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must prove not only that men can rule themselves but that democracies can wisely foresee and efficiently prepare.

CONGRESS AND THE PORK BARREL

Congress as the representative of the Nation, is rebuked by a dozen or more papers for subordinating preparedness to what the Washington Post phrases as "local selfishness," which "takes the form of a scramble for 'pork.' whether it is to be found in a river and harbor bill, a public buildings bill, or in Army and Navy appropriation bills." The Nevada State Journal (Reno) remarks bitterly that "senators and representatives have their millions for building political fences but only a paltry dole to secure this nation from foreign attack." The Quincy (III.) Herald says: "How simple it would be if some of the pork barrel waste of undeserved pensions could be used in proper sources and without the corruption of politics." And the Minneapolis Journal calls for a new national defense, "defense against the ship and arms lobbies and the navy yard and army post tax-eaters."

THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

Answering the question, What is adequate defense? many papers agree with the St. Louis Post Dispatch that "our defense against powerful foreign attack is on the sea." And many add, with the same paper, that "we ought to have a Navy sufficient and efficient enough to resist sea attack by the most powerful foreign navy." Thus the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune declares that "our first line of defense must be a real one, large enough, modern enough, and efficient enough to cope with any in the world"; and the Schenectady (N. Y.) Union Star, that "this great nation of wealth and resources should at once develop the greatest naval strength of any nation in the world." The Evansville (Ind.) Press, the Norfolk (Va.) Ledger Dispatch and the Columbus (O.) Citizen call for "the biggest navy on the seas."

More moderate, if less explicit, programmes of naval defense are outlined by other papers. The Detroit Free Press says that "the country wants to be sure its Navy will cope with attacks if they

should be made." The New York Times chides the Nation because "in an hour of great peril we have been adhering to the ordinary programme of naval development. The situation demands a change." The Sioux Falls (S. Dak.) Press feels that "the United States needs a Navy of sufficient strength to keep invaders away from either coast, and to safeguard the Panama canal and insular possessions."

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DEFECTS OF THE NAVY

The Brooklyn (N. Y.) Eagle summarizes most of the defects in the Navy that are mentioned by other papers:

We have not in the Navy a single battle cruiser,

type of demonstrated value, and we have a submarine flotilla that would be a joke if the tragedy of the F-4 were not at this moment so conspicuously revived to view as to make joking indecent. Our torpedo-boat squadrons are insufficient to protect our battleships against submarine attack, and with the construction of the Minneapolis and Columbia, now almost or quite obsolete, we seem to have definitely abandoned the idea of building up a group of swift scouts and commerce destroyers such as have excellently served the purposes of both England and Germany.

"SUBMARINES THE REMEDY"

"The remedy" for the deficiencies of our Navy, says the New York Commercial, "is the submarine." The Atlanta Constitution agrees: "If the war in Europe has proven anything, it has demonstrated beyond question the fact that it is upon the development and construction of the submarine that we need to first concentrate our energies." The New York Evening Journal declares that "our submarine manufacturers should be kept at work by our Government until we have enough submarines to protect every port, East and West, including the Panama Canal," adding that "it ought to be somebody's business to keep all the submarine energy, mechanics, and engineers of this country busy until we have enough submarines of our own a hundred to start with-and then more."

The Syracuse (N. Y.) Journal, however, warns us to "keep the balance even, asserting that, though “the 'big ship' men have ruled the Navy, it is a

polish man who puts all his eggs in one asket," and hence it counsels the Nation o "provide for big ships and little ships.'

THE ARMY'S NEEDS

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Coming to the Army and its needs, there s, among editors, as the Buffalo Evening News points out, "a variance of opinion. is to the proper ways and means. suggestions vary from the proposal that we rely upon trained citizenry to the admonition that nothing short of organized militia numbering 2,000,000 men will The afford us security from invasion." The same paper speaks for many others when it adds: "The pleasing feature is to see that the old spirit of 'squirrel-gun Yankeeism' is passing."

Many papers agree with the New York Times that "all that need be done by Congress for the immediate improvement of the Army will be duly set down in Secretary Garrison's recommendations." Perhaps the best concise statement of just what the "Garrison plan" is appears in the Syracuse (N. Y.) Post Standard:

The military forces of the United States shall be, it is proposed, of four classes.

