VOLUME XXXI

NUMBER 6

T

Herr

HE German Government, after the sinking of the Arabic, pledged that its submarines would not sink merchant vessels without warning, and that the passengers and crews should be saved unless the ships resisted or fled. von Jagow himself admitted that before these pledges were given he knew that British merchantmen were armed, as according to law and usage they have a right to be, for defense; and we have always admitted that vessels otherwise armed are properly subject to attack.

Germany's order that after March 1st its submarines would sink without warning vessels armed for defense is in violation of the earlier pledge. That pledge was but a recognition of international law which Germany had violated in killing the American passengers on the Lusitania and Arabic. The order to sink ships with defensive armament violates international law, German pledges, and our rights.

This is the "scrap of paper" theory, not against Belgium's neutrality but against ours.

Moreover, it is backed by the policy of frightfulness against us as it was against Belgium. The Lusitania was sunk despite our warning that we should hold the government responsible for such acts to a strict accountability. The sinking of the Arabic followed, and the pledges given

after that sinking are now modified to suit Germany's convenience. German political propaganda has been pushed here to overawe our Government, and our factories and docks have been blown up to further German ends. This is the policy of frightfulness as applied to us, and when the peace people and pro-Germans in Congress wished to pass a resolution to warn Americans from taking passage on merchant ships armed for defense and gave as their reason that they were afraid that if we did not give up our rights in this way and allow Germany to violate its pledges and our neutrality there would be war, Germany hailed it as a proof of the effectiveness of the policy of frightfulness-rejoiced that its political propaganda and its threats against our rights could start a panic in our national legislature.

But that panic served Germany little. It aroused the President to force those afraid of and those over-friendly to Germany to show their numbers in public and to prove how weak their disaffection was. It aroused the President to take with vigor the leadership from the wobbling, meddling hands of Congress and to stand firm for American rights; and in this course, to whatever ends it leads, the people will support him. The United States is a nation. It has rights, convictions, and the courage to maintain them.

MAKING MEXICO UNDERSTAND

W

THEN Francisco Villa and his outlaw band crossed on to American soil and suddenly attacked Columbus, N. M., killing civilians and soldiers alike, he ushered in a new phase of the Mexican problem.

There have been several stages in Mexican relations with the United States since Porfirio Diaz went away from Mexico City and Madero took his place in the national palace on the Zocalo. The first period, the provisional presidency of Madero, came to an end with his assassination. The United States had recognized the Madero Government. As a nation we sympathized with the Mexican people's desire to achieve a larger measure of popular rule than Don Porfirio judged advisable for his people, and the Madero Government was generally accepted here as a sincere if not particularly effective attempt toward liberalization. There were then, however, as there are now, many Americans who did not sympathize with the revolution because they agreed with President Diaz's disbelief in the Mexicans' capabilities for self-government.

When Huerta took the Government of Mexico as a result of the murder of Madero he was not recognized by the United States. The American Government took a hostile attitude toward Huerta's dictatorship Huerta's dictatorship because to recognize the government of a man who achieved power by assassination is repugnant to any civilized nation, and, moreover, it would put a premium on that method of political preferment in Mexico. And there was yet another rea

There seemed to be a grave danger that under Huerta Mexico would make financial arrangements with foreigners likely to embarrass the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. A close study of the events leading up to our recent intervention in Haiti makes plain enough the possible international dangers in Mexico.

The unfriendly attitude of the United States finally forced Huerta out. The occupation of Vera Cruz was the most tangible and effective evidence of that attitude. But the expedition to Vera Cruz was not sent to force Huerta out

at least it was not so stated. It was sent to force an apologetic salute to our flaz Neither from Huerta nor Carranza did we get either the apology or the salute. On the contrary, the correspondence of both was far from apologetic, despite the fact that many Americans were killed in Mexico and much American property destroyed Nor were the special emissaries who were sent to Mexico any more effective than our correspondence. Consequently our desire to be patient with Mexico because of its internal difficulties began to take on an aspect of impotence and vacillation. stead of appearing as a strong and forbearing neighbor helping a weak brother to self-mastery, we appeared somewhat as a bungling busybody who was forced to put up with a good deal of insult and injur without having the intelligence or courage to resent it.

In

This unfavorable aspect of our conduct arose from the mishandling of a fundamentally wise and sound policy-a policy more far-seeing than most of the critics of our Mexican relations could have conceived. The President's policy that Mexico should be given every possible opportunity and help to govern itself is in strict accord with our better feelings toward our neighbors; it furnishes a convincing and needed proof of the disinterestedness of our Monroe Doctrine-a policy of mutual advantage to us and to Mexico and of advantage to Pan-American relations in general.

But the bungling execution of the policy tended to obscure its real meaning from the Mexicans perhaps more than from any other people. The recognition of Carranza after we had seemed to favor Villa and after Carranza's very pugnacious notes to us, seemed to fit in with the picture of the United States as a vacillating meddler.

Out of this situation Villa emerged to attack a town on American soil guarded by United States soldiers. Villa did not so much lack respect for American troops as he evidently counted on the continuance of their orders to stay on their own side of the border. He evidently was confused between what our policy appeared to be from its execution and what it is in truth His confusion led him to precipitate a new chapter in the Mexican problem

When this chapter is concluded it is to be hoped that our fundamental aim will be just as it was-to be a forbearing neighbor trying to help Mexico find itself-and that this policy will be better understood here and in Mexico.

It is fortunate that, as we have to send O troops after Villa, there is precedent for such an expedition, legalized by old agreements between the two countries that troops of either can cross the border after bandits. For this precedent could make it easier for the Mexicans to accept the situation without admitting any impairment of Mexican sovereignty. This should be useful, for it must be kept constantly in mind that the main end for which we are striving is to make Mexican sovereignty worthy of the pride which the Mexicans take in it. We have not been helping toward that end in allowing them to harbor serious misconceptions about the rights of foreigners in Mexico or about the sacredness of life and the rights of property. We have not helped if we have encouraged them to mistake friendly toleration for weakness. Therefore if we do our full duty by Francisco Villa we shall be serving

Mexico in two ways-in ridding the country of a disturbing character and in making our own motives and intentions clearer than they have been. Moreover, there is every reason for the Mexicans to facilitate our efforts because, as disorder continues in Mexico, more and more Americans take the view that Mexico cannot govern itself and that we might as well intervene.

The possibility of intervention has long hung over the relations between the American Government and the governments of Mexico, for the Mexican problem is not a problem of months or even years, but of decades. The progress of civilization is slow. The art of self-government is not learned quickly. It is well for every one to have an accurate understanding of our policy, for in the years to come, as Mexico tries to work out its problems, that policy will in all probability be severely tried on many occasions. In the last analysis the success of our efforts of friendly helpfulness does not rest with us but with the Mexicans. Events have tended to suggest that the progress toward self-government in Mexico might cost more than it was worth and intervention become necessary.