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lay to the number of 300, faces purple, twisting and writhing in agony, dying by long-drawn-out torture, their piteous eyes asking for help and there was none we could give. The ghastliest wounds were sweet and pleasant beside it."

Concealed by the greenish-yellow cloud, the Germans followed the gas as it rolled down upon their enemies, and finished with the bayonet what the chemical retort had begun. They made a breach four miles long in the Allied line which only seven days of the most desperate fighting safely closed.

THE ULTIMATE BAYONET

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The bayonet-that, after all, is the ultimate weapon, just as infantry is the ultimate army. 'Cold steel" has one virtue; it is decisive. Apply it, and one side or the other yields, and yields beyond question. It means die, surrender, or run. But tacticians of less than a generation ago had about concluded that its day was past. Of what use is the bayonet, they asked, when artillery sweeps a field three miles away with a precise rain of shot, when the hand rifle itself is deadly at half a mile, when the machine gun can be revolved to send a solid wall of steel against the weak advancing wall of flesh?

Nevertheless, their caution and tradition outweighed their calculation, and the event has proved their provision to be wise. Mewed in the trenches, within speaking distance of the enemy, it is almost certain death to expose oneself to view. An unsupported charge across the inter

vening space is simply wholesale suicide. The only hope of successful advance is under cover of supporting artillery fire which, first with a prolonged and concentrated fury of assault with high explosive shell upon a section of the opposing trench, and then with a rain of shrapnel on its surviving occupants, at least partially protects the company that leaps from its trenches and makes the short dash to meet the enemy hand to hand. Here the bayonet has returned to its own as one of the most destructive of all weapons ever devised. Its thrust is deadlier than the cut of the sword or the blow of the axe or club. And the moral effect of it is incomparably greater. The defense against a blow is instinctive and effective—the arm upraised to break its impact. But there is no natural defense against the thrust, and, worse still, it comes sickeningly at the seat of human courage, the pit of the stomach. In euphemistic paraphrase of Private Mulvaney's vernacular, it takes diaphragm to stand a bayonet charge.

THE LONGEST AND SHORTEST BAYONETS

A glance at the infantryman's arms of the various countries gives a graphic suggestion of the courage that is required to face such a charge. The shortest bayonets in use are those of the Belgians and the Austrians. They are practically 9-inch bowie knives fastened on the end of a rifle 4 feet 2 inches long. The English and the Russian bayonets are nearly twice as long-a fraction more than 17 inchesthough the former (a knife) is on the shortest of all the rifles (3 feet 8 inches long) whereas the latter (an old-style triangular bayonet) is on the longest of all the rifles (4 feet 3 inches). The German bayonet is 3 inches longer, and the French the fraction of an inch longer still. Counting gun and bayonet both, the French, German, and Russian "weapons of thrust” are the longest, in that order.

The Russians have an especial fondness for the bayonet-probably because the simplest of weapons naturally appeals to the simplest of soldiers. The official reports of the Russian War Office are full of references to it.

of references to it. For example, the communique of April 20th: "On the East

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COMPARATIVE LENGTHS OF RIFLES AND BAYONETS USED IN THE GREAT WAR The kind of rifle used is indicated under the name of each country

Rozanka range we exploded on Sunday (April 18th) a mine under a German trench. This was immediately followed by a bayonet attack by our infantry, who captured the position." And the communique of April 16th: "In the Carpathians our troops noiselessly approached the enemy's barbed wire entanglements between the villages of Telepovce and Zuella, broke through, and, after a brief bayonet encounter, gained possession of two heights." But the use of the bayonet is characteristic of the war on all fronts.

So much for infantry's weapons of offense. Of the three most effective defensive weapons one is the oldest, the second had long been accounted obsolete, the third had been used in all other modern wars. They are common earth, medieval armor, and barbed wire. Of the earth (the intrenchments themselves) and of the wire (the familiar obstacle in front of them) little need be said though the French have devised a hardened steel wire that they are using in are using in the Vosges Mountains, wire so tough it cannot be cut. But few people realize the extent to which the armor of romantic history has returned to the stern reality of war.

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Doubtless our grandfathers, reading "Ivanhoe" or Froissart's "Chronicles, got from the descriptions of the be-armored knights of the tourney and the battlefield only the pleasant odor of an age gallant but forever gone. The words tinkled pleasantly in the ear: hauberk, helm, and greaves, buckler, sword, and spur; but they were the words of an art lost with the advance of advance of "unromantic" gunpowder. What no one stopped to perceive, save only some antiquarians and some especially discerning military experts, was that "the improvement in firearms did not drive out armor, but a change in strategy that called for long marches and rapid movements of armies." In other words, it became of less moment that a man should be proof against bullets (as armor still made him) than that he should be swifter in living up to Napoleon's maxim that the general who had the most troops at the critical place at the crucial moment won the battle.

