to fear that this case showed that the courts could no longer be trusted to follow the rule which had been law since Chief Justice Marshall's decision.

You have all probably learned by now that on April 17, 1952, the Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court in this case. and ruled that the United Nations Charter did not invalidate the California land law. Since so much has been said about this case, and since this decision is an important precedent in connection with treaties, I should like to read to you several short excerpts from the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson of California:

The provisions in the Charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would indicate an intent to create justifiable rights in private persons immediately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future action by the member nations. Secretary of State Stettinius, chairman of the United States delegation at the San Francisco Conference where the Charter was drafted, stated in his report to President Truman that article 56 "pledges the various countries to cooperate with the Organization by joint and separate action in the achievement of the economic and social objectives of the Organization without infringing upon their rights to order their national affairs according to their own best ability, in their own way, and in accordance with their own political and economic institutions and processes."

The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and legislatures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace and for equality of rights and opportunities. The Charter represents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. We are satisfied, however, that the Charter provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended to supersede existing domestic legislation, and we cannot hold that they operate to invalidate the alien land law.

In short, the California Supreme Court has confirmed the views of the Senate, as indicated by Senator Bricker, to the effect that the Charter was not intended to "supersede a large body of Federal or State legislation."

I particularly wanted to call your attention to those excerpts from the court's opinion because of the reference therein to the report which Secretary Stettinius made. That report made it clear that the United States representatives, in negotiating the United Nations Charter, had no intention of using the treaty power to change our basic political and social institutions.

I am aware that it has been argued that the United States is alone in having a constitutional system under which treaties can become automatically the supreme law of the land. This statement appears to me to be quite misleading. I would like to submit for the record an analysis of the constitutional provisions of other countries dealing with this subject.

This survey shows that while in most countries participation by the legislature is required to apply a treaty which conflicts with existing law, this action is almost universally taken as part of the same action by which the treaty is ratified. This is generally by simple majority. The more important of these countries have parliamentary systems under which only a majority vote in the lower house is significant.

Section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 130 would require two separate and specific actions in order to redeem the pledge made by a treaty which required the altering or abridging of State or Federal

law. No other country in the world, so far as careful study of the laws and practices of other countries reveals, is required by its constitution or constitutional practices to follow such a double procedure.

We do not believe that the reasons advanced for the proposed amendment outweigh the reasons set forth by Justice Story. When the United States ratifies a treaty it assumes an international obligation. If the treaty is one intended to be self-executing it should go into effect immediately upon ratification. The United States should not adopt a constitutional procedure which would require it immediately to reconsider whether it could live up to the obligation it had assumed.

So far, Mr. Chairman, I have directed my comments chiefly to the treaty power aspect of Senate Joint Resolution 130. With respect to executive agreements, I understand that the sponsors of this resolution had in mind the type of agreement that the President makes without securing the prior or subsequent approval of the Congress. As this resolution now reads, it could well be construed to include executive agreements which have received the prior or subsequent approval of the Congress. Section 4 reads:

Executive agreements shall not be made in lieu of treaties.

Executive agreements shall, if not sooner terminated, expire automatically 1 year after the end of the term of office for which the President making the agreement shall have been elected, but the Congress may, at the request of any President, extend for the duration of the term of such President the life of any such agreement made or extended during the next preceding Presidential term. The President shall publish all executive agreements except that those which in his judgment require secrecy shall be submitted to appropriate committees of the Congress in lieu of publication.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of State prepared several studies on the subject of executive agreements which we submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with respect to Senate Joint Resolution 122, and copies of these studies have been submitted to this subcommittee.

The information contained in them serves to place the question of executive agreements in proper perspective. I should like to summarize it now in the context of Senate Joint Resolution 130.

Obviously, if Congress adopts a resolution authorizing the President to enter into a certain international agreement or if the President negotiates an agreement which expressly is to be submitted to Congress and to be made effective by congressional legislation, such an agreement-although called an "executive agreement" to distinguish it from a treaty-does and should have the same legal character and effectiveness as any other statute or public law of the United States.

As a matter of record the great majority of international agreements other than treaties have included and continue to include one of these two forms of congressional participation. It may be of interest to illustrate the kinds of agreements so made by some examples. The following are illustrations of agreements made pursuant to prior authority given the President by legislation:

One hundred and eleven agreements governing technical aspects of commercial aviation have been made within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Convention, which is a treaty, and pursuant to certain statutes; 105 economic and technical agreements, including point 4 agreements, have been made under the Economic

Cooperation Act of 1948 and the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949; and 25 mutual defense assistance agreements have been made under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs Act has been the statutory basis for over 100 agreements setting up cooperative programs in the fields of health and sanitation, agriculture, development of productive resources, and education. Other examples are agreements in the fields of shipping, radio communications, taxation, the work of American military and technical missions abroad; and there are many others.

The second category of agreements which have come into effect through congressional action is that involving subsequent approval or implementation by legislation. Of particular importance within this category has been congressional approval of United States participation in the work of international organizations such as the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary Fund and Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization. The United Nations trusteeship agreement under which the United States became administering power for the former Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific was approved by the Congress before it entered into force.

There remains a portion of the total number of international agreements other than treaties which are in fact entered into and given effect by Executive action alone. Of this portion a large percentage in turn are concerned with purely military arrangements incident to war or arising from the presence of American Armed Forces abroad. These include armistice agreements; understandings with certain countries at the end of the Second World War to the effect that United States forces were present in the other country with its permission; arrangements regarding jurisdiction over United States forces abroad, their movement and treatment and aid to be given them by foreign countries; arrangements concerning our military occupation of enemy territory; and, in Korea, agreements arranging such matters as the use of a Swedish Red Cross field hospital and a Norwegian mobile surgical hospital.

