felt the confequences of that blow at a great diftance, and our allies had, from its effects, gained very decifive advantages. The ftrong fortreffes of Durwar and Copaul had long been invested and befieged by the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and with fo little profpect of fuccefs, that it had been more than once under the confideration of the courts of Poona and Hydrabad whether they fhould not convert thofe fieges into blockades, to fet their armies at liberty for more active operations; but the news of the fall of Bangalore, which feemed to have been unexpected by the garrifons of thofe places, fo effectually intimidated them, that, although in no fhape reduced to extremity, or even diftrefs, they agreed to furrender.

Large magazines of military ftores, which had been amaffed in thofe places, at a vaft expence, by Tippoo, fell into the hands of the captors; and during the time that I was employed in forming a junction with the Nizam's cavalry, and in drawing fupplies and reinforcements from the Carnatic, they alfo obtained complete poffeffion of the whole enemy's extenfive and valuable territories lying between the Khristna and Tumbuddra.

Nothing of confequence occurred on the march from Venkatigherry to Bangalore, and after having taken out of that place heavy guns and fupplies of military ftores and provifions, to the utmost extent that could be tranfported by the general zealous affistance that I received from the officers of the army, and by all the draft and carriage cattle in the poffeffion of the public; and after having received information that general Abercromby, with a battering train, which, in addition to my own, I was in hopes would be fufficient for the accomplishment of our object, was at the head of the Pondicherrum Ghaut, and in readiness to co-operate with me, I moved on the 3d of May, from the neigh bourhood of Bangalore, with a refpectable and fufficient corps of artillery, the Nizam's horfe, his majesty's 19th regiment of dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry, fix king's regiments, and one of the company's European regiments, and feventeen battalions of native infantry.

Tippoo, after calling in all his detachments, had, about that time, encamped near Magri, and, foon after, receiving information of my movement, he marched, by one of the most direct roads, to his capital, where he arrived on the 8th or 9th of May.

I knew that he had long before given

orders to burn the villages, and to deftroy the provifions and forage on all the roads by which we could march to Seringapatam, and therefore no road was, in these respects, preferable to another; but, after the moft mature confideration, I determined to take the most easterly route, which paffes through Cankanelly, though it is not the fhortelt, because it would lead us near the banks of the Caveri for many miles before we should reach Seringapatam; and as there is no place of ftrength near the capital, on the north fide of the river, in which I could lodge the heavy artillery and ftores in fecurity for a few days, with a moderate garrison, I was in hopes that I might be able to cross that river with the whole of the army, and to effect a junction with general Abercromby, before I fhould find it necefiary to approach near to the ultimate object of the movement.

It foon appeared, that only a fimall number of the enemy's irregular horfe had been appointed to attend to that road; but by an extraordinary activity on their part, and a most unaccountable fupineness and want of exertion on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my requifitions nor orders could overcome, we fuffered fome lofs, both in baggage and followers, on the march; and not only the villages were laid in afhes, but all the inhabitants of the country, on the whole of the road to Seringapatam, were alio, with the most unrelenting barbarity, carried off, and more completely removed beyond our reach than could have been fuppofed to be practicable. Thofe fevere meafures of the enemy, and the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a distance, frequently occafioned a fcarcity in the camp, both of forage for the cattle, and provifions for the followers; and in a country, of which no minute or correct defcription has hitherto been published, or, till now, obtained by any Europeans, I experienced the greatest inconveniences, in many fhapes, by the removal of the inhabitants.

The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greatest part of last May; and as none of the people, who pretended to be acquainted with its courfe, and who were repeatedly examined upon that point, had ever ftarted a doubt of its being paffable for an army, with heavy artillery, below Seringapatam, I was not a little furprized and disappointed at finding, from my own perfonal inspection, or from the reports of intelligent officers, who were fent with detachments in fearch

of

of fords at different places, that, from its bed being rocky, and difficult beyond what I have ever feen for fo great a tract in any other river, it appeared nearly, if not utterly, impracticable to pafs our heaviest guns over at any ford that could be difcovered below Seringapatam.

After feveral difappointments at other places, I was, for a fhort time, encouraged to hope, that a ford might, by confiderable labour be rendered practicable near the urge village of Arrakery, which lay upon our road, and about nine or ten miles diftant from the capital; and if it could have been accomplished, my intention was to have poffuffed myself of the new fort of Myfore, which is only diftant about twelve or fourteen miles from that part of the river, and was described to me to be in fo unfinished a ftate as to be inca pable of making a confiderable refiftance against our army, though fufficiently advanced to be early rendered, with a garrifon of ours, a fafe depôt, for a few days, for our stores and heavy artillery, and to make two or three marches with the army, lightly equipped, toward Periapatam, in order to put myself between Tippoo and general Abercromby, and by that means render our junction eafy and fecure.

