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Entente thought it possible that "the by some one else. In fact, such stories old man of the lakes" had been supplanted were spread by the Germans themselves.

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THE EASTERN THEATRE OF THE WAR-JULY 28TH By July 28th the great battles on Field Marshal von Mackensen's front along the line of the Ivangorod-Lublin-Kholm-Kiev railroad had been determined in favor of the Germans, and the Russians had begun their retreat across and east of that railroad. This was the signal for the launching of a general attack by Field Marshal von Hindenberg from East Prussia against the river lines opposite that front and the Russian barrier forts of Pultusk, Rozan, Ostrolenka, Lomza, and Ossowiec. To the west of the Vistula the armies of Prince Leopold of Bavaria attacked the "Blonie" line of defenses protecting Warsaw. These forces joined the forces operating on Mackensen's

extreme left in front of Ivangorod. The Russians were now attacked with determination from the north, south, and west by the Austro-Germans. About 1,500,000 Germans and Austrians plunged through the morasses, rivers, and forests of Poland at an equal number of Russians supported by intrenchments and permanent works of all kinds.

As the Germanic allies' forces flanked the Russians in the "salient" formed by their lines toward Warsaw the Russians were in great danger of having the railroads cut behind them unless they could defeat their opponents decisively on each one of their three fronts.

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THE EASTERN THEATRE-AUGUST 6TH

During the week preceding the 6th of August the Germanic allies had broken down the resistance of the Russians at all places. On the north the barrier forts between Novo Georgievsk and Ossowiec were falling at an alarming rate. The Germans west of the Vistula had broken through the strong lines covering Warsaw, and Field Marshal von Mackensen had crossed the Lublin-Kholm railroad in the south. The Russian army had been definitely divided into two parts, one south of the Pripet Swamps and the other north of them. The northern part contained about three fourths of the whole mobile force, the great quadrilateral of permanent forts, and the large advance base situated at the fortress of Brest-Litovsk. At this time the Russians decided that to attempt to hold the Polish "salient" any longer meant the destruction of their field army with little hope of ever renewing it. They therefore decided to evacuate the whole Polish salient and fall back to the line of the Bug River, with its fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, and Brest-Litovsk. Warsaw was evacuated by the Russians on August 5th and immediately occupied by the army of Prince Leopold, who was on their heels. The line of the Vistula was forced at many points and the fortress of Ivangorod captured on the 6th. The Russian army was now in full retreat and the pursuit was rushed with all possible speed by the Austro-Germans.

They found expression in the English and French press, to the effect that the Kaiser had displaced him because he had stated that, as no more could be done by the German armies, peace should be sought. All these tales were spread for the purpose of concealing, as much as possible, what was actually taking place along the East Prussian frontier. The signal for Hindenburg's advance came when Mackensen's great battle for the possession of the

Lublin-Kholm railroad was decided. He held off until this time so as to try to make the Russians send all the reserve troops possible to their southern lines on Mackensen's front, thereby making it impossible to bring them back again in time to the north. Due to Mackensen's victory, also, the Russians were definitely thrown on the strategic defensive with no hope of retaking the strategic offensive anywhere on their whole line. Furthermore, their armies in Poland and those south of the Pripet Swamps, in Volhynia and Galicia, were definitely separated by this great morass. Those in Poland were jammed between the Pripet Swamps and the East Prussian frontier. In this area, bounded roughly by lines joining Kovno-OssowiecNovo Georgievsk-lvangorod to south of Brest-Litovsk, lay three fourths of the Czar's active forces, their power of offense on a large scale gone, their command of the air taken from them by the more numerous and efficient German aircraft, and their principal railroad lines running parallel to their adversaries' front. Their greatest assets were the difficult country over which the enemy had to advance to get at them and the incomparable fortitude of their troops in adversity. The battle for the possession of the LublinKholm railroad, then, may be considered as the end of the first strategic operations by the Austro-Germans in this campaign.

THE POLISH QUADRILATERAL

As a result of these operations the Russian army was thrust into the worst position, strategically, which it had occupied since the beginning of the war. This, therefore, was the time chosen for Hindenburg's stroke from the north. A simultaneous advance was begun all along the front of East Prussia by the German armies with forces totalling about 900,000 men, whose equipment in all respects was complete to the last detail. Of transport, both animal and motor, they had a vast accumulation. Railroad material stood ready to repair the captured roads, and great trains of siege guns had been prepared for the attack against each fort.

Of a sudden, then, the major operation shifted from southern to northern Poland.

The object, as ever, was to get behind the Russian army in the vicinity of Bielostok, or west of it, before the Russians could withdraw from the end of the salient toward Warsaw. To accomplish completely this manœuvre the river lines of the Narew, Bobr, and Niemen had to be forced, the great fortresses of Novo Georgievsk, Grodno, and Kovno had to be taken, and the lesser fortresses of Przasnysz, Serock, Pultusk, Rozan, Ostrolenka, Lomza, Ossowiec, and Olita barred the way as advanced positions. The greatest pressure was applied at first by the Germans in the Ossowiec region because it afforded the shortest route to Bielostok.

