This, he

Mr. BRIGHT took this to be a preparatory step to an extended war. believed, was also the idea of the Honorable Gentleman who just sat down.

Mr. BROUGHAM begged not to be misunderstood. He thought he had expressed himself with sufficient clearness to have made the House aware that he looked upon this as a preventive of war.

Mr. BRIGHT, in continuation----The question, however, seemed really to him to be, whether the House were prepared for war or not. He had read the clause in the treaty of 1705, which, it was considered, bound England to protect Portugal. That clause provided, that in case Spain should attack Portugal with an overwhelming force, we should make war against Spain with all our might. Now, here we are doing too much or too little. If there were really an aggression on the part of Spain, we were not doing enough; if there were no such aggression, we were doing too much. He did not deny that events might arise which would call upon us to act upon that treaty; but those events had not yet arisen, and we should not, therefore, interfere. We ought, to give any color of justice to our proceedings, to wait until some substantial evert act of aggression took place on the part of Spain. There really seemed so few Gentlemen in the House who appeared inclined to criticise this measure, that he had thought it right to say what he had done in order to justify himself to the country.

MR. SECRETARY CANNING.---I do not intend to occupy the House with a reply, but there have been two or three objections taken by Honorable Gentlemen which I should be sorry to leave unanswered. I admit I understated the case against Spain---I did so purposely---I did so designedly. I wished to shew no more of her conduct than was sufficient to establish the casus fæderis, but not to state so much as would make it impossible for Spain to avoid war. The Honorable Gentleman who spoke last, wishes, in his great love for peace, to do that which would make war inevitable. He would not interfere now---he would wish to tell Spain, "you have not done enough to rouse us--"you have given no cause of offence---I "think nothing of your hovering over my "frontiers---I think nothing of your "coming in arms, of your ravaging my

*

"plains, and carrying destruction into my "cities---I think nothing of your collect"ing knots of conspirators, and of your supplying them with food, clothing, and arms---nothing of your training them, supplying them with Spanish stores, and "of your sending them into Portugal. I "will not stir for all these things; but, in "order to keep the peace of Europe, "which I so dearly love, I call on you to "make a declaration of war, and then I'll come and fight you." (Laughter.) That is the effect of the Honorable Member's speech---that his contrivance to keep the peace. The more clumsy contrivance of Government has been, to warn the Spanish authorities that they were known to meditate disturbances in Portugal. His Majesty's Ministers said to them---" Beware of your proceedings, for we are sure to avenge your deeds: it is with you to determine if the present misun"derstanding shall end in open hostili"ties." In the meantime the 'question is open to any means of reconcilement and whether Ministers or the Honorable Gentlemen are right---whether we ought to have endeavoured to obtain the grand object of his chivalrous imagination, a trial of that question upon a tented field, and in a listed battle---if it was really our duty, as we ourselves apprehend, to nip the disorder in the bud; or if, according to the Honorable Gentleman, we ought to let it grow up to maturity, in order to mow it down with the more magnificent scythe of war.---I leave the House to determine. (Laughter and cheers.) It has been complained that no papers have been laid before the House. The facts which call for our interference might be made as notorious as the noon-day sun. It should be remembered, that if this course had been taken---if an act of unmistakeable hostility on the part of Spain had been demonstrated by papers laid on the table of the House, Spain would have been precluded from that locus penitentia which I was desirous to leave to her. I did not wish to cut off all means of retreat---to drive Spain into a corner from which she could have no escape. I hope I have sufficiently explained the reasons why I understate the case against Spain. With the knowledge which my official situation necessarily gives me, I make a statement to the House such as I judge will be suffi

An

cient to answer my purpose. It is for the House in general to judge whether I have succeeded. My Honorable Friend, if he ask at the proper time, should that time arrive, will be convinced that it is not from want of evidence that my statement is not so full as he wished it to be. Amendment has been made upon the original proposition, and it has been justified by a reference to a declaration which I made some years ago, when I stated, that it would be exceedingly onerous for this country to engage in war---which declaration has been supposed to be inconsistent with the measure which I now propose. The variation between the two cases upon which I ground the difference of conduct, is, that in the one instance I maintained that war was to be avoided, when we were not obliged to engage in it; whereas, in the present case, I say, that unless it can be averted by seasonable demonstrations on the part of this country, war cannot be avoided. I do not, therefore, change my opinions as to the desirableness of peace, nor do I the less deprecate the necessity of war; but I say that, in the former instance, though, in the opinion of some respectable persons in and out of Parliament, it might have been politic to embark in war, my argument was, that we were not bound by any engagement of good faith or honor to engage in war---that our choice, in short, was free, and, being free, my choice was for peace. My argument, at the present day, is, that we have no choice---our faith is engaged; honor is pledged; and, with all the same predilections for peace which I then professed, I maintain that no course is left to us on the present occasion, but that which is dictated both by honor and policy, to maintain the faith of the country, and to fulfil the national engagements. It has been suggested, that the Foreign Enlistment Act might be repealed on the present occasion, and Mina and his associates be enabled to rush to the contest, and by that means obviate the effect of the aggression upon Portugal. Believing, Sir, as I do, that such a measure would entail the heaviest calamities upon that country, I cannot consent to give it my countenance. I am ready to admit, Sir, in the first place, that the Foreign Enlistment Bill was passed principally at the instigation of Spain, and that that Bill operated more in her favour than in that of any other

