news of the entry of the rebels, Ministers demanded the extension of their executive powers---an augmentation of the troops, and permission to apply for foreign assistThe Deputies assembled, agreed to the demand with acclamation, and a similar spirit operating in the other Chamber, the Members rose in a body from their seats, expressed their readiness to acquiesce in the call, and many of them offered their personal assistance in the cause of their country. The Duke Cadoval, the President, was the first who so declared himself, and the Minister, who described the proceeding to our Ambassador, declared it was a moment worthy of the good days of Portugal. (Hear, hear.) So far the House will see we have a reasonable guarantee for the good reception of our troops; and then, the next question remaining for our consideration is, has the casus fæderis arrived? Bands of Portuguese, armed and equipped by Spain, made hostile incursions

ance.

into Portugal at several points; and what was remarkable in this case is, that the attack on Portugal is not the ground on which the application for British assistance has been complied with. The attack in the South of Portugal was stated in the French papers; but that on Tras os Montes was only received, authentically, this morning, and those on Villa Viçosa no longer ago than Friday. The intelligence of this new fact is the more satisfactory, as it confirmed the facts which were already known. The irruption upon one point of Portugal might be stated to be made by some corps who had escaped the inspection or the vigilance of the Spanish Government; it might be represented as the effort of some stragglers, acting in defiance of Spain but an attack on the whole line, gives that decided and certain character to the aggression, which cannot be mistaken. Even if a single Spaniard, in arms, had crossed the frontier, the hostile aggression would be undoubted; and here the question is, to consider whether persons, clothed and equipped by Spain, and crossing the frontiers, are, or are not, guilty of an attack or invasion of Portugal---forsooth, because they were not Spanish soldiers, or Spanish mercenaries in the employ of Spain; but Portuguese troops, whom Portugal had nurtured, and who, in return, had brought with them devastation into their native land, and that by means furnished by a foreign enemy? (Hear, hear.) Why, it could be but petty and puerile quibbling to say,

that this was not an invasion, because the agents were originally from Portugal; and that, therefore, their attack was not to be repelled. I said, formerly, in this House, and I repeat it now, that there is no intention, on our part, to interfere with the internal affairs of Portugal, or any other State; and my distinction, I beg to be understood, is between her external and internal affairs. As to discussions on the form of her Government, on the nature of her institutions, or with respect to their adaptation to the happiness of the people, God forbid it ever should be our policy, or our duty, to interfere; but if bands of refugees, armed against the Mother Country, were to be allowed to put off their country for one purpose, and then put it on to answer another, I say, it would be permitting such a laxity in politics, and such a solecism in morality, that we should be indeed held worthy of that reprobation to which we have been subjected; but for the non-permission of which, I think, we are entitled to that commendation, which, I have no

doubt, we shall receive from this House, and all good and honorable men out of it. (Hear, hear.) Here, then, is the whole of my case to lay before Parliament---here is a case of undoubted obligation on our parts, not framed in a corner, nor kept secret, but recorded amongst all the recollections of history, and all the well-known occurrences of our own time. On the other hand, here is a case of foreign aggression, carried on by foreign means, directed to foreign objects; and, putting the fact and obligation together, I say, neither could the King of Great Britain refuse assistance to his ally, nor the Parliament dissent from his Majesty, in giving effect to, and adequately fulfilling, undoubted obligations. On this case, I can safely rest the whole of the question; and I have so put it together, without any reference to collateral circumstances, because my wish is, that the precise ground of our interference should, in the minds of those who now hear me, and of those who are likely to hear of our proceedings, be kept separate and distinct, from collateral grounds, on what I need not now say, whether we would have been bound to interfere or not. I wish to separate the legal gist of the question from all collateral circumstances which might, or might not, constitute a ground of claim for our calling on Parliament, but which might, nevertheless, be found deserving of Parliamentary consideration. I feel, in what I have henceforward to state, that I would not be dealing fairly to Parliament, if I kept back any thing which might throw the greatest possible light upon the real state of the affairs with which we have to grapple. If, however, I had now sat down--if I said no more---I think I have already said enough; but, Sir, when I state to the House that I am willing to rest my case even here, I am sure they will see, that the vote for which I call is a vote of defence for Portugal, and not of war against Spain. As I said before, I beg of Honorable Gentlemen to keep these matters separate and distinct and though, in what I am now going to say, I must bear rather hard on Spain, yet I must say it is most unjustifiable---it is contrary to all notions of good neighbourhood with the Portuguese---it is contrary to all rules of God and man, that Spain should have committed such an aggression upon Portugal. (Hear, hear, hear.) I do not, however, mean to say there is no locus penitentiæ for Spain---no possibility of her making redress---no opportunity of retracing the steps she has taken; all I do say is, it is our duty to fly to the defence