The Regular Army will consist of 200,000 men, double its present nominal strength. The term of service, however, will be reduced, without reduction in the term of enlistment. The recruit who has shown the required proficiency may, after one year's service, pass to the re

serves.

The reserves, steadily increased by this process of graduation from the Regular Army, will be, not only subject to call for war service, but required to attend manœuvres. The reserve army would, under the plan proposed, grow at the rate of 100,000 a year.

The national guards of the states will be brought into still closer connection with the Federal Government and there will be new inducements offered for service in it.

A new force will be organized to be called by the attractive name of Continentals, volunteers under command of regular army officers enlisted for three years, but required to do service only a month or two a year.

Under this plan we find "the regulars and reserves constituting the first line, the militiamen and continentals the volunteer second line of defense."

At this point we come to the sharpest

division of opinion among the papers that we find on any aspect of the whole subject of preparedness. Some editors place their chief reliance on an enlarged Regular Army, some on an improved militia, some on volunteers, some on the Swiss system of universal training.

FOR VOLUNTEER ARMIES

The case for the volunteer system is well presented by the New York World:

The volunteer system must be the main deNeipendence of this country in case of war. ther the regulars nor the state troops are strong enough in numbers to make an army for the national defense. A citizen soldiery, with all its drawbacks from the strictly military point of view, is the only means by which large forces. can be prepared for service in the field on short notice.

In sharp contrast with this view, the Buffalo Express exclaims:

Above all, let us have no nonsense about volunteer forces raised for the short terms by states, as was done in the Spanish and Civil wars. The Express intends no reflection on the quality of those volunteers or their services. But what is needed now is a regular United States Army of not less than 300,000 men, enlisted for the sevenyear period-four years with the colors and three years in reserve.

FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING

A surprising number of papers regretfully prophesy the approach of universal compulsory military training. Thus the Kansas City Journal says:

"Many present-day Americans have insisted that in a liberty-loving country the people would make any sacrifice to preserve their freedom. The comparative lack of voluntary recruits in the British isles is a hard blow to such a belief."

The Duluth News and Tribune sees such a lesson in Plattsburg:

Instead of 1,200 such reservists, this country should have 1,200,000. Instead of waiting until adults to take this drill, it should come in the high schools all over this country with annual encampments afterward, of some ten days, to keep in shape and acquire the latest in war instruction.

This is the Swiss system; it should be ours.

The Portland Oregonian, the Washington Post, the Chicago Herald, the Boston Transcript, and the New Orleans Item, favor the Swiss or some similar system.

Perhaps strangest of all, the Milwaukee Leader, the paper of Mr. Victor L. Berger, the Socialist leader, comes out for "a citizen soldiery." It says:

Until the American workingman shall be prepared to take the little brown brother to his bosom and until the American capitalist shall manifest a disposition to surrender his advantages, until the Monroe Doctrine shall be repudiated and American pretensions to the overlordship of two continents abandoned, a reasonable amount of common sense would suggest that, at least, we should take such a reasonable and democratic measure for national defense as is found in a citizen soldiery.

FOR AN IMPROVED MILITIA

On the other hand, many papers declare that American opinion will not, for the present at least, tolerate compulsion. This is the belief of the Washington Post and of the Newark Evening News, for example. The Philadelphia Bulletin sees an escape from it in the National Guard:

Before conscription is resorted to and universal military training enforced, public opinion should insist on a practical attempt at the development of a compensated national army reserve, a plan that never has been tried, although urged by military experts continuously. And the first step in that direction is the encouragement of efficiency in the existing National Guard organization.

Many papers, of substantially the same mind as those just quoted, feel that the National Guard has been neglected by the states and unfairly used by employers. For example, the Omaha World Herald describes one reason for the small enlistments in the Guard:

Members of the Guard are everywhere saying that they enlisted to defend the United States Government and as a reserve for the Regular Army. They did not enlist to defend Standard Oil or any other trust or corporation in contests with laborers,

The St. Louis Globe-Democrat points out that "one of the handicaps of proper militia development has always been the refusal of business men to cooperate with

the states by allowing their employees to take the time needed for necessary drill in the annual encampments. The business interests, it seems, must be aroused to the value and the need of the work." The Kansas City Journal calls for "a federalization of the whole militia organization."