our

European Power. In the next place, I am ready to admit, that the whole conduct of Spain has been to do directly to-wards Portugal, those acts which Spain earnestly implored Great Britain to take away from British subjects the power of doing towards her. If we do what is suggested, there would be some ground for saying to this country, you recognised and acted upon a principle in 1819, when you had no private interests to promote---you last year, acting upon that principle, refused to withdraw the protection afforded to Foreign Powers by that Bill, but you now withdraw it, and violate that principle where you have a private interest to promote. I admit, there would be strong ground for saying to Spain :---" Since the

66

year 1819, we have given you the be"nefit of a particularly efficient measure, "and you have thought proper, since last year, to turn that very measure, conferred solely for your own protection, against "the pacific interests of our ally. Are we not fairly entitled, then, to place you where you would have been, had "that act never passed?" This would, undoubtedly, have justified the revocation of the bill from Spain: that I most clearly admit; but I do not equally well see how it would apply to the other great objects involved in such a question as this, and which I have rather adumbrated than over-stated in my opening speech. The great desire of this country ought undoubtedly to be to effect her purpose by the most lenient means. If circumstances should lead to hostilities, and that war must rage in Spain, the course now taken by Great Britain would rather take from war that most tremendous of all characters which could attach to such an event, were it once driven to assume the name of a war of opinion. (Hear, hear.) If we are to have war, let us---if we can take from it that character which has been so ably and so eloquently described by an Honorable and Learned Gentleman (Mr. Brougham)---that tremendous character, which must attach to war, when war is let loose in the shape of a war of opinion--(Cheers)---I, Sir, for one, should be extremely sorry to be driven, whatever acts Spain might be guilty of, to have recourse to that most lamentable and disastrous mode of warfare.---Another point has been touched upon by an Honorable Member, who, in a speech with which, in no other

respect, I find fault, has, in the most handsome and able manner, stated his reasons for approving of the line of conduct adopted, in this instance, by his Majesty's Government. That Honorable Member has said, "Instead of repealing the Fo'reignEnlistment Bill, call upon France to "withdraw her armies from Spain." There are, Sir, so many considerations connected with that subject, that they would carry me beyond what it is necessary to state upon the present occasion. It is enough now to state, that I do not know how the French army can be employed to promote the views of Spain. I believe the effect of the presence of the French army in Spain, is the protection rather than otherwise of that very party, to put down which, the aid of that army was called in; and that my firm belief is, that the first and immediate consequence of the withdrawal of that army, at a moment of excitement, would be the letting loose of that party rage, of which the party least in numbers would be the victims. But when it is stated, that the presence of the French army in Spain, has entirely altered the relative situations of France and Great Britain, and that France is thereby raised, and Great Britain lowered, in the eyes of Europe, I must beg leave, most humbly, to give my dissent to that proposition. The House knows---the country knows--that when the French army was on the point of entering Spain, that 1, in common with the other members of his Majesty's Government, did all in my power to prevent it; that we did resist, and that we were most anxious to resist it, by every means short of war. We did not think the entry of that army into Spain a sufficient ground for war on the part of this country; and that, Sir, for various reasons ---and, among others, for this, that whatever effect a war, commenced upon the mere ground of the entry of a French army into Spain may have, the effect it would not have, would be this---to get that army out of Spain. I again repeat, that a war, entered into for the express purpose of getting the French army out of Spain, would defeat the object wished to be obtained. Whoever heard, in the whole history of wars between the European powers, of a war between two great nations having been ended by the obtaining of the exact, the identical, object for which the war was begun? I believe that,

