wished for such a plan as most eligible, he had never been sanguine that it was practicable; and the discussions which had taken place had finally satisfied him, that it would be necessary to limit the call for a general revenue to duties on commerce, and to call for the deficiency in the most permanent way that could be reconciled with a revenue established within each State, separately, and appropriated to the common Treasury. He said the rule which he had laid down to himself, in this business, was to concur in every arrangement that should appear necessary for an honorable and just fulfilment of the public engagements, and in no measure tending to augment the power of Congress which should appear to be unnecessary; and particularly disclaimed the idea of perpetuating a public debt.

Mr. LEE, in answer to Mr. MADISON, said the doctrine maintained by him was pregnant with dangerous consequences to the liberties of the Confederated States; that, notwithstanding the specious arguments that had been employed, it was an established truth, that the purse ought not to be put into the same hands with the sword: that like arguments had been used in favor of ship-money in the reign of Charles the First,

thing would be so likely to prevent dispute among the States, with the calamities consequent on them. The States were jealous of each other, each supposing itself to be, on the whole, a creditor to the others. The Eastern States, in particular, thought themselves so with regard to the Southern States. (See Mr. GORHAM, in the debates of this day.) If general funds were not introduced, it was not likely the balances would ever be discharged, even if they should be liquidated. The consequence would be a rupture of the Confederacy. The Eastern States would, at sea, be powerful and rapacious; the Southern opulent and weak. This would be a temptation; the demands on the Southern States would be an occasion; reprisals would be instituted; foreign aid would be called in by, first, the weaker, then the stronger side; and finally, both be made subservient to the wars and politics of Europe.

it being then represented as essential to the support of the Government; that the Executive should be assured of the means of fulfilling its engagements for the public service. He said it had been urged by several in behalf of such an establishment for public credit, that without it Congress was nothing more than a rope of sand. of sand. On this head he would be explicit ; he had rather see Congress a rope of sand than a rod of iron. He urged, finally, as a reason why some States would not and ought not, to concur in granting to Congress a permanent revenue, that some States, as Virginia, would receive back a small part by payment from the United States to its citizens; whilst others as Pennsylvania, would receive a vast surplus, and, consequently, by draining the former of its wealth.

Mr. MERCER said, if he had conceived the Federal compact to be such as it had been represented, he would immediately withdraw from Congress, and do every thing in his power to destroy its existence; that if Congress had a right to borrow money as they pleased, and to make requisitions on the States that would be binding on them, the liberties of the States were ideal; that requisitions ought to be consonant to the spirit of liberty; that they should go frequently, and accompanied with full information; that the States must be left to judge of the nature of them, of their abilities to comply with them, and to regulate their compliance accordingly; he laid great stress on the omission of Congress to transmit half-yearly to the States an account of the moneys borrowed by them, &c.; and even insinuated that this omission had absolved the States, in some degree,

from the engagements. He repeated his remarks on the injustice of the rule by which loan-office certificates had been settled, and his opinion that some defalcations would be necessary.

Mr. HOLTEN was opposed to all permanent funds, and to every arrangement not within the limits of the Confederation.

Mr. HAMILTON enlarged on the general utility of permanent funds to the federal interests of this country, and pointed out the difference between the nature of the Constitution of the British Executive and that of the United States, in answer to Mr. LEE'S reasoning from the case of ship-money.

Mr. GORHAM adverted, with some warmth, to the doctrines advanced by Mr. LEE and Mr. MERcer, concerning the loan-office creditors. He said the Union could never be maintained on any other ground than that of justice; that some States had suffered greatly from the deficiencies of others already; that if justice was not to be obtained through the Federal system, and this system was to fail, as would necessarily follow, it was time this should be known, that some of the States might be forming other confederacies adequate to the purposes of their safety.

This debate was succeeded by a discharge of the Committee from the business of devising the means requisite for restoring public credit, &c., &c., and the business referred to a committee, consisting of Mr. GORHAM, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. MADISON, Mr. FITZSIMMONS, and Mr. RUTLEDge.

No Congress till

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25TH.

In favor of the motion of Mr. GILMAN, (see the Journal of this date,) to refer the officers of the army for their half-pay to their respective States, it was urged that this plan alone would secure to the officers any advantage from that engagement; since Congress had no independent fund out of which it could be fulfilled, and the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island, in particular, would not comply with any recommendation of Congress, nor even requisition, for that purpose. It was also said that it would be satisfactory to the officers; and that it would apportion on the States that part of the public burden with sufficient equality. Mr. DYER said, that the original promise of Congress on that subject was considered, by some of the States, as a fetch upon them, and not within the spirit of the authority delegated to Congress. Mr. WOLCOTT said the States would give Congress nothing whatever, unless they were gratified in this particular. Mr. COLLINS said Rhode Island had expressly instructed her Delegates to oppose every measure tending to an execution of the promise out of moneys under the disposition of Congress.

On the other side it was urged, that the half-pay was a debt as solemnly contracted as any other debt; and was consequently, as binding under the twelfth Article of the Confederation on the States, and that they could not refuse a requisition made for that purpose; that it would be improper to countenance

a spirit of that sort by yielding to it; that such concessions on the part of Congress would produce compliances on the part of the States, in other instances, clogged with favorite conditions; that a reference of the officers to the particular States to whose lines they belong, would not be satisfactory to the officers of those States who objected to half-pay, and would increase the present irritation of the army; that to do it without their unanimous consent, would be a breach of the contract by which the United States, collectively, were bound to them; and, above all, that the proposed plan, which discharged any particular State which should settle with its officers on this subject, although other States might reject the plan, from its proportion of that part of the public burden, was a direct and palpable departure from the law of the Confederation. According to this instrument, the whole public burden of debt must be apportioned according to a valuation of land; nor could any thing but a unanimous concurrence of the States dispense with this law. According to the plan proposed, so much of the public burden as the half-pay should amount to, was to be apportioned according to the number of officers belonging to each line; the plan to take effect, as to all those States which should adopt it, without waiting for the unanimous adoption of the States; and that, if Congress had authority to make the number of officers the rule of apportioning one part of the public debt on the States, they might extend the rule to any other arbitrary rule which they should think fit. The motion of Mr. GILMAN was negatived. See the ayes and noes on the Journal,