This gallant little fortress, which had been under constant attack since the 21st of March, guarded the way. Situated in the midst of swamps and river courses, astride the railroad from Lyck to Bielostok, it formed the great barrier to a quick German advance. Try as they did to reduce it, the German heavy guns sank down in the swamps even after their emplacements had been strengthened by piles driven deep into the mire. The infantry literally had to swim to approach, while the Russians had behind them a modest fort, a railroad, and a well organized defense.

Let all who have the impression that modern fortresses are worthless look at the example of Ossowiec. It was not taken until the Germans had "turned" its fortifications and got behind it. Whatever parts of the Russian main force escaped must thank Ossowiec for playing the principal part in their salvation.

The first operation which confronted Hindenburg in his offensive move was to defeat the Russian field forces guarding the river lines and extending between the secondary forts such as Przasnysz, Pultusk, Ostrolenka, Lomza, Ossowiec, and Olita, next to capture these works in order that the road centres and communications which they controlled could be made available for supplying the German armies in their further advance. The work of defeating the field forces in the intervals between the forts was the work of a comparatively short time, and by the first week in August these Russian forces were

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THE EASTERN THEATRE-AUGUST 18TH As soon as the Russians began falling back with such great rapidity and when the Germans could not promptly reduce the fort of Ossowiec, due to its excellent position in a swampy country, an immediate strike into the Russian line of retreat around Bielo

stok was avoided. Instead a great attack was launched against the main Russian fortress of Kovno, The smaller forts along the line of the Narew and Bobr rivers had now practically all been taken, and as the advance was pushed the gallant fort of Ossowiec became surrounded. Within five days after the great Krupp siege guns began to hammer the works of Kovno that fortress fell and was occupied on the 18th of August. Novo Georgievsk fell on the 20th with great stores of guns and ammunition and 90,000 prisoners. This fortress controlled the line of the Vistula River. While it held out, no riverborne traffic could be sent from the Vistula's lower waters in Germany to Warsaw and above. It also controlled the railroad from Mlawa to Warsaw. For the first time in history the Vistula was completely dominated by the Germans. Mackensen's army had pushed up to the outer works of Brest-Litovsk. The Russians now, although losing heavily in personnel and material, were falling back with great rapidity and saving most of their field artillery. As only two fortresses remained in the hands of the Russians, i. e., Grodno and Brest-Litovsk, both of which the Germans were perfectly confident of taking in short order, they began a redistribution of their forces for future operations, which were to take the form of a main attack on the Russian central army at Vilna.

badly broken despite their most vigorous resistance.

Next the line of the secondary fortresses was attacked. The German move had been so organized that the attack took place against almost all of them simultaneously. They began falling with such suddenness that the Russian forces on the

lines west of Warsaw were forced into a precipitate retreat in an attempt to extricate whatever they could of their armies.

The instant that this move became apparent to the Germans-an easy matter for them, as they had practically complete control of the air, enabling them to fly at will over the Russian lines and observe whatever they wanted to the forces which stood along the old Bzura-Rawka lines in Poland were launched into the Russian centre west of the Vistula River. Immediately the Russian front was pierced at a dozen points and the broken brigades and divisions retired and were driven across the Vistula with the Germans and Austrians close on their heels. The Bavarian army of Prince Leopold entered Warsaw on August 5th with insignificant loss.

So rapid had been the German advance that the great fortress and intrenched camp of Novo Georgievsk was completely cut off with its garrison of 90,000 troops, 1,200 cannon of all calibres, and vast accumulations of stores. The Russian armies were now in full retreat in all parts of Poland, and their great fortresses of the famous quadrilateral were exposed to the Teuton attack. These were Novo Georgievsk and Ivangorod (which fell on August 6th), Grodno and Kovno in the north, while the way to Brest-Litovsk, the largest supply point of them all, had been cleared by Mackensen and the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in the south.

The Russians attempted to rally on the line Kovno-Niemen River-Grodno-Bug River-Brest-Litovsk, but the Teuton onslaught was so determined and vigorously sustained that wherever the Russians attempted to stand they were either immediately defeated, enveloped, or turned out of their positions by the Teutonic forces operating elsewhere. As the Allies had the initiative they could hit anywhere, at the most important or weakest point of the Russian line, and, once having made a hole, the rest of the Russian line had to fall back in order to maintain their alignment and to prevent whole armies from being captured.