PAYING FOR PREPAREDNESS

"Financing Preparedness" is the title of an editorial in the Springfield (Mass.) Republican, which raises a question to which many papers try to find the answer. The Republican itself, after pointing out that "the German private soldier under the conscription system gets ten cents a day and the private in the United States Army under the volunteer system gets nearly five times that sum," remarks:

If the people demand a Regular Army double or triple in size the present Army, they must be prepared to pay on a scale such as no European people are forced to meet. . . . Our total war department expenditures, omitting pensions in the fiscal year before the outbreak of the European war, was nearly the same as the ordinary expenditure for the whole German imperial army: and Germany had a standing army of 800,000 men on a peace basis, while the United States maintained considerably less than 100,000 men. The Federal Government cannot possibly find the necessary money for a much larger military establishment under the present fiscal system.

Other papers, notably the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Wall Street Journal, regard the cost as of secondary moment. Says the Inquirer:

All this will cost money. Yes, but what of it? billion to be obtained by a bond issue would be We have no debt worth mentioning. Half a none too much to expend upon national defenses and the money would be well invested. Far better pay the cost of an insurance policy against war, such as preparedness would be, than foot the bills of a costly war that might be forced upon us overnight.

And the Philadelphia Telegraph is convinced that no one could or would object to providing the means for national defense by an issue of bonds to the amount of $500,000,000, or more, if necessary. But the Springfield Republican feels that "bond issues year after year cannot be

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tolerated for this purpose in time of peace." The Richmond (Va.) Times-Dispatch finds partisan calculation in those proponents of preparedness who advocate more extreme measures than are outlined in the President's more moderate views." To" those who talk about a standing Army of 1,000,000, or even of 500,000," it issues a demand that they "stop a moment and consider the cost"; and it estimates at once that "an Army of 500,000 would cost half a billion dollars a year in itself." Continuing, the Times-Dispatch says:

Where is this money to come from, year by year, assuming that the jingoes will carry their point? Increased income taxes are not likely to be favored, and internal revenue receipts from the liquor traffic will decline sharply with the spread of prohibition sentiment. There is but one other considerable factor in the total of Government revenue, which is the customs tax on imports. Is it not conceivable that some of the strenuous advocates of enormous military expenditures are affected by the hope that the country's needs would inspire-would even demand-the reimposition of the old high protective tariffs? Whatever the animus of the

militarists, it is about as certain as anything in

the future can be that the attainment of their ambition would be accompanied by a strongly organized movement for the re-enactment of the Payne-Aldrich tariff law, or something

like it.

No paper of the entire 261 expressed downright opposition to preparedness. Six newspapers were either more interested in other aspects of our relation to the possibility of war or were so lukewarm toward preparedness as to suggest an opposition they did not express. These papers are the New York Call, the San Francisco Bulletin, the Florida TimesUnion, the Great Falls (Mont.) Tribune, the Bloomington, (Ill.) Bulletin, and the New York Evening Post.

THE NEED FOR SELF-SACRIFICE

Taking the broadest possible view of national defense, the Adrian (Mich.) Telegram discusses the fundamental question of character-the character of the American people, and the effects upon it of a too easy acquiescence in the gospel of peace. After a searching investigation

of our national failings, it makes an eloquent plea for the personal sense of responsibility for the welfare of the country, in an editorial, "The Struggle for Ease" in which it says:

The one thing that the average man detests is the idea of doing anything himself. He is willing to give up some money to hire men, away off somewhere, to man guns and sail ships that he never saw. But when it comes to giving some of his own precious time, and separating himself from his own precious job, in order to learn how to fight if his country should need him, he balks. He takes refuge in a cloud of words about "militarism" and "millions leaping to arms," invokes the holy check-book, and hopes that nothing will happen.

