against the Germans and Austrians in every field of war, and as these lines are written on the first of October, that theory

T

seems to be borne out by the general offensive which is being thrust home against the subterranean German armies in France.

HE situation on the Austro-Italian front is much as it was two months ago. The Italian army is across the political frontier at nearly all points and in October confronts the Austrian front line permanent and semi-permanent positions. No counter offensive has been attempted by the Austrians because the bulk of their army is engaged in Russia. The strategical aspects of the campaign remain exactly as they were described in the WORLD'S WORK for September. After five months of fighting no important impression has been made on the Austrian works and defense lines by the Italians.

Since the declaration of war by Italy against Turkey there have been many

rumors of the transportation of 110,000 Italian troops to Turkey. This expeditionary army, which is supposed to be on the Island of Lemnos, has so far failed to make its appearance on any battlefield in that region. As the Italians may need all the men they can get on their northern frontiers before many months are past it seems improbable that they will send any very great number of troops away from home. To do so would be to play directly into Austria's hands. "Stalemate," then, characterizes the Austro-Italian operations for the time being. The decisive area in this theatre of the war still lies along the line of the Adige River or, in other words, in the Tyrolean salient.

OLITICAL campaigns have been waged with growing intensity in the Balkans for the last two months. From present appearances Roumania, Greece, and Bulgaria, but particularly the last, are much like "men from Missouri" and desire with Balkan vehemence to be shown. What impresses them particularly is the success of the Teutonic military operations against Russia uninterrupted from May to September. Bulgaria appears to have come to a definite understanding with Turkey, accomplished by the Turks' ceding a narrow strip of territory from the vicinity of Adrianople to the Ægean Sea, through which passes a railroad connecting Sofia with the seaport of Dedeagatch. This wise concession on the part of Turkey gives Bulgaria a port on the Ægean Sea with an all-Bulgarian railroad to it, a long desired combination which they did not formerly possess.

On their side the Entente Allies have tried to bring back to life the "Balkan League" of Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for an attack on the Turk, but

the possibility of renewing that old agreement seems at this writing to be very slight on account of the bitter antipathy of Bulgaria against Greece and Servia, due to the second Balkan War and the hard terms of the peace of Bukharest.

In the first days of October the Balkan nations are still watchfully waiting and willing to sell out to the highest bidder whenever they are convinced that he can deliver the goods he is promising. The ability to deliver the goods is being determined on the battlefields of western Europe and Russia. Recently there seem to be indications that Bulgaria is leaning decidedly toward the Teutonic Allies, although after the checking of the Austrians in easternmost Galicia, and the beginning of the Anglo-French offensive in Flanders and Champagne, the Government at Sofia, disclaiming anything but armed neutrality, is apparently hedging. All the Balkan nations have been, since August, on a thorough war footing, although only two have any power to take the offensive unsupported by the Allies.

These are Roumania, whose field army is efficient and numbers about 500,000 men, and Bulgaria, equally efficient, whose field army numbers more than 400,000 men. Greece can maintain a force of about 150,000 men in a field army and Servia at the present time can probably muster 300,000 men. The Servian army has been strengthened by the addition of French artillery, French and English staff officers, and a few troops of both these countries. But against such a large country as Austria they are entirely incapable of large offensive operations alone.

Of all the Balkan states Bulgaria is in the strongest strategic position, no matter which side it may eventually join. It holds the "inner line," has well fortified borders, and good communications within itself. As no shots have been fired by the Balkan states against each other, up to October, what they are going to do remains a matter for speculation. The effect of their entrance on the war in Turkey would be great, but their effect elsewhere would not be immediate, no matter which way they might jump.

THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE BALKANS

The value to any of their supporters or abettors which any of the Balkan nations might have is entirely a question of how much military strength they can turn out. Military strength is a very hard thing to explain because so many elements enter into it. Numbers, geographic position, which includes natural military obstacles such as mountains and rivers, characteristics of the people, and organized resources, all have to be taken into consider ation. Every one of these states, with the exception of Greece, might be termed a "fighting" nation; that is, they have fought hard and steadfastly throughout most of their history. Greece has not showed much military ability of a high order in the last twenty years. Everything else being equal, the various Balkan states may be considered to have the following military weight, in which the units mean army corps and auxiliaries which can be put into the field and maintained there for a period of time. Incidentally it might be mentioned that Servia's power has been impaired so

greatly during the last year that neither the great Powers nor her Balkan neighbors consider her as seriously as they did before. We may therefore take Greece's value as 3, Servia's as 5, Bulgaria's as 8, and Roumania's as 9.

If Bulgaria and Roumania were fighting each other independently either one should be able to keep the other off because so much advantage lies in the defensive along their straight and contiguous frontiers. If Greece and Servia attacked Bulgaria alone, Bulgaria by a judicious handling of her troops should easily whip them both because she has the central position if nothing else. This advantage allows her to concentrate superior forces wherever she cares to exactly the situation in the second Balkan War, nullified in that case by Roumania. If Greece, Servia, and Roumania jumped on Bulgaria untroubled by any other enemies, they should probably triumph in short order because they have a military value of 17 to 8 and have a completely enveloping frontier over Bulgaria. So much for the nominal military value of the Balkan states themselves, which is only a very small part of the present "Balkan Question." Now as to their strategic disposition, what is their respective relative value?

To begin with, Servia is eliminated by the central empires right at the start because they can easily concentrate superior military strength against her.

TURKEY'S MILITARY POWER

Next a greatly rehabilitated Turkey has a military value of twelve, four units of which are being used in the Caucasus, one on the Euphrates, one in Egypt, and four around the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Two units of strength at least are therefore available for helping a "friend" if this friend should be Bulgaria. Turkey's help would be almost enough to neutralize Greece and might be even more of a deciding element, depending on what pressure the Allies can apply directly against Turkey. If the Allied forces are driven away from the Marmora theatre of operations, Turkey's power can be applied to a very much greater extent to help Bulgaria. Now if Bulgaria and Roumania decide to

remain neutral, Servia and Greece together could oppose a Teutonic invasion with eight units of military power, Servia alone with five. Roumania, as its territory Roumania, as its territory lies on the other side of Bulgaria from Servia and Greece, could not join them directly unless Bulgaria sided with Roumania. Should all the Balkan states join together—that is, Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, and Roumania-they would have a military efficiency figure of twenty-four, a very formidable amount of military strength. To take the offensive, however, against the central empires and hope for any rapid success, in view of the obstacles offered by the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River, is another matter, as the Teutonic Powers can spare probably enough military units to hold these positions against any military pressure that these little states can exert.

It must be held in mind that these small states would be acting as a confederacy with many points of difference between them in language, customs, aims, and military system. Against great military nations like Germany and Austria their power of offence would not be very great in proportion to their numbers, and it therefore is a very great question whether they could force the lines of the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube River. Besides this consideration, it must be remembered that if Germany were successful in smashing up Russia before the Balkan states had succeeded in getting across these great military obstacles, and the central empires could turn a great army against them, the result could not be long deferred. In addition, Turkey also, would neutralize their combined military strength to an appreciable degree.

WATCHING RUSSIA'S FATE

The importance of Bulgaria's decision is, therefore, apparent, as is also the reason why the Balkan states do not fly into the arms of the Entente Allies. They want to see what is going to happen to Russia. To gain anything big they must be willing to take a small amount of chance and gamble a little on who is going to come out ahead. If Bulgaria sides directly with the central empires and Turkey, Roumania

might be able to swing the balance of military strength in the Balkans. This situation, however, as has been indicated above, would be materially varied by the sending of French, British, or Italian troops to whichever country sided with the Entente Allies.

Such Allied troops, for example, might be sent across a small strip of water from the Island of Lemnos, the British-French base in the Ægean Sea. Providing Greece approved, such troops could easily be sent to Servia over the railroad from Salonica to Nish. It is of course possible that the troops said to be for use against Turkey that are, at the first of October,on the Island of Lemnos, are intended for use against Bulgaria, or to help Servia on the north. A strength of several well equipped and trained army corps is necessary in such an event to bring about anything decisive. Montenegro has not been mentioned because it is so small a country that its military strength can make very little difference. Its terrain is mountainous and hard to traverse and its strategic position is not especially good for large operations against Austria. Albania offers some advantages for a move from Italy through Avlona or Durazzo, but the absence of railroads makes this a difficult field for large operations also.