in the whole history of Europe, such an instance cannot be found. I also think, Sir, that the effects of the entry of the French army into Spain have been exaggerated, and think that those exaggerations are to be attributed to these circumstances -that the connexion between France and Spain is mixed up with recollections of the most brilliant---the most glorious--periods of English history. Now, however the withdrawal of that army might be in other respects and at other times desirable, I cannot allow that it at all affects the present question. On the contrary, I most sincerely believe that the exertions of France are directed to the preservation of existing treaties; and it is my conviction, that if the army was withdrawn, the situation of affairs would not be remedied; while, in a moment of such excitement, party rage would re-assume its desperate violence, and that class, avowedly the least in numbers, would, beyond question, become its victims. (Hear, hear, hear.) The most exaggerated importance has always, in my opinion, been attached in this country to the connexion between France and Spain. I ask the House to look back to the time of Anne, when the question of the association of France and Spain was agitated. I ask the House to look back to the votes of Parliament at that period, where they will find, that the Parliament had voted that no peace could be made between the two countries, whilst Spain remained in the power of France; or, rather, whilst a Bourbon sat upon the Throne of Spain. Look to the exaggerated apprehensions of those days, and see how they have been realized look back to the state of Spain in those days---look at her when she was a most formidable power---when she was a power of such strength, as to threaten to blow up the whole world. Look at her in those days, and you will see that England was then fixed in a nook of that Spain ---that our possession of the Rock of Gibraltar was contemporary with those exaggerated apprehensions. I do not believe, Sir, that the danger which could accrue from the possession of Spain by France, to be so great as it is represented. Spain now, is not what Spain was then. Where can we now find that Spain, in the map of the world, which was to have swallowed up the power of maritime England? Do we not still remain in a nook of that same

Spain---Gibraltar; where we have settled at a period contemporaneous with those fears, holding a firm and unshaken occupation up to this hour? And where, now, is that nation, which "was to have shaken 66 us from our sphere?" That Spain of old map was, be it remembered, the Spain within the limits of whose empire the sun never set---it was Spain with the Indies---where will you find her now? (Cheers.) When the French army entered Spain, we might, if we chose, have resisted that measure by a war; but, Sir, if we had resisted it by a war, that war would not be a war entered into for the same object for which the wars of other days were undertaken; that war would not have been a war for the restoration of the balance of power. Other means should be resorted to for that purpose, if necessary. The balance of power in Europe varied as civilization advanced, and new nations sprung up in Europe. One hundred years ago, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and perhaps Austria, constituted the balance of power. Within the next 30 years, Russia started up. Within the following 30 years, Prussia became a power of importance, and thus the balance of power, and the means of preserving it, were enlarged. The means of preserving the balance were enlarged, I may say, in proportion to the number of states---in proportion to the number of weights which could be put into the one scale or the other. To take a leaf, Sir, from the book of the policy of Europe in the times of William and of Anne, for the purpose of regulating the balance of power in Europe at the present day, is to be utterly regardless of the march of events, and to regulate our policy by a confusion of facts. I admit, Sir, that the entry of a French army into Spain was a disparagement to Great Britain---was a blow to the feelings of this country. I do not stand up here to deny that fact. One of the modes of redress was, by a direct attack upon France---by a war upon the soil of Spain. The other was to make the possession of that country harmless in rival hands---to make it worse than harmless, to make it injuriousto the possessor. The latter mode I have adopted. think, that, for the disparagement to England, we have not been compensated? Do you think, that, for the blockade of Cadiz, England has not been fully compensated?

Do you

I looked, Sir, at Spain by another name than Spain. I looked upon that Power as Spain and the Indies. I looked at the Indies, and there I have called a new world into existence, and thus redressed the balance of power. (Loud and continued cheering.) I redeemed the movement of France, while I left her own act upon her, unmitigated and unredressed, so that I believe she would be thankful to have relief from the responsibility of her assumed undertaking, and to get rid of a burden which has become too bitter to be borne without complaint. Thus, Sir, I answer the question of the occupation of Spain by the army of France. That occupation is an unpaid, and unredeemed, burthen to France. I say that France would be glad to get rid of the possession of Spain. I say, Sir, that France would be very glad if England were to assist her to get rid of that possession. I say, that the only way to rivet France to the possession of Spain is, to make that possession a point of honor. I believe, Sir, there is no other point upon which it is necessary to trouble the House with any explanation. I believe no other point has been adverted to by those Honorable Members who have so unequivocally and honorably supported this motion, and I should be ungrateful for their support if I were to detain the House with a single observation more than is absolutely necessary. (Hear, hear.) The object of this measure is not war. (Loud cheers.) I repeat, Sir, that the object of this measure is not war. The object of this measure is to take the last chance of peace. (Continued cheers.) If England does not promptly go to the aid of Portugal, Portugal will be trampled down, and England will be disgraced, and then war will come, and come, too, in the train of degradation. If we wait until Spain have courage to ripen her secret machinations into open hostility, we shall have war---we shall have the war of the pacificators, and who can then say when that war will end. (The Right Honorable Gentleman sat down amid loud cheers.)

The Amendment was then put and negatived, there appearing only three or four supporters for Mr. Hume's proposition, and the original question was then put and carried, with only the same number of dissentients.