But that very thing-personal service by individual men-is what we must come to. Every other nation under the sun, in every age, has come to it-or else gone down in the dust before more vigorous peoples. As long as the American soldier is looked upon as a hired man, working at a job for the pay that is in it, just so long we shall be without an Army worthy of the name. If the safety of the country and the honor of the flag are not worth Mr. Average Man's giving a little of his own time to military service, then country and flag mean little. Trained men alone are worth anything in war; and the only way to get trained men is for Mr. Average Man, and his sons and brothers-his clerks, partners, and neighbors-his employer and his employees- -all alike to do their individual shares toward providing for the Nation's defense.

So what we need and what we must have, and what we will have, is the very thing that Mr. Bryan and Mr. Carnegie and the "peace congresses" detest and abhor-military training. We must increase our Army. We must strengthen and improve our state troops. We must have instruction camps like that at Plattsburg, where right-minded men can learn at least a little about military service. We must have an enlarged national military academy to train officers, and we must offer every incentive to rifle practice and to military exercises of every kind.

And finally we must see that our children are not fed on a diet of false ideals, but teach them that citizenship means personal duty and individual sacrifice-that the flag not only protects but must be protected that the Nation is not a meal-ticket to get fat on, but a glorious master to be served. We have fed too long on the doctrine of the Nation's duty to the individual. It is time we learned that the individual's duty is to the Nation, even unto death.

THE COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS

THE DEBIT SIDE OF THE NATION'S LEDGER OUR WARS AN EXAMPLE OF INEF-
FICIENCY AND UNPREPAREDNESS-A TREMENDOUS TOLL OF HUMAN LIFE
AND WASTE OF MONEY-THE SAME CONDITIONS EXIST TO-DAY

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ONVINCED as I am that a government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanicized by education and discipline for battle, I cannot withhold my denunciation of its wickedness and folly."

These are the words of "Light-Horse Harry" Lee after the Revolution. Washington himself is on record that if he had had trained troops he should not have had to retreat across the Delaware in the beginning of the Revolution.

In the War of 1812, although we had nearly ten times as many men under arms at one time or another as those opposed to us, we achieved only one success on land and that was after the war had closed-and we had the humiliation of seeing the Capital burned by a small invading force.

In the Mexican War our forces were successful, but more because of the enemy's weakness than of our strength. Few enemies would allow a little army in hostile territory to await reinforcements unmolested as General Scott was allowed to do at Puebla; or permit us to train our troops as General Taylor for eight months trained the volunteers who won the battle of Buena Vista.

At the beginning of the Civil War the United States was faced by a government just coming into being whose forces were necessarily little better than an armed mob. Had there been an adequate army the Confederacy would never have had the chance it did to train its soldiers. As it was, the Federal Government was no better off than the Confederacy. General Upton, in his "Military Policy of the United States," says that the failure to subdue the Rebellion in 1861 was due to "our total want of military organization and preparation." In his opinion "the last

three costly and bloody years of the Civil War were needless." And General Upton's deductions were approved by no less an authority than General Sherman.

The Spanish War brought again the same old story. Some of the volunteer regiments reported without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothing. Wherever the untrained volunteers were there also were sickness and inefficiency. By contrast the campaign of the regulars in Porto Rico was achieved with neatness and dispatch.

In the past we have prolonged our wars, murdered our citizens, wasted our resources, and suffered humiliations and defeats because we have been unprepared. Yet the difficulties of transportation a hundred years ago and the unpreparedness of our antagonists since then have averted any national calamity. any national calamity. We know that other nations can strike quick and hard. We know that great bodies of troops can be moved across the water. From our own past we know that "a nation which goes to war unprepared educates its statesmen at more expense than its soldiers."

The

We have been accustomed to think of the Atlantic and Pacific as our main defenses. They certainly would add tremendously to the difficulties of an attack upon us and limit seriously the number of men that would be sent against us. transportation of the troops to Gallipoli may revise our estimate of the limits of sea transportation but it still remains true that adequate defense does not mean the burden for us that it does, for example, for France. The limits of sea transportation also make it easy for us to differentiate between an offensive and defensive army, for numbers that would be adequate for our defense would offer no menace to the armies of Europe. We can get from our military and naval authorities the facts of our condition and requirements

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