On August 20th the great fortress of Novo Georgievsk fell, enriching its captors with vast stores and establishing their

strategic position in Poland. One reason that such a store of munitions of all sorts remained there was that when the Russians were attempting to withdraw some of their heavy artillery a bridge across the river gave way, leaving no main avenue of egress. The fall of this great work opened up the railroad from Mlawa to the Vistula and also opened up the whole line of the Vistula River for the water-borne traffic of the allied army. This great artery, from its source in Silesia to its mouth in the Baltic, was now for the first time completely in the hands of the Austro-Germans. All permanent bridges across its broad waters had been destroyed by the fleeing Russians, but these were quickly supplanted by ferries and pontoon and spar bridges, while repairs to the demolished structures went on. Kovno was captured on August 18th and Grodno on September 4th. Nothing now remained of the Russian main line of defense on their Polish frontier, and nothing but the difficult country was left between the units of the Russian army and the Germans in the area north of the Pripet Swamps. This ended the second strategic phase of the campaign, the breaking up and destruction of the Polish “quadrilateral."

ESTABLISHING A RUSSIAN BASE

The way had now been paved for a further advance, and a rearrangement of the Teutonic forces was at once begun. The Germans announced at the conclusion of this phase of the operations that, since the 2d of May, 1,100,000 Russians had been taken prisoners. During August alone 1,500 cannon and 560 machine guns were captured.

While these principal operations were taking place in central Poland operations were being carried on in Courland and eastern Galicia, the two secondary theatres of the campaign.

Of these the more important for the time being was the one in Courland, or the area between the East Prussian frontier and the Dvina River with its two fortresses of Riga and Dvinsk (Dunaberg). It will be remembered that coincident with Mackensen's drive through Galicia in the first part of May the mass of the

German cavalry had been hurled into the Russian Baltic provinces. The cavalry was closely followed by heavy columns of infantry and artillery, which captured the seaports and began extending eastward. This particular part of the campaign took on the character of a combined land and sea operation, in which the German navy guarded the coasts, brought up supplies, and eventually obtained control of the Gulf of Riga. Now the purpose of this campaign into Courland was, of course, first to protect the left flank of Hindenburg's army in its dash for the fortress of Kovno, but in addition it had a deeper significance. This was nothing short of establishing a great base in all of Courland, from which the offensive could be taken further into Russia.

Could this objective be accomplished, the Germans would control all the country from the Niemen to the Dvina. For operations from anywhere in Courland southwest toward Minsk their left would rest securely on the line of the River Dvina, their right on the Niemen, and their rear on the Baltic, controlled by their navy. The possession of this territory not only would give them ample room to reorganize their forces for offensive operations under the cover of these great natural obstacles, and give them a wide base to retreat on in case of defeat, but also, from its position on the flank, would protect the railroads in the area from Pinsk to Vilna and west of those places. Should the central mass of the Russian army be destroyed completely, and the line of the Dvina River conquered in its entirety, this area would form an excellent base for further operations into the interior of Russia (toward Petrograd or Moscow), or on the other hand form an excellent line of defense should the invading armies be defeated or be compelled to assume the defensive.

Then again, this expedition forced the Russians to provide another army group for the defense of the Dvina River, so that at the conclusion of the operations which resulted in the reduction of all the Russian second line fortresses in Poland the Russian army was distributed in three principal groups, i. e., one on the line RigaDvinsk, the central mass in the triangle

Vilna-Minsk-Baranovichi, and the southern group, which extended from south of the Pripet Swamps to the Roumanian frontier.

These great scattered army groups, in so far as their immediate coöperation was concerned, depended on very precarious and roundabout means of communications. The whole Russian field army, therefore, had been split into three parts which could not coöperate effectively. The Germans had continuous railroad communication behind them, and as they had seized the best net of railroads possessed by Russia they had even a greater amount of rail power, comparatively, than they had on the first of May. The railroads were repaired with all the celerity possible in the months of July, August, and early September.

Of the three principal Russian army groups the central one was by far the most numerous and important. Sound strategy, therefore, dictated that this should be attacked. While the Germans were rearranging their forces and bringing great masses of troops and material into Kovno Province and Courland for their further attack on the Russian central army, the Russians on their side were doing their utmost to bring up all the men and material at their command. At this time, late in August and early in September, it appeared to many that the German offensive in the north had come to a standstill. To further strengthen this feeling in their enemies' minds, the allies launched a local offensive against the Russian army group in the south, the idea of which was to make it appear as much as possible like a main operation so as to cause the Russians to bring up whatever they could in the way of men and material from the interior to strengthen this area. Whatever Russians were sent into that part then would be no longer available at the extreme northern end of their line, that is, in the Dvina River area. The strategic threat in a southern campaign is the possibility of an advance to Kiev, the Black Sea, and an eventual joining of hands with the Turks.

Should success attend such an effort the Balkan question would be pretty well settled and the control of the Black Sea by the Turks assured, because, with the fall of

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