deducted from its pay roll, amounts aggregating over $2,000, so due by its laborers but did not pay them over, and on filing its claim it embodied as an integral part thereof the amounts so deducted and retained as a proper credit or offset. The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the corporation retained the amounts with the knowledge of the bankrupt's insolvency and with the intention to secure a prefer- ence to that extent thereby, but that the bankrupt had no such in- tention, and ordered that the entire claim be expunged unless the cor- poration paid the amount so retained to the trustee. On appeal objections were taken to the jurisdiction of this court. Held, that as the claim to set off is controlled by and is necessarily based on the provisions of § 68 of the Bankrupt Act and its construction is neces- sarily involved, and the question is one which might have been taken to this court on appeal or writ of error from the highest court of a State, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal. Under the facts as found below the deductions from pay roll did not give rise to a voidable preference nor was the corporation entitled to credit them as a set-off as they were not mutual debts and credits within the set-off clause of the bankrupt act, but were collections made independently of other transactions and as trustee for the bankrupt. The corporation was entitled to prove its gross debt with the alleged set-off eliminated and was a debtor to the bankrupt for the amount of such deductions, and the court below has power to protect the bankrupt's estate in respect to dividends to the corporation in case it should not discharge its obligations. Western Tie and Timber Co. v. Brown, 502.
5. Preference not constituted by mortgagor consenting to mortgagee's possession of mortgaged property within statutory period. The enforcement of a lien by the mortgagee taking possession, with the consent of the mortgagor, of after acquired property covered by a valid mortgage made and recorded prior to the passage of the act, is not a conveyance or transfer under the bankrupt act; and, where it does not appear that it was done to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, it does not constitute a preference under the act although at the time of the enforcement the mortgagee may have known that the mort- gagor was insolvent and considering going into bankruptcy and the petition was filed within four months thereafter. Thompson v. Fair- banks, 516.
6. Property rights of bankrupt after discharge-Effect of secretion from trustee. If a claim owned by a bankrupt is of value his creditors are entitled to it, and he cannot, by withholding knowledge of its existence from the trustee, after obtaining a discharge of his debts, immediately assert title to and collect the claim for his own benefit. First National Bank v. Lasater, 115.
7. Provable debt-Arrears of alimony not provable debt barred by discharge. A husband owes the duty of supporting his wife and children not because of contractual relations with the wife but because of the policy of the
law which will enforce the duty if necessary and the bankruptcy act was not intended to be a means of avoiding this obligation. Arrears of alimony awarded to a wife against her husband for the support of herself and their minor children, under a final decree of absolute divorce, is not a provable debt barred by a discharge in bankruptcy, nor does the fact that there is no reservation in the decree of the right to alter or modify it deprive the debt of its character of being for the support of the bankrupt's wife and children. The amendment of February 5, 1903, excepting decrees of alimony from the discharge in bankruptcy was not new legislation creating a presumption that such decrees were not excepted prior thereto, but was merely declaratory of the true meaning and sense of the statute as originally enacted. Wetmore v. Markoe, 68.
8. Trustee's right of election as to bankrupt's property. While a trustee in bankruptcy is not bound to accept property of an onerous or unprofitable character, and in case he declines to take it the bank- rupt may assert title thereto, he is entitled to be informed of the prop- erty and have a reasonable time to elect whether he will accept it or not. First National Bank v. Lasater, 115.
Relation of bank to customer in the matter of checks deposited. The deposit of checks in a bank and drawing against them by a customer constitutes the relation of debtor and creditor and the bank becomes the absolute owner of the checks so deposited, and not the agent of the customer to collect them; this relation is not, in the absence of any special agreement, affected by the right of the bank against the cus- tomer, and his liability therefor, in case the checks are not paid. Bur- ton v. United States, 283.
See NATIONAL BANKS; CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
BILL OF LADING.
See MARITIME LAW.
See LOCAL LAW (S. C.);
TAXATION, 6, 8, 10.
1. Rivers-Accretion and avulsion defined-Change of boundary not affected by avulsion.
Accretion is the gradual accumulation by alluvial formation and where a boundary river changes its course gradually the parties on either side hold by the same boundary-the center of the channel. Avulsion is the sudden and rapid change in the course and channel of a boundary river. It does not work any change in the boundary, which remains
as it was in the center of the old channel although no water may be flowing therein. These principles apply alike whether the rivers be boundaries between private property or between States and Nations. Missouri v. Nebraska, 23.
2. Missouri River as boundary not affected by avulsion of 1867. The boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska in the vicinity of Island Precinct is the center line of the original channel of the Missouri River as it was before the avulsion of 1867 and not the center line of the channel since that time, although no water is now flowing through the original channel. Nothing in the acts of 1820 and 1836 relating to Missouri or the act admitting Nebraska into the Union indicates an intent on the part of Congress to alter the recognized rules of law fixing the rights of parties where a river changes its course by accre- tion or by avulsion. Ib.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 4; WILLS, 3.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; PRACTICE, 2.
Richmond & Alleghany R. R. Co. v. Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, distinguished from Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Murphey, 194.
American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, followed in Adams Express Co. v. Iowa, 147.
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, followed in Cook v. Marshall County, 261. Flanigan v. Sierra County, 196 U. S. 553, followed in Wheeler v. Plumas County, 562.
Slavens v. United States, 196 U. S. 229, followed in Travis v. United States, 239.
1. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 344. The writ of error in this case was dismissed because it did not appear that the commerce clause of the Constitution was relied on in, was called to the attention of, or passed on by, the state court, and the case is inapposite where it appears that the protection of commerce clause was properly set up, relied upon in, and denied by, the state court. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 133.
2. Bowman v. Chicago, 125 U. S. 465, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, Vance v. Vandercook Co., No. 1, 170 U. S. 438, rest on the broad principle of the freedom of commerce between the States, of the right of citizens of one State to freely contract to receive
and send merchandise from and to another State, and on the want of power of one State to destroy contracts concerning interstate com- merce valid in the State where made. Ib.
CERTIFICATE.
See JURISDICTION, A 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
See MORTGAGE.
See BANKS AND BANKING. NATIONAL BANKS; CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICTION, B 2.
CLOUD ON TITLE.
See JURISDICTION, B 1.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Combination of dealers to regulate prices, etc., held illegal. A combination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat through- out the United States, not to bid against, or only in conjunction with, each other in order to regulate prices in and induce shipments to the live stock markets in other states, to restrict shipments, establish uniform rules of credit, make uniform and improper rules of cartage, and to get less than lawful rates from railroads to the exclusion of competitors with intent to monopolize commerce among the States. is an illegal combination within the meaning and prohibition of the act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, and can be restrained and enjoined in an action by the United States. Swift and Company v. United States, 375.
2. Immateriality of monopoly within single State where combination directed against interstate commerce.
It does not matter that a combination of this nature embraces restraint and monopoly of trade within a single State if it also embraces and is directed against commerce among the States. Moreover the effect of such a combination upon interstate commerce is direct and not accidental, secondary or remote as in United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1. Ib.
3. Unlawfulness of otherwise lawful separate elements of scheme when bound together by a common intent.
Even if the separate elements of such a scheme are lawful when they are bound together by a common intent as parts of an unlawful scheme to monopolize interstate commerce the plan may make the parts unlawful. Ib.
4. Shipment of cattle constituting interstate commerce.
When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation they will end their transit, after purchase, in another State, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a constantly recurring course, it constitutes interstate commerce and the purchase of the cattle is an incident of such commerce. Ib.
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