The army arrived at Arrakerry on the 13th, and a particular examination of that ford, as well as of the river for a confiderable distance above and below it, obliged me, early in the forenoon of the 14th, to relinquith all idea of being able to execute that plan; and, after minutely re-examining every perfon in the army who was acquainted with the river, my expectation of being able to form an early junction with general Abercromby refted folely on affurances, that the ford near the village of Kannambady, about eight or nine miles above Seringapatam, over which it was pofitively allerted that Hyder Ally had frequently paffed twelve-pounders, and fometimes heavier guns, would be found practicable.

In the mean time, however, I conceived that Tippoo had furnished an opening which would enable me to force him to rifk an action, and I refolved not to let flip fo favourable an opportunity to endeavour to obtain the reputation to our arms, which must neceffarily refult from a victory in the fight of his capital, and, in the event of my being able to cut off the greatest part of his army, to be prepared to follow up the advantage to the greatest extent that might be poffible.

Upon my arrival on the ground, which

was marked for the encampment at Arrakerry, I faw a confiderable body of the enemy, at the distance of about fix miles, in our front, who were drawn up with their right to the river, and their left to a mountain of a very rugged and inacceffible appearance; but I confidered them in no other light, at that time, than as a large detachment, fent to obferve our motions, without any defign to wait for our aps proach.

My intention to pass the river at that place, if the ford could be rendered practicable, and the hopes that were at first held out of the fuccefs of our working parties, occafioned my halting on the 14th, in the camp at Arrakerry, and I then obtained certain intelligence, that although only a fmall part of the enemy's force could be feen from the ground in our poffeffion, yet that Tippoo, with his whole army, had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Caveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep fwampy ravine, the paffage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole of his front; and that being encouraged by the advantages of this pofition, as well as thofe of the intermediate ground, which, by the river on one fide, and a steep ridge of hills on the other, was narrowed to a fpace no where between the two encampments exceeding a mile and a half, and within cannon hot of his line not above one mile in breadth, he had determined, at the hazard of the event of a battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer approach to his capital.

In confequence of this information, and from my having afcertained, from the few people in camp who had any knowledge of the adjoining country, as well as from the obfervations of intelligent perfons who were employed for the purpofe, that it was practicable, though difficult, to cross the ridge on our right, from the great road on which we were encamped to a road which leads from Cenepatam to Seringa patam, I refolved, upon that knowledge, to attempt, by a night march, to turn the enemy's left flank, and, by gaining his rear before day-light, to cut off the retreat of the main body of his army to the Illand and Fort of Seriagapatam.

Orders were accordingly given, with the utmost secrecy, to the principal officers who were to be employed, that the 19th dragoons, the three strongeft of the native regiments of cavalry, his majesty's fix regiments, and twelve battalions of native R 2

infantry,

infantry, with field pieces only, fhould be

in readiness to march at eleven o'clock at night, leaving their piquets and camp guards behind, and their tents ftanding; and colonel Duff, with those detachments and the remainder of the army (except the Nizam's horse, who were directed to follow me at day-light) was left in charge of the encampment, provifions, ftores, and heavy artillery.

We had fuffered greatly, during the preceding week, by rains uncommonly frequent and heavy fo early in the feafon but unluckily, on that particular night, we had for feveral hours the most violent thunder, lightning, and rain that I have feen in this part of India.

The ground of our encampment having been interfected by fome ruined villages and inclotures, and feveral deep ravines, much valuable time was loft before it was poffible to form the troops in the order of march which was directed; and, owing to the heavy rain and exceffive darkness of the night, I was obliged to halt fo frequently after I had begun to move forward, either on account of many of the regiments lofing at different times the line of march, or of the weakness of the gun bullocks, which were jaded and exhausted by the feverity of the ftorm, that I had only advanced a few miles when the day began to dawn.

All hopes were then at an end of being able to execute my original plan; but having accomplished the part of the march that had been defcribed to me as the most difficult, and having the utmost confidence in the valour and discipline of the king's and company's troops, I determined to perfevere in endeavouring to force Tippoo to hazard an action on ground which I hoped would be lefs advantageous to him than that which he had chofen, with the expectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of our temporary diftreffes, but tend to bring the war to a very fpeedy conclufion.

The army, therefore, continued its march; and the movement had heen fo intirely unexpeЯed by the enemy, that we had begun to defcend the heights on the eaftward of the deep ravine that I have mentioned, and at the diftance of four or five miles from the left of their camp, before they took the alarm.