gadoes, it is not to be repelled; and the more so, when such force is employed against a country, having the honor of being the old and faithful Ally of Great Britain? Has such, I ask, been the conduct of Spain? Let the House and the country decide. However, without now entering into the question, whether this be the conduct of Spain, or the Government of Spain; whether it be the work of a Government acting with the usual power, prudence, and foresight of a Government acting for the good of the people, without which it is not fit to be a government; or whether it be the result of secret powers, operated upon by factious people, defying the government in the capital, and disobeying them on the frontiers; this, I say, can make no difference to Portugal, while suffering from such conduct, or to England, who has to avenge the wrongs committed upon her ancient Ally. If the attack come from the Government of Spain, having a power to control it, they must be responsible for its results; and if they have not the power, they should be called upon immediately to assume it. It would be unjust to the Government of Spain to say there is a disposition in its members to entertain an unconquerable hatred to free institutions; but it would be equally unjust not to state the facts fully and fairly as they exist. I am persuaded that there is, in the vast majority of the Spanish people, a decided love of arbitrary power, and that they do feel annoyed at, and exasperated against, the more liberal institutions of their neighbours, so that, whether the Government do, or do not, partake in their sentiments; do, or do not, stimulate their passions; it is certain that this vast majority do not require its orders to excite them to action. It may be fairly and naturally supposed, that a sort of national antipathy has existed, and does exist, between those two nations; that from this antipathy has arisen mutual injuries, mutual cppressions, and mutual complaints, such as no Government could altogether explain or redress; and that in those antipathies have originated the differences, which, in their progress, have been matured. That some Power has been actively employed in moving and increasing those differences, is almost most certain; but I believe that their real origin is to be found in the nature of the Spanish people, rather than in the nature, or in any acts, of the Government itself. But this is the question that is to be developed between Spain and us, and with respect to which, his Majesty's most

gracious Message has been sent to the House of Commons. If the Spanish Government, though participating in the blame, never meant to commit the acts of which Portugal complains in the language of accusation-if it never did embody the deserters from the army of that kingdom-if it never did put arms into the hands of the discontented of her people---if it never did stimulate their discontent until it became rebellion; if, on the contrary, the direct orders of the Government were directly disobeyed--if the treaties were broken, despite of its intentions and commands---then, I say, let us see its repentance for what has been done, and let us measure that repentance by the care it will take to prevent the recurrence of those evils, and of those aggressions---and, then, to this Address I might propose a different reply. But let us remember, that a measure for the defence of Portugal, is not necessarily a measure for carrying on war against Spain. I am about to state some facts which it is material I should state, before I call upon you to decide, as to what course you intend to pursue. When, within a comparatively recent period, a great desertion had taken place of the Portuguese army into Spain, and also desertion of the Spanish army into Portugal, at our advice, the Portuguese Government, refusing to give them shelter, did unquestionably discountenance the desertion of those Spanish soldiers. There existed a treaty between Spain and Portugal, respecting the giving up of deserters, by which Portugal had a right to claim from Spain, that all deserters from her should be forthwith restored to Portugal. I cannot say, if it were in consequence of a resolution of the Portuguese Government, or in consequence of the advice which we conveyed to them---for I believe that both occurrences took place nearly at the same time---that Portugal was content to waive this right, because it saw the difficulties with which it would have to contend, if those deserters were restored, in either placing them on the ground of a dangerous amnesty, or of ordering executions, as numerous as they would be deplorable. From the choice of those evils, Portugal desired to be spared; and, therefore, Portugal told Spain, that if, instead of delivering up those deserters themselves, their arms and their equipments were returned, the officers and the men separated, and both removed from the frontiers into the interior of the kingdom, Portugal would, on her part, be satisfied. A treaty to this effect was then solemnly entered into by Spain, and a promise that