Senator HENDRICKSON. Mr. Secretary, did we consummate an agreement with Western Germany giving Western Germany jurisdiction, civil and criminal jurisdiction, over our troops?

Mr. BRUCE. No, sir. The status of our troops is covered by certain articles in this agreement which was presented to you yesterday. I think it will be satisfactory. It will give generally a status accorded to any of the nations of the Western Allied countries.

Senator HENDRICKSON. When I was over there last fall Mr. McCloy was discussing the possibility of surrendering jurisdiction of our troops, civil and criminal, to the Western German Government. I know it gave the military a great deal of concern.

Mr. BRUCE. We have had a great deal of discussion about it. What the final upshot was I do not know. It was heading toward a resumption by the German Federal Government of civil jurisdiction and criminal jurisdiction, but I would not like to go on record with that because I do not know. They gave Mr. McCloy a great deal of difficulty. The Army was rather insistent on retaining as much jurisdiction as possible.

Senator HENDRICKSON. Under the rules of land warfare.

Mr. BRUCE. Yes.

They also include certain types of purely executive agreements made by the President in his conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. One historic example, of course, was the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The various countries concerned signed a final protocol at Peking in 1901. This protocol was not submitted to the Senate and it was not considered necessary that it should be.

The application of section 4 of the proposed amendment to this type of agreement would in our judgment be unwise. If the design of that section is to prohibit the President from exercising his historic constitutional powers to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and to act as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, it is apparent that a basic alteration in the structure of our Government is contemplated.

It apparently would require the participation of the Congress in functions which the framers of the Constitution thought should be vested exclusively in the executive branch of the Government. If anything, conditions today require more urgently than ever that the President be in a position to employ his traditional powers. As a practical matter, neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole is set up and equipped to discharge this function with respect to the cases that would come before them as a result of the conduct of foreign relations.

Upon the basis of our analysis of Senate Joint Resolution 130, Mr. Chairman, I submit the following conclusions:

1. The assumption is unwarranted that the President, the Senate, and the courts will abuse the treaty power and alienate the constitutional liberties of American citizens. There is absolutely nothing in the record to support this assumption.

2. Senate Joint Resolution 130 as now drafted is unclear in several important respects. It would appear, however, to prevent many treaties which have been beneficial to the United States and to its citizens.

3. Senate Joint Resolution 130 also would appear to place serious handicaps upon the United States Government in the conduct of its foreign relations. It would appear to impose serious and unnecessary limitations upon the treaty-making authority-the President and the Senate so that this Government would be unable to enter into beneficial and humanitarian treaties.

4. Finally, this resolution would alter the fundamental division of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches which is the basic structure of our constitutional system. It would burden the already overburdened legislative branch with historically and fundamentally executive functions while it seriously impairs the effectiveness of the Executive in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much. We appreciate your giving us the benefit of your views.

Do you have anything else, Mr. Fisher?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir.

Senator SMITH. We hope these men over here will not denominate all this talk we have as poppycock this morning.

Mr. Turlington is the next witness. Please identify yourself, sir.

STATEMENT OF EDGAR TURLINGTON, MEMBER, COMMISSION TO STUDY ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE

Mr. TURLINGTON. I should like to begin by saying I am from North Carolina. At present I am a citizen of Maryland, but the old State holds me still to a large extent. Perhaps I should qualify myself very briefly.

I am offering myself here to your subcommittee in view of the experience that I have had in this field. For some years I have been giving a great deal of attention to the constitutional aspects of international agreements. I believe that the record that has been made by the peace and law committee members who have appeared before you will indicate that there has been a division of opinion between two groups in the American Bar Association.

I have adhered to the school of thought that was unsuccessful in a recent contest that we had in the American Bar Association.

I am the chairman of the section of international and preparative law committee on constitutional aspects of international agreements, and I am the delegate of the section in the house of delegates. I do not want to ask this committee to hear me at length on the issue on which we are outvoted by the house of delegates.

I am available to answer any questions that the committee may have regarding the views that did not prevail on the issue whether a constitutional amendment is necessary.

I should state also I have been engaged for a good many years in the practice of law in Washington, specializing in international law. And this will interest Senator Hendrickson: I collaborated quite closely over a period of 2 or 3 years with one of his constituents, Mr. Amos J. Peaslee, my law partner, in the preparation of a compilation of constitutions of nations. That was a comparative study of

constitutions.

Among other things, we considered the control of foreign relations under the various constitutions. Two years ago I delivered six lectures at the Academy of Comparative and International Law in Habana on that subject specially relating to the control of foreign relations under the constitutions of the 21 American Republics.

I have lectured for the last 6 years once a week at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service on this kind of problem. I think apart from the experience I have had in the American Bar Association I may be of some use to your committee.

After the hearing started, Mr. Schweppe, the chairman of the committee on peace and law through the United Nations, asked me to bring to your attention especially one phase of the problem on which the section of international comparative law and the committee on peace and law were able to agree. Our history of agreement is shorter than our history of disagreement. Nevertheless, on the approach to the question of international measures for the promotion of human rights we did agree and the house of delegates, upon my motion seconded by Mr. Schweppe last February, passed a resolution to the effect that the participation of the United States in international measures for the promotion of human rights should be in a form and by a procedure similar to those which have been followed with respect to the improvement of conditions of labor throughout the world. Since 1934 the United States has been a member of the International