After fome movements, the object of which could not for a fhort time be clearly afcertained, it appeared that Tippoo, notwithstanding that we were advancing by a route for which he was not prepared, did

of

not decline to risk the event of a battle in a new pofition. He detached immediately from his main body a large corps infantry and cavalry, with eight guns, to occupy the fummit of a rifing ground, about two miles from the extremity of his left, which terminates to the Northward in an abrupt precipice in the middle of a plain; and though the afcent is broken by large rocks, and fome intermediate leffer heights, rifes gradually for about a mile and a half, or two miles, from a valley that was in our front, and which continued to the Caveri, and divided the ridge of hills that we had crossed during the night from another steep ridge, confifting principally of two large mountains (on a projecting point of the fouthernmost of which ftands the Carigut Pagoda), running nearly at right angles to the former, at the diftance of about a mile and a half, and extending very near to the Caveri, opposite the island of Seringapatam.

While the corps was on its march, to poffefs itself of the fummit that I have mentioned, Tipoo was employed in changing the front of his army to the left, covering his left flank with the steep hill, which had been in his rear, and his right flank with the ravine, which ran along his former front.

The difpofition on our fide for action could only be made on the afcent of the heights, to the fummit of which the enemy's detachment was then moving, and from which it was abfolutely neceffary to diflodge it before I could attack their main body.

Our march was therefore continued in that direction across the valley, through which ran a continuation of the ravine which covered the enemy's right; but, owing to the depth of that ravine, the weak state of the gun bullocks, and the near approach of a large body of the enemy's horse, that, though repulfed in feveral attempts, appeared to be prepared to take advantage of the leaft diforder in any of our battalions, it was upward of two hours after the paffage of the head of the column before the whole infantry could crofs to the fame fide of the ravine with the enemy, and confequently before the difpofition for action could be completed; and during that time we fuffered fome lofs from the guns on the height, oppofite to the head of the colnmn, but were feverely galled by a well-directed though diftant fire from the artillery of the enemy's main body, which had formed nearly parallel to the direction of our march.

6

Under

Under thefe difficulties, and under the difadvantage of the want of all fatisfactory local information beyond what could be feen of the intended field of battle, and of the adjoining country, nine battalions were formed oppofite to the enemy's main body, in a first line, under the command of general Medows and lieutenant colonel Stuart; four battalions in a fecond line, under lieutenant colonel Harris, and five under lieutenant colonel Maxwell, were destined for the attack of the enemy's corps on the fummit of the hill upon our right. This attack had been unavoidably poftponed until the other parts of the difpofition could be made, and by that means Tippoo fhould be effectually awed and prevented from making any attempt on the flank or rear of thofe troops while they were moving forward to drive his detachment from their poft. Our own cavalry and the Nizam's horfe were left out of the reach of the cannonade on the descent of the rifing ground on the oppofite fide of the ravine, in readiness to take advantage of any confusion they might observe in the enemy's army; and orders were given to lieut. col. Maxwell, after fucceeding in his attack, to leave only a fufficient force to retain poffeffion of the fummit of the hill, and to advance immediately with the remainder of his corps, and endeavour to poffefs himself of the mountains which covered the left flank of the main army of the enemy.

A rocky height afforded confiderable protection to the troops from the enfilade from the hill on our right, during the time that was neceffarily employed in making the difpofition and forming the lines; which being accomplished, I began the action by ordering lieut. col. Maxwell's corps to attack the hill on our right, and, upon obferving that he had, without much lofs or difficulty, completely fucceeded, I moved forward with the main body of the army, and the action foon became general along the whole front.

The enemy's cavalry, that had haraffed us, and frequently attempted to break in upon the infantry while the column was paffing the ravine, made no ftand after we were prepared to advance, part of it retreating to the weftward of the ridge on which the Carigut Pagoda ftands, with the infantry that had been driven from the hill by lieut. col. Maxwell, and the remainder falling into the rear of the main army. Their infantry, on this occafion, fhewed a much better countenance than usual, which perhaps may be prin

cipally attributed to Tippoo's own prefence and exertions among them; but, in a thort time, they began to waver, and foon after, upon the cavalry moving toward their right, and three battalions of lieut. col. Maxwell's corps advancing rapidly to gain the heights on their left, they entirely gave way.

At this moment our own cavalry made a gallant charge; but, after difperfing and almost destroying a finall body of infantry that made a very determined refiftance, were foon obliged to fall back, from a more confiderable body of infantry, that had rallied and made a stand on a space of broken rocky ground, extremely difadvantageous for cavalry; and at the moment of their retreat, and while the whole of our first line was impeded by it, the Nizam's horfe, which had followed col. Floyd across the ravine, with very good intentions, but very injudicioufly, threw themselves, in an unwieldy mafs, into the front of our left wing, on a piece of ground fo rugged and rocky, as well as fo near to the enemy's batteries on the island of Seringapatam, that they could not act with efficacy in front, and continued to prevent our line of infantry from advancing, by which means an invaluable, though fhort fpace of time was loft, which enabled the enemy to avail themfelves of the vicinity of the batteries upon the island, and, by retreating to their protection in the utmo confulion, to fave their army from entire deftruction.