But in this war-on the western front, at least-troops are no longer mobile: they are literally sitting in chairs in trenches-most of the time waiting for something to turn up. High explosive

shells and shrapnel are their most dangerous foes when they stay below their ramparts: rifle bullets when they peer above them. Against "H. E." shells there is no real protection. But shrapnel bullets are discharged from their shells at a relatively low velocity; good armor has proved to be proof against them. The protection against rifle bullets is a different matter. Here the velocity is terrific. Strangely enough, however, the course of a modern rifle bullet is most unstable. The bullet is so delicately balanced, and so carefully formed to slip most easily through the resisting air, that the slightest force against it sideways deflects it hopelessly from its path. Head on, it will go through the bodies of six men. But let it strike a twig ever so little to one side of its case, or strike its mark a glancing instead of a direct blow, and it flies off easily. Here rounded or pointed armor has proved its great value. French soldiers are being equipped with steel skull caps that are almost indistinguishable from the brimless helmets of English armor after the Norman conquest. Enough experience

has been gained from their use to demonstrate their value in turning rifle bullets and shrapnel; and French field surgeons are urging that their use be widely extended. Similar experience with fine cuirasses has shown similar results: but great danger lies in the use of chain mail, and coats of mail made of steel pieces sewn on canvas or leather, because the value of armor under modern conditions is in its property of causing bullets to glance off, not in its direct resistance; and where bits of the mail are driven inward they greatly complicate the surgeon's task.

ARMOR NOT TOO HEAVY

The weight of armor is not an objection. "A very serviceable half-armor weighs about 30 pounds, to which may be added another 15 pounds for clothing and arms, making together 45 pounds. Against this may be placed the (British) service equipment (of 1911) totalling 59 pounds 11 ounces. In the case of the cavalry the comparison is still more striking, for the war horse of the late fifteenth century carried about 350 pounds (horse armor, rider, rider's armor,

arms, and saddlery), while the German Cuirassier horse of 1909 carried 334 pounds."

Perhaps of even more value than its use for defense, armor is valuable in those vital operations of digging-in and of the brief charges across the open space between the trenches. Imperfect as its protection is, it is still protection, and its moral value is, therefore, great. Already steel shields are used in the trenches to protect the heads of the men as they dig. The need of something of the sort under fire is suggested by the device of the infantrymen, who carry a bag of sand on their backs as they crawl out into the open to begin new trenches; the bags are a complete protection against shrapnel. Armor, then, in various forms, is already a potent element in this war, and likely to increase in importance.

In one of his observations on the art of war, Napoleon remarked that "cavalry is most useful where the country is open and level. I found it so on the plains of Poland." Exactly that phrase may be repeated as of this war, though it will gain by an addition to make it read: "cavalry is most useful where the country is open and level, and when the armies are unevenly matched so that they move too rapidly across the plain to dig themselves in. This has been especially so on the plains of Poland." In the early part of the war, when the Russians drove the Austrians rapidly back on the Carpathians. and in the last few months, when the Germans drove the Russians rapidly back from Warsaw, cavalry—and especially Russian cavalry-has had nearly all its value as of old; its value for scouting, its value for swift manœuvres to press an advantage or retrieve a defeat, its value for "shock" against the enemy's line when its weight and velocity were needed to give impact to a decisive blow.

THE CAVALRY OF THE CLOUDS

But the aeroplanes, clattering through the clouds, are the real cavalry of this war. They are the ideal scouts, for they see the whole country they spy out, not merely a detail here and there. Except when one side gains "control of the air." their reports eliminate surprise as a device of

victory; sudden flanking movements, disguised by a "diversion with cavalry" at some other part of the line, have largely gone to the rag-bag of tactics. Even Von Kluck's gigantic drive around Sir John French's flank owed its failure largely to the constant watching of British aeroplanes which kept the retreat always just a little ahead of his advance. Aeroplanes are the real protagonists of the prosaic story of the trenches. They tell the hidden artillery where to shoot, and that part of the field becomes automatically the graveyard of any force that seeks to cross it.