The Bulgarians, as they have since the beginning of the war, hold the key. Roumania can remain neutral or run the risk of being attacked in front by Bulgaria and in rear by the Austro-Germans: In this case, with the addition of help from Turkey, Bulgaria would have a military strength figure of at least ten, which with an Austro-German addition of five from the rear against Roumania would probably mean the defeat of the latter nation. An invasion of Servia and Greece, with a strength figure of eight, would need an additional application of about twelve by the central empires or, on the outside, seventeen against all the Balkans, except Bulgaria, to win. This number the central empires appear to have available, depending, of course, on the success of their campaigns in Russia and on the western front, and on the military help given to Servia by England, France, Italy, or Russia.

HE position of the Allied expeditionary forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula during August was a matter of very serious concern to their governments. They had to be reinforced or get out. To help them small reinforcements of both French and British were sent from time to time and in addition a new unit of British troops was organized on the Island of Lemnos during July for the purpose of making a surprise attack against the Turks on the Gallipoli lines. During the first days of August a force of about 50,000 men was embarked on transports of all sorts at the island port of Mudros. The equipment for the landing operations was very complete in all details and the troops had been well instructed in what they were to do. Several days prior to this time demonstrations had been made by the Allied warships on the coast of the Gulf of Adramyti, about 50 miles south of the Dardanelles, and also at various places along the coast of Anatolia for the purpose of diverting the Turks' attention to those areas and making them move troops southward in those directions.

On the night of the 6th of August the expedition left Lemnos and, proceeding to the Gulf of Saros, made a feint at a landing near Kara Tehali, not far from the head of the Gulf. A small detachment was put ashore and, after an encounter with the Turks in which a few men were killed, the rest reëmbarked. The Turks appear to have been uncertain where the main landing was to be made because only small groups of them were encountered by the landing forces at Suvla Bay, toward which actual objective the whole British force now proceeded.

The British colonial troops have held a footing at Ari Burnu, called by the British the "Anzac" position from the letters of the different contingents, Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian, composing the landing forces. This position contains an area of about one square mile. Now the landing at Suvla Bay was designed to connect up with this foothold at Ari Burnu as a pivot from which, by swinging around from the left, they hoped to take the

Turkish main force north of Maidos both in flank and rear. To be successful this movement would have had to be a complete surprise.

The landing began at Cape Suvla on the night of the 6th of August and continued on the 7th along the beach between that point and Ari Burnu. At the same time the Allies at the tip of the Peninsula launched strong attacks against the Turks on the Krithia front, while the troops at Ari Burnu also attacked strenuously. The Turks were slow in bringing up their reserves, as they did not wish to commit them to the contest until there was no doubt of what the Allies' intentions were. The result was that the forces landing at and near Suvla Bay not only accomplished their disembarkation successfully, but advanced a considerable distance inland, in some places as much as three miles. The Turkish reserves were then brought up and attacked the whole of the British lines, breaking them at many points, and hurling them down the slopes of the hills, taken in front, flank, and in some places even in the rear. For about twelve days the fighting was of the most desperate nature, at the end of which time the British had been driven back to a line running from Cape Suvla to their old position of Ari Burnu, a front of about twelve miles. In this position they have held on up to the present writing, October 1st.

The losses in this fighting were tremendous on both sides. The Turks claim that the British losses during the twelve days amounted to nearly as much as the whole force that they landed from Lemnos. Although the exact casualties incurred are not as yet known, we do know that they were, on both sides, the heaviest of the whole Turkish campaign. In the operations around the Dardanelles during the last two months, i.e., up to October 1st, while the Allies have extended their lines on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, nothing at all decisive has yet been gained there, whereas enormously disproportionate losses have been incurred.

In the Egyptian, Euphrates, and Caucasian theatres of war no great changes