Attorney-General v. Sooy Oyster Co. 78 N. J. L. results to the state if the public policy inspired by this grant be adopted, as a result of which this great natural industry, the prolific toiling-place of generations of independent selfsupporting citizens shall be aliened forever, and they themselves evicted as completely and as effectually, by the mere presence and potency of the great seal of the state, as were the thrifty Highland crofters of Scotland under the great "Sutherland clearances" at Lochaber, when a whole people were swept into exile, to make way for sheep walks and pasture lands. As against a so-called public policy, that would ignore the independent existence and self-supporting happiness of a people, and set it in the balance as quid pro quo for what Tennyson calls the "Jingling of the guinea," we may well invoke the condemnation of John Stuart Mill; "that when the inhabitants of a country quit it, because the government does not leave them room to live in it, that government is already judged and condemned." From whatever aspect, therefore, we may view this grant, it is defenceless in law and insupportable in policy. The court being equally divided in opinion, the judgment under review must be affirmed. For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, GARRISON, REED, TRENCHARD, PARKER, VOORHEES, VREDENBURGH, JJ. 8. MINTURN, BOGERT, For reversal-SWAYZE, BERGEN, MINTURN, VROOM, GRAY, DILL, CONGDON, JJ. 8. 49 Vroom. Kenilworth v. Board of Equal, of Taxes. BOROUGH OF KENILWORTH, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF TAXES, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR. Argued June 30, 1909-Decided November 15, 1909. A municipality which objects to the apportionment of taxes by the county board upon the ground that the total of ratables as returned by its assessor is excessive must object promptly. The apportionment will not be reviewed by the court where the municipality waits until December 14th to make any objection. On error to the Supreme Court. For the plaintiff in error, Franklin W. Fort (MacLear & Fort). For the defendants in error, William R. Codington (Codington & Swackhamer). The facts are stated by the Supreme Court, ante p. 302. The opinion of the court was delivered by SWAYZE, J. The difficulty we find in the claim of the plaintiff in error is that it failed to object to the apportionment of taxes by the county board of taxation before that board. Fairness to the other municipalities in the county and the orderly administration of the tax laws, require that a municipality should object promptly if it questions the return of ratables made by its own assessor. A change in the apportionment cannot be made afterward without imposing loss upon the county and perhaps throwing its financial administration into confusion. The attacks that have been made upon the action of the county board of assessors (of which the county board of taxation is the successor) have been based upon irregularities in its procedure, not upon a charge of excessive valuations by the local assessor. The tax acts of Kenilworth v. Board of Equal. of Taxes. 78 N. J. L. 1905 and 1906 provide no machinery by which the other municipalities of the county whose interests are necessarily affected by a change of the apportionment can be notified or heard. It would be quite intolerable to hold that the apportionment of state and county taxes among the municipalities is subject to change whenever the amount of ratables is altered by successful appeals of individual taxpayers. Probably it happens every year in nearly every municipality in the state that some such reductions are made. If the apportionment to the municipalities were thereby made liable to change, a final assessment would never be possible in time to permit the collection of the tax by the day fixed by law. Frequent as such changes must have been, this is the first instance of an attempt to have the apportionment altered when based on the return of the local assessor. The impracticability of the attempt has no doubt been foreseen. In such cases, either the municipality or the state and county must suffer loss, and it is more reasonable to impose the burden upon the municipality whose officer has made the error; allowance for the result of possible errors of the kind should be made in making up the municipal budget, for which contingency, among others, the statute authorizes the addition of ten per cent. to the amount appropriated for state, county, school district or local purposes. Pamph. L. 1903, p. 410, § 25; Pamph. L. 1906, p. 215, § 6. The argument is, of course, not so strong in favor of the apportionment as far as it is the result of including exempt property in the total amount of ratables. This, however, was a mere oversight, and would have been corrected at once by the county board if their attention had been called to it. The failure of the borough to act until December 14th, when the time for payment of taxes had nearly expired, amounts to a waiver. Our views are supported by an opinion of the Supreme Court in Township of Delaware v. Assessors of Taxes, 24 Vroom 319. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. 49 Vroom. Saunders v. Adams Express Co. For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, GARRISON, SWAYZE, PARKER, BERGEN, VOORHEES, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GRAY, DILL, CONGDON, JJ. 13. For reversal-None. BERTRAM H. SAUNDERS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, DEFENDANT IN ERROR. Argued June 21, 1909-Decided November 30, 1909. 1. A common carrier may contract to carry goods to a point beyond its own line. 2. Where a common carrier contracts generally to carry goods, but provides that if it has not an agency at the point of destination. it shall carry to its agency nearest or most convenient thereto, and there notify the consignee or deliver the property to some other carrier, it is not sufficient to bring the case within this provision of the contract to prove that the carrier had no office at the point of destination. On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 47 Vroom 228. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and the judge found the following facts: The action is for an injury to a calculating machine, delivered by the plaintiff to an agent of the defendant at Washington, D. C., to be transported to Clifton, New Jersey. The Adams Express Company, having no office at Clifton, transferred the machine to the Wells-Fargo Express Company at Jersey City, and that company continued the transportation and delivered the machine to the plaintiff's representative at Clifton. When the box was opened the machine was found to be injured. At the time plaintiff delivered the machine in Washington to the defendant's driver he received from the latter a receipt, which contained the following conditions: Saunders v. Adams Express Co. 78 N. J. L. "1. In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is regulated by the value thereof, and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars, unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said property is not more than fifty dollars, unless a greater value is stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable in any event for more than the value so stated, nor for more than fifty dollars if no value is stated herein. "2. If the Express Company has not an agency at the point of destination, it shall carry the property to its agency nearest or most convenient thereto, and there notify the consignee, or deliver the property to some other carrier to continue the transportation. The Adams Express Company shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring after such delivery, nor for detention after having tendered the property to a connecting carrier." The driver, at the time of shipment, asked the plaintiff the value of the article, and either a value of $50 or no value was declared. The plaintiff did not read the receipt given to him, although it was legible and intelligible. The injury to the machine more probably occurred while being delivered at the plaintiff's house by the agent of the Wells-Fargo Company than while in the charge of the Adams Company. The judge on these facts found generally for the defendant. For the plaintiff in error, Preston Stevenson. For the defendant in error, Robert H. McCarter and Conover English. The opinion of the court was delivered by SWAYZE, J. The question presented in this case is much narrower than the important legal questions which were so fully and ably argued by counsel. We assume for the purpose of this decision that the whole contract was set forth in the receipt, and that the plaintiff assented to its terms, and we lay no stress upon what seems to have been the finding of the |