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Statutes of N. J.

Gen. Stat., p. 833, pl. 148, 4281
Gen. Stat., p. 835, pl. 161, 428
Gen. Stat., p. 836, pl. 166, 428
Pamph. L. 1899, p. 160, §
1,

Pamph. L. 1902, p. 170,
Collateral Inheritance Taxes.
Pamph. L. 1894, p. 318, §
13,
297, 299
Pamph. L. 1906, p. 432, 297

Corporations.

Pamph. L. 1896, p. 307, §
97,

Pamph. L. 1904, p. 384,

Criminal Law.

Pamph. L. 1898, p. 799,
Pamph. L. 1898, p. 803, §
31,
Pamph. L. 1898, p. 827, §
119,

Pamph. L. 1899, p. 214,

Criminal Procedure.

Pamph. L. 1898, p. 915, §§
135, 136,

Death Act.

Gen. Stat., p. 1188,

Disorderly Persons.

Pamph. L. 1898, p. 942, §
17,

District Courts.

Pamph. L. 1898, pp. 556,
564, § 30,

Pamph. L. 1905, p. 259.
Pamph. L. 1905, p. 494, §

4,

Ejectment.

Elections.

Pamph. L. 1883, p. 171,
Pamph. L. 1884, p. 323,
Pamph. L. 1908, p. 266,

Eminent Domain.

Pamph. L. 1900, p. 79,
Pamph. L. 1900, p. 82, §§
7, 8,

Evidence.

Pamph. L. 1900, p. 362, §
53.

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Gen. Stat., p. 1288, pl. 41, 411 Practice.

Mechanics' Lien.

146 Oaths.

Pamph. L. 1903, p. 251, §
1,
569
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 252, §
5,

570

Pamph. L. 1909, p. 13,

Mortgages.

Gen. Stat., p. 1976, § 17, 731

TA

Gen. Stat., p. 2112,

15

239

240

Pamph. L. 1898, p. 538, §§
1, 16, 23, 24,
588

Negotiable Instruments Act.
Pamph. L. 1902, p. 583,
Pamph. L. 1902, p. 592, §
51,

622

622

147

610

23, 327

388

156

157

Gen. Stat., p. 2335, pl. 42, 618

280

Gen. Stat., p. 2542, § 55, 242
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 537,
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 537, §
56,
242
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 537, §
57.
241
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 568, §
105,

Pamph. L. 1903, p. 537, §§
110, 111,

722
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 575, §
140,
Pamph. L. 1903, p. 537, §
166,

667

179

93

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Street Railways.

3. It is not negligence to run a trol-||
ley car upon a public highway
at a rate of speed which is not
incompatible with the lawful and
customary use of the highway by
others with reasonable safety.
Smith v. Public Service Corpora-
tion,
478

4. Suck timely warning of the ap-
proach of a trolley car must be
given as will enable others to
avoid any danger from it, and the
non-performance of such duty in
approaching a street crossing in-
tended to be crossed is evidence
of negligence, which, if the nat-
wal ard proximate cause of the
injury complained of, is action-
able.
Ib.

5. In an action for damages for an
injury claimed to have been sus-
tained because of negligence of
defendant in permitting a dan-
gerous and defective condition of
a crossing switch between street
car tracks, which alleged condi-
tion should, by proper inspection,
have been discovered, and, by
proper diligence, have been rem-
edied, evidence of the same con-
dition existing within a reason-
able time, both before and after
the injury sued for, is admissible
in corroboration of evidence that
such condition existed at the time
of such injury; and such evi-
dence as to its previous existence
is also available to show its per-
sistence for such a length of time
that defendant, with due dili-
gence, should have discovered and
rectified it. Alcott v. Public
Service Corporation,
482

6. Temperance Hall Association v.
Giles, 4 Vroom 260, and Bobbink
v. Erie Railroad Co., 46 Id. 913.
distinguished; Annapolis Gas,
&c., Co. v. Fredericks, 109 Md.
595, disapproved.
Ib.

7. Plaintiff was struck by a trolley
car and injured while crossing]
the track on foot. He claimed
that he looked for a car and
could not see it on account of the
foggy condition of the air. Itll

Stock.

was dark, but plaintiff was under
an electric light. The lights on
the car were dim. Plaintiff ad-
mitted seeing lights in a store
several doors away in the op-
posite direction, and other wit-
nesses some distance away testi-
fied to seeing the plaintiff under
the light and the car as it struck
him. Held, that the testimony
did not conclusively demonstrate
that the car was visible to plaint-
iff before he stepped on the track.
Farese v. North Jersey Street
Railway Co.,
499

S. Whether the plaintiff, who was
driving along an intersecting
street, and saw a trolley car a
block distant advancing at a high
rate of speed, was guilty of negli-
gence in attempting to cross the
track before the arrival of the
car at that point, was a jury
question, and a nonsuit granted
under the circumstances is set
aside. Zindler v. Public Service
Railway Co.,
536

9. Consent granted to a traction
company under Pamph. L. 1893,
p. 302 (Gen. Stat., p. 3235), for
the construction, maintenance
and operation of a street railway
along certain streets and high-
ways, does not warrant the con-
struction and maintenance, with-
in the limits of the highway, of a
bridge for the accommodation of
the tracks that in design and con-
struction is dangerous to ordi-
nary travel and calculated to en-
trap and kill horses and other
animals that may attempt to
pass over it. Opdycke v. Public
Service Railway Co.,
576

See NEGLIGENCE.
TAXATION, 9.

STOCK.

See CORPORATIONS.

SURRENDER.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

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Taxation.

TAXATION.

arrearages.

Speer,

Taxation.