But it is easy to forget-it has largely been forgotten-that the aeroplane is also a weapon. Bombs dropped from a little British Sopwith "tabloid" flier destroyed a new Zeppelin in its shed at Düsseldorf; the Kaiser narrowly escaped death from its missiles at Thielt, in Belgium, where he had gone to watch the assault on Ypres, and several members of his staff were killed; aeroplane raids have done real damage to the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen and to German supply depots at several places in Belgium. Dropping steel darts the size of a lead pencil in lots of several hundred at a time has caused the confusion of marching columns of troops and the instant death of many soldiers. But after all, this is most character

istically a war of artillery. Napoleon is its presiding genius. He first massed guns to annihilate part of an enemy's line before the charge: the record of this war is monotonous in the uniformity of the entries, day after day, describing the massing of batteries such as Napoleon. wanted but could never get. 'Always work the artillery with great rapidity, he said: these 4-inch British howitzers and French 75-millimetre rifles shoot from five to twenty-five shots a minute. "It is always behind time, and there is never enough of it," Napoleon added: a battery of a hundred pieces is a commonplace in France, and once, in Galicia, at the Battle of the San, last May, the Austrians and Germans concentrated the fire of 1,500 guns upon one short section of the Russian lines. High explosive shells to wreck trenches, shrapnel to kill their occupants-that is the ceaseless and characteristic note of this war. Artillery itself is old as history: good big siege cannon date from 1453, when the Turks besieged Constantinople with guns that fired a 600-pound stone a mile. Shrapnel is the better part of a hundred years old. The big novelty in weapons is the aeroplane-it has altered the tactics of all armies and with it the relative value of all other weapons.

WILL PROSPERITY OR POVERTY
FOLLOW THE WAR?

THE CONCLUSIONS OF AN OPTIMIST WHO DOES NOT BELIEVE THE PREDICTIONS
OF A FINANCIAL CATACLYSM

T

BY

THEODORE H. PRICE

THE SECOND OF A SERIES OF SIX ARTICLES ON THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR]

HE president of one of the larger New York trust companies, recently returned from Europe, is quoted as having said that the war would surely last until the end of 1916; that it was likely to last two years more and, if so, two years

from now the United States will be involved in a universal financial cataclysm because of the destruction of European capital by the war.

His prediction has made a very definite impression and has intensified the apprehension previously felt by many regarding

the financial and commercial conditions which will prevail here after the war.

It is this feeling that is restråihing our internal trade, despite abundant crops, plethoric bank reserves, and an unprecedented. balance of trade in favor of the United States. It is this feeling that prompts so many men to say "Go slow" when asked to authorize constructive and wealth-producing work. It is this feeling that is responsible for the depression in the shoe trade, the lumber trade, the building trade, and many other industries not directly stimulated by the "war orders," and it is this feeling which, pervading extensive commercial areas of the country such as the Pacific Coast and the South Atlantic States, dampens enthusiasm and checks normal development.

It is safe to say that were it not for this feeling the superabundant bank credit now available would have found safe employment long ere this in developing the marvelous resources of our but partially developed country.

It may, in fact, be said that almost one side of the body commercial in the United States is paralyzed by the fear of this postbellum cataclysm, while the other side is feeling the glow of the hectic activity induced by the demand for military supplies.

It becomes, therefore, highly important to know whether the fear is justified.

To go slow is wise if a cataclysm is really impending, but if not the productive power of many lives that can never be lived again will be lost and the energy of the capital now reposing in our banks will remain latent.

The belief that the waste and disorganization of war will bring business depression seems plausible and is fostered by the gloomy exhalations of the battlefield, but it becomes very debatable when examined in the light of the precedents and the facts.

NO DEPRESSION AFTER OTHER WARS

The precedents are the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, our own War of the Confederacy, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, and the Russian-Japanese War. None of these wars was immediately succeeded by acute depression. Some of

them, in fact, appear to have induced or at least were followed by extraordinary activity and prosperity.

This is noticeably true in the case of all the wars that have occurred since steam, electricity, and labor-saving machinery have made rapid economic adjustment possible.

But it may be said that precedents do not apply to an unprecedented situation and that the magnitude of the present struggle is entirely beyond the measurement of history.

This is true, and although principles generally apply irrespective of size, it is just as well to scrutinize the facts as well as the precedents.

What, then, are the facts? About twenty million men are in arms in Europe at an expense to the various governments involved estimated at $40,000,000 a day. How much of this would be spent in luxury and extravagance if the belligerent nations were at peace, it is hard to say.

IS ECONOMY OFFSETTING THE WAR WASTE? Certainly great economy is now being practised throughout Europe.

Is it the equivalent of ten cents per capita daily? If so, the European population of 450,000,000 is saving $45,000,000 a day, which is more than the cost of the armies.

It is guesswork at best, but thus far the war has not disproved the axiom that the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts and that it cannot exceed that sum.

Up to date the war has been fought with money obtained in Europe, and not elsewhere. Whatever may be borrowed in America is but a drop in the bucket.

The belligerent nations are, therefore. taxing themselves or going in debt to their own citizens to pay for the war. This looks like the redistribution, but not the destruction, of capital. There is, of course, waste. It is represented by the cost of explosives which are reconverted into gas; of guns that are destroyed; of ships that are sunk, and the value of a few, not many, cities that are razed. is this cost greater than that of automobiles that are worn out in the pursuit of pleasure, of superfluous servants, of extravagant dressing and eating, and of the

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