deducted from its pay roll, amounts aggregating over $2,000, so due
by its laborers but did not pay them over, and on filing its claim it
embodied as an integral part thereof the amounts so deducted and
retained as a proper credit or offset. The Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the corporation retained the amounts with the knowledge
of the bankrupt's insolvency and with the intention to secure a prefer-
ence to that extent thereby, but that the bankrupt had no such in-
tention, and ordered that the entire claim be expunged unless the cor-
poration paid the amount so retained to the trustee. On appeal
objections were taken to the jurisdiction of this court. Held, that as
the claim to set off is controlled by and is necessarily based on the
provisions of § 68 of the Bankrupt Act and its construction is neces-
sarily involved, and the question is one which might have been taken
to this court on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a
State, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Under the facts as
found below the deductions from pay roll did not give rise to a voidable
preference nor was the corporation entitled to credit them as a set-off
as they were not mutual debts and credits within the set-off clause of
the bankrupt act, but were collections made independently of other
transactions and as trustee for the bankrupt. The corporation was
entitled to prove its gross debt with the alleged set-off eliminated and
was a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount of such deductions, and
the court below has power to protect the bankrupt's estate in respect
to dividends to the corporation in case it should not discharge its
obligations. Western Tie and Timber Co. v. Brown, 502.
5. Preference not constituted by mortgagor consenting to mortgagee's possession
of mortgaged property within statutory period.
The enforcement of a lien by the mortgagee taking possession, with the
consent of the mortgagor, of after acquired property covered by a
valid mortgage made and recorded prior to the passage of the act, is
not a conveyance or transfer under the bankrupt act; and, where it
does not appear that it was done to hinder, delay or defraud creditors,
it does not constitute a preference under the act although at the time
of the enforcement the mortgagee may have known that the mort-
gagor was insolvent and considering going into bankruptcy and the
petition was filed within four months thereafter. Thompson v. Fair-
banks, 516.
6. Property rights of bankrupt after discharge-Effect of secretion from trustee.
If a claim owned by a bankrupt is of value his creditors are entitled to it,
and he cannot, by withholding knowledge of its existence from the
trustee, after obtaining a discharge of his debts, immediately assert
title to and collect the claim for his own benefit. First National Bank
v. Lasater, 115.
7. Provable debt-Arrears of alimony not provable debt barred by discharge.
A husband owes the duty of supporting his wife and children not because
of contractual relations with the wife but because of the policy of the
law which will enforce the duty if necessary and the bankruptcy act
was not intended to be a means of avoiding this obligation. Arrears
of alimony awarded to a wife against her husband for the support of
herself and their minor children, under a final decree of absolute divorce,
is not a provable debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, nor does
the fact that there is no reservation in the decree of the right to alter
or modify it deprive the debt of its character of being for the support of
the bankrupt's wife and children. The amendment of February 5,
1903, excepting decrees of alimony from the discharge in bankruptcy
was not new legislation creating a presumption that such decrees were
not excepted prior thereto, but was merely declaratory of the true
meaning and sense of the statute as originally enacted. Wetmore v.
Markoe, 68.
8. Trustee's right of election as to bankrupt's property.
While a trustee in bankruptcy is not bound to accept property of an onerous
or unprofitable character, and in case he declines to take it the bank-
rupt may assert title thereto, he is entitled to be informed of the prop-
erty and have a reasonable time to elect whether he will accept it or
not. First National Bank v. Lasater, 115.
Relation of bank to customer in the matter of checks deposited.
The deposit of checks in a bank and drawing against them by a customer
constitutes the relation of debtor and creditor and the bank becomes
the absolute owner of the checks so deposited, and not the agent of
the customer to collect them; this relation is not, in the absence of any
special agreement, affected by the right of the bank against the cus-
tomer, and his liability therefor, in case the checks are not paid. Bur-
ton v. United States, 283.
See NATIONAL BANKS;
CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
BILL OF LADING.
See MARITIME LAW.
See LOCAL LAW (S. C.);
TAXATION, 6, 8, 10.
1. Rivers-Accretion and avulsion defined-Change of boundary not affected
by avulsion.
Accretion is the gradual accumulation by alluvial formation and where a
boundary river changes its course gradually the parties on either side
hold by the same boundary-the center of the channel. Avulsion is
the sudden and rapid change in the course and channel of a boundary
river. It does not work any change in the boundary, which remains
as it was in the center of the old channel although no water may be
flowing therein. These principles apply alike whether the rivers be
boundaries between private property or between States and Nations.
Missouri v. Nebraska, 23.
2. Missouri River as boundary not affected by avulsion of 1867.
The boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska in the vicinity of Island
Precinct is the center line of the original channel of the Missouri River
as it was before the avulsion of 1867 and not the center line of the
channel since that time, although no water is now flowing through the
original channel. Nothing in the acts of 1820 and 1836 relating to
Missouri or the act admitting Nebraska into the Union indicates an
intent on the part of Congress to alter the recognized rules of law
fixing the rights of parties where a river changes its course by accre-
tion or by avulsion. Ib.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 4;
WILLS, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
PRACTICE, 2.
Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, distinguished
from Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.
American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, followed in Adams Express
Co. v. Iowa, 147.
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, followed in Cook v. Marshall County, 261.
Flanigan v. Sierra County, 196 U. S. 553, followed in Wheeler v. Plumas
County, 562.
Slavens v. United States, 196 U. S. 229, followed in Travis v. United States,
239.
1. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 344. The writ of error in this case was
dismissed because it did not appear that the commerce clause of the
Constitution was relied on in, was called to the attention of, or passed
on by, the state court, and the case is inapposite where it appears that
the protection of commerce clause was properly set up, relied upon in,
and denied by, the state court. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 133.
2. Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S. 465, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, Rhodes
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, Vance v. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438,
rest on the broad principle of the freedom of commerce between the
States, of the right of citizens of one State to freely contract to receive
and send merchandise from and to another State, and on the want of
power of one State to destroy contracts concerning interstate com-
merce valid in the State where made. Ib.
CERTIFICATE.
See JURISDICTION, A 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
See MORTGAGE.
See BANKS AND BANKING.
NATIONAL BANKS;
CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICTION, B 2.
CLOUD ON TITLE.
See JURISDICTION, B 1.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Combination of dealers to regulate prices, etc., held illegal.
A combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat through-
out the United States, not to bid against, or only in conjunction with,
each other in order to regulate prices in and induce shipments to the
live stock markets in other states, to restrict shipments, establish
uniform rules of credit, make uniform and improper rules of cartage,
and to get less than lawful rates from railroads to the exclusion of
competitors with intent to monopolize commerce among the States.
is an illegal combination within the meaning and prohibition of the
act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, and can be restrained and enjoined
in an action by the United States. Swift and Company v. United
States, 375.
2. Immateriality of monopoly within single State where combination directed
against interstate commerce.
It does not matter that a combination of this nature embraces restraint
and monopoly of trade within a single State if it also embraces and is
directed against commerce among the States. Moreover the effect
of such a combination upon interstate commerce is direct and not
accidental, secondary or remote as in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. 1. Ib.
3. Unlawfulness of otherwise lawful separate elements of scheme when bound
together by a common intent.
Even if the separate elements of such a scheme are lawful when they are
bound together by a common intent as parts of an unlawful scheme
to monopolize interstate commerce the plan may make the parts
unlawful. Ib.
4. Shipment of cattle constituting interstate commerce.
When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation
they will end their transit, after purchase, in another State, and when
in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a
purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a constantly recurring
course, it constitutes interstate commerce and the purchase of the
cattle is an incident of such commerce. Ib.
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