1. The supplement of April 14th,
1891 (Pamph. L., p. 393), to the
Martin act of 1886 re-enacts the'
provisions of said original act 5. Where a borough consents to the

as of such later date; its effect,
therefore is to invest the com-
missioners appointed under such
original act with jurisdiction to
adjust arrearages of taxes exist-
ing at the date of such supple-
mental act as if such taxes had
been so in arrears at the date of
the original act; it does not pur-
port to enact any radical de-
parture from the provisions of
the parent act or to engraft upon
them any new provision, hence it
does not invest the commissioners
with a prospective jurisdiction to
deal independently with future
Jersey City V.

confirmation of the assessment
of ratables as made by its asses-
sor before the county board of
taxation, and such assessment is
thereafter confirmed, no contro-
versy exists; and the borough
cannot be said to be aggrieved
by the action of the county board
so as to justify an appeal to the
state board. Kenilworth V.
Board of Equalization of Taxes,
302

34

3. The duty of the state board of
assessors under the supplemental
act of March 4th, 1908, is the
same, and none other than that
required of them by section 3 of
the revised act of 1888 recited
in such supplement.
Ib.

to be entitled to exemption under
section 3, placitum 4, of the Tax
act 1903. Pamph. L., p. 394.
Stevens Institute v. Bowes, 205

6. This court will not review the
action of the state board of
equalization in dismissing an ap-
peal where the action appealed
from was consented to by the
petitioner.
Ib.

2. In the ascertainment of the value

of second-class railroad property 7. The fact that other property in

under subdivision 2 of section 3
of the revised act of 1888 for the
taxation of railroad and canal
property, the state board of as-
sessors is required to value such
property at the value it has in
exchange for money as shown by
the testimony, i. c., at its market
value. Additional value im-
parted to such property by its

a taxing district is assessed for
taxation at less than its true
value affords no ground for re-
ducing the assessment placed
upon the property of a complain-
ing taxpayer below the true
value thereof. Royal Manufac
turing Co. v. Board of Equaliza-
tion of Taxes,
337

use under a railroad franchise S. A municipality which objects to
should not be included in such
ascertainment. Long Dock Co.
v. State Board of Assessors, 44

the apportionment of taxes by
the county board upon the ground
that the total of ratables as re-
turned by its assessor is excess-
ive. must object promptly. The
apportionment will not be re-
viewed by the court where the
municipality waits until Decem-
ber 14th to make any objection.
Kenilworth v. Board of Equali-
zation of Taxes,
439

4. Land acquired by Stevens Insti- 9. Under the Franchise Tax Act of
1900 (Pamph. L., p. 502), pro-
viding, in substance, that moneys
payable by the holders of fran-
chises to any taxing district for
its exclusive use pursuant to con-
tract, shall continue to be paid
notwithstanding the act, and if
less in amount than the sum pay-

tute in Hoboken subsequent to
the erection of its academic build-
ings, separated therefrom by a
street, and used mainly, if not
entirely, for athletic purposes, is
not land whereon the buildings
are situated, necessary to the fair
use and enjoyment thereof, so as

Trespass.

See COLLATERAL INHERITANCE
TAX.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6.

able under the act shall be con-
sidered as a payment on account|
thereof; and the difference made
up by payment pursuant to the
act-Held, that when a street
railway company under annual 5. The admission of evidence which

contract liability of $250 to a
township was taxed more than
that amount in the township un-
der the act of 1900 and paid the
tax in full, such payment in-
cluded payment of the contract
liability without separation into

bears remotely on the issue
involved in a cause is within the
discretion of the trial judge, and
its admission is no ground for
reversal on error. Worcester
Loom Co. v. Heald,

172

parts or specific appropriation by 6. When a defendant has been held

the company of the proper share!
of the fund to such contract lia-
bility. Eatontown v. Monmouth
County Electric Co.,
493

TRESPASS.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5.

TRIAL.

1. The trial court may in its dis-
cretion allow the opening counsel
to make a second address to the
jury although no reply to his first
address was made; when such
second address has been made it
is error to refuse to permit de-
fendant's counsel to reply to it.
Silber v. Public Service Railway
Co.,
59

2. New York and Long Branch
Railroad Co. V. Garrity, 34
Vroom 50, followed.
Ib.

Trial.

3. Where it is necessary for a party,
in order to maintain the issue, to
prove several facts, the court
should admit any legitimate evi-
dence tending to establish either
fact. Barrish v. Orben, 128

he knew he was dealing with
Runyon as with a principal or
with him as the agent of another
than the defendant.
Ib.

to bail in an action of contract
on affidavits showing fraud in the
inception of the contract sued on,
and on the trial the fraud is
inquired into pursuant to section
166 of the Practice act of 1903,
the issue of fraud is for the de-
termination of the judge, and the
burden is on the defendant of
proving absence of fraud. Aus-
trian v. Laubheim,
178

7. An instruction to the jury that
an accused on trial for murder,
who sets up insanity as a defence
to the crime charged against him,
must convince the jury by a pre-
ponderance of testimony that his
mind was so deranged as to make
him irresponsible for his act, does
not require him to bear a bur-
den greater than that which the
law imposes upon him. The
word "convince" in the connec-
tion in which it is used, is equiv-
alent to "satisfy," and does not
indicate that the defendant must
prove his insanity by evidence
which would produce absolute
conviction in the minds of the
jury. State v. Maioni, 339

8. An erroneous instruction to the
jury upon a matter not involved
in the issue being tried, and
which could not have misled them
or affected them in their deter-
mination of the questions before
them for decision, affords no
ground for a reversal.

Ib.

4. Where the plaintiff testified to
transactions with one Runyon as 9. A judgment entered upon a di-
with the agent of the defendant,
it was error to exclude cross-
examination tending to show that

rected verdict will be reversed on
error if by such direction any
material matter in issue concern-

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