Fatigued and exhaufted as the troops were by the badnefs of the night, the tedioufnels of the march, and by their long and extraordinary exertions during an exceffive hot day, and covered, as the beaten enemy were, by the works on the island and by the guns of the fort, nothing more could then be attempted; and the army accordingly, after the arrival of the tents from Arrakerry, encamped just beyond the reach of the cannon on the iland, and nearly on the ground upon which the action had terminated.

Three of the enemy's guns were taken on the hill that was attacked by the corps under the command of lieut. col. Maxwell; and one gun, with a great number of ftandards and colours, were taken from their main body. Their lofs in men was very confiderable, but the number could not be afcertained.

It may probably appear to you, and to any other perfon unacquainted with the peculiar fituation of Seringapatam, that, after having defeated the enemy's army, I

might have proceeded to the attack of the place, without losing time, or putting myfelf to any material inconvenience, to form a junction with general Abercromby; but even if I had thought the heavy guns that I had brought with me fufficient for the fiege, I could not there, as at Bangalore, chufe my point of attack, and keep my army in a compact ftate to refift the whole force of the enemy, and defend my approaches. In order to befiege the fort it would have been neceffary to force my paffage over to the island; and this can only be done on the North fide, oppofite to the Carigut Pagoda, where there is a good ford, at the diftance of more than a mile from the fort; for the ford on the South fide is not only very rugged and difficult, but is likewife commanded, within 700 yards, by the works of Seringapatam, and the bridge, which is still standing on that fide, is immediately under the guns of the place.

The ground on the South fide rifes gradually from the river; and, as Tippoo would certainly have croffed over with his army to that fide, as foon as he faw my batteries in fufficient forwardness to enable me to force the paffage of the Northern ford, I fhould have been expofed, on getting upon the ifland, to a crofs fire from the fort and from the enemy's army, which would not only have rendered it impoffible for me to attempt the fiege, but would probably have obliged me to abandon the iland with confiderable lofs.

It was therefore neceffary, before any attempt could be made upon the island, that a force, able to refift the attack of Tippoo's whole army, fhould be stationed on the South fide of the river, which could only be effected by my joining fome of my battalions to the corps under general Abercromby; and I therefore determined, after allowing the troops to recover themfelves a little from their fatigues, by a halt of two days on the field of battle, to proceed to Kanambaddy Ford, according to my former intention.

The foil of all the parts of the Myfore country, that I have feen, is in general dry, and by nature unfruitful; and fuftenance, either for men or animals, can only be railed upon it by a molt perfevering industry in its inhabitants; but the country adjoining to Seringapatam is peculiarly rugged and barren. The mountains are immenfe bare rocks, and the lower grounds are fo thin in foil, and fo univerfally and closely covered with large loofe ftones, that no confiderable produce

can be raised from them by the exertions of any degree of industry whatever.

The utmoft pains had likewife been taken by the enemy, during the two preceding months, to deftroy all the villages, and every particle of forage and provifions belonging to the inhabitants, within a circuit of feveral miles; and to thofe circumstances, of fo much disadvantage to the operations of the army, was to be added the premature fetting-in of the monfoon, near a month before the ufual period; and, by the united operation of the causes that I have stated, we had not only, during the fix or eight preceding days, fuffered very confiderable loffes among our draft and carriage cattle, but the greatest part of those which furvived, were at this time reduced to a very weakly condition.

We were obliged to make fo great a detour, that we could only reach the Kanambaddy Ford in two marches; and as the face of the country is exceedingly uneven and hilly, interfected with a number of deep ravines, and the road for the heavy guns was to be made the whole way by our own pioneers, thefe marches were found fo difficult, that, notwithstanding the preffure for time, I was forced to halt one day, after the first march, by the draft cattle having been completely exhaufted in accomplishing it.

Confiderable detachments of troops were ordered to attend and affift the heavy guns on the fecond day's march; but the bul locks were fo extremely reduced, that, even with the aid of the foldiers at the dragropes, their progrefs was fo tedious, that the body of the army was upward of twelve hours in marching as many miles, and the rear guard did not reach the encampment near the Ford till nine o'clock, in the evening of the 20th of May.

and

It was not, however, till after I had received the reports from the different detachments, on the following morning, of the general wretched condition of the public cattle of the army, that I faw the impoffibility of moving the heavy guns tores from the fpot where they then were, and that it became neceffary for me to decide on relinquishing entirely the profecution of the plan for the campaign, in which general Abercromby had been inftructed to co-operate. I then loft no time in communicating my determination to general Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapatam; and I directed him, after defcending the Ghaut with the troops under his command, to put them into can

tonments