hostilities.

The controversy was finally settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty and a part of the territory Buren. Jan. 22, 1840, Senate Docs., No. 107, 26th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. III, 66 pp., 8vo.

Response to Senate resolution; Copies of correspondence relating to boundary and jurisdiction of the disputed territory; also in relation to establishment of military posts in the State of Maine.

Message on the Northeastern Boundary. President Martin Van Buren. Jan. 29, 1840, Senate Docs., No. 266, 26th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. V, 14 pp., 8vo.

Additional correspondence relative to adjustment of boundary and occupation of disputed territory.

Message relating to Northeastern Boundary. President John Tyler. Feb. 5, 1842, Senate Docs., No. 97, 27th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. II, 10 pp., 8vo.

Report of commissioners appointed for the exploration and survey of boundary line between Maine and New Hampshire and the British provinces; Expenditures and estimates for completion of the work; Commissioners: James Renwick, A. Talcott, and J. D. Graham.

Message on the Northeastern Boundary. President John Tyler. Feb. 26, 1842, House Docs. No. 109, 27th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. II, 1 p., 8vo. Declines giving information on the subject.

Message on the Maine and New Hampshire Boundary. President John Tyler, April 7, 1842, House Docs., No. 31, 27 Cong., 3 sess., Vol. III, 49 pp.

Report of northeastern boundary commissioners on Maine and New Hampshire boundary, with map.

Northeastern Boundary. Daniel Webster. Aug. 11, 1842, House Docs., No. 2, pp. 25-104, 27th Cong., 3d sess., Vol. I.

Treaty with Lord Ashburton, and correspondence with same and with authorities of the States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Memoir on the Northeastern Boundary. Albert Gallatin, 1843. Library of the State Department, 74 pp., with map.

Memoir on the northeastern boundary in connection with Mr. Jay's map, together with a speech on the same subject by Hon. Daniel Webster.

Message on Northeastern Boundary. President James K. Polk. Feb. 9, 1846, House Ex Docs., No. 110, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. IV, 78 pp.

Correspondence with Great Britain in relation to the "Washington treaty;" Free navigation of St. John River; Disputed territory fund.

Message on Northeastern Boundary. President James K. Polk. April 3, 1846, Senate Docs., No. 274, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. V, 22 pp. Transmits correspondence of British Minister and Secretary of State from June, 1840, to March, 1841, relative thereto.

Memorial for indemnity for Lands Ceded to Great Britain. March 22, 1848, Senate Mis. Docs., No. 91, 30th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. I, 3 pp.

claimed by the State of Maine was included in the territory relinquished by the United States to Great Britain. Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, declared in the course of the correspondence that the United States had no power to dispose of any part of the territory of a State by treaty without the consent of the State. Chancellor Kent differed with him declaring, that "the better opinion would seem to be that such a power of cession does reside exclusively in the treaty-making power under the Constitution, although a safe discretion would forbid the exercise of it without the consent of any State." Forty-five years later this opinion was di

Citizens of Maine ask for payment for lands in former limits of Maine ceded by treaty.

Report on Claims of Maine and Massachusetts. Senator Bradbury. Dec. 29, 1852, Senate Reports, No. 361, 32d Cong., 2d sess., Vol. I, 24 pp.

On claims of Maine and Massachusetts to indemnity for lands conveyed by those States to enable the Government to fulfill stipulations in the treaty of Washington. Favorable.

Report on claims of Maine and Massachusetts. Rep. David Ritchie. May 4, 1858, House Reports, No. 366, 35th Cong. 1st sess., Vol. III, 2 pp.

On claims of the States of Maine and Massachusetts arising under the treaty to settle and define the boundaries between the United States and the possessions of Great Britain; " Claims for protected disputed territory in 1839-41. Committee favorable to payment of claim.

Resolution relating to the Northeastern Boundary. Maine Legislature. Jan. 20, 1871, House Misc. Docs., No. 41, 41st Cong., 3d sess., Vol. I, 4 pp.

In favor of the owners of certain land on the northeastern boundary of the State of Maine being paid for it, as it was ceded to Great Britain by the United States.

Senator Wadleigh.

Report on Lands Ceded to Great Britain. July 15, 1876, Senate Reports, No. 466, 44th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. II, 3 pp. Favorable to providing for the compensation of owners of lands ceded by the United States to Great Britain in and by the treaty of Washington of July 9, 1842.

2 For reference to correspondence | VIII, part 1 of Kent's Commentain regard to this treaty see Whar-ries, while treating of the law of ton's Int. Law Dig.. Vol. II, § 150c, nations, in which he says (p. 167): pp. 175, et seq. "There can be no doubt that the For views of Jefferson and Ham-power competent to bind the nation ilton see note 1 to § 467, p. 382, ante. by treaty may alienate the public So quoted by Professor Woolsey domain and property by treaty. in his International Law, § 103, If a nation has conferred upon its p. 161, 6th ed. See also Lecture executive department, without re

rectly controverted by Justice Field in his opinion in Geofroy vs. Riggs, which has already been cited, and which evidently referred to the Chancellor's opinion. Justice Field declared, that while the treaty-making power of the United States extended to all proper subjects of negotiation, and is in terms unlimited, except by those restraints which are found in the instrument itself against the action of the government, or of its departments, or from those arising from the nature of the government itself, and that of the States, it would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its consent; the learned Justice continued, however, "with

serve, the right of treating and contracting with other states, it is considered as having invested it with all the power necessary to make a valid contract. That department is the organ of the nation, and the alienations by it are valid, because they are done by the reputed will of the nation. The fundamental laws of a state may withhold from the executive department the power of transferring what belongs to the state; but if there be no express provision of that kind, the inference is, that it has confided to the department charged with the power of making treaties a discretion commensurate with all the great interests and wants and necessities of the nations.

A power to make treaties of peace necessarily implies a power to decide the terms on which they shall be made, and foreign states could not deal safely with the gov ernment upon any other presumption. The power that is intrusted generally and largely with authority to make valid treaties of peace can, of course, bind the nation by alienation of part of its territory;

and this is equally the case whether that territory be already in the occupation of the enemy or remains in the possession of the nation, and whether the property be public or private. In the case of the Schooner Peggy, the Supreme Court of the United States admitted that individual rights, acquired by war, and vested rights of the citizens, might be sacrificed by treaty for national purposes. So, in the case of Ware vs. Hylton, it was said to be a clear principle of national law that private rights might be sacrificed by treaty to secure the public safety, though the government would be bound to make compensation and indemnity to the individuals whose rights had thus been surrendered. The power to alienate, and the duty to make compensation, are both laid down by Grotius in equally explicit terms."

4 Geofroy vs. Riggs, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1890, 133 U. S. 258, FIELD, J., and see other references to this statemenu of Justice FIELD in § 335, p. 31, ante, and § 435, page 238, ante.

these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." In one of the Insular cases recently decided, Mr. Justice White in an opinion in which three other judges concurred, expressed some views in regard to the power of the United States to cede territory. The discussion was to some extent if not entirely obiter as there was no question of cession of territory by the United States involved in those cases.

§ 475. Professor Woolsey's views on same subject.—In his work on international law Mr. Woolsey quotes Chancellor Kent's opinion as to cessions of the territory of a State and after referring to the possibilities of such a far-reaching power, says: "But it might be asked whether the treatymaking power is not necessarily limited by the existence of states, parties to the confederation, having control for most purposes over their own territory. Could the treaty-making power blot out the existence of a State which helped to create the Union, by ceding away all its domain? Such fearful power was never lodged in the general government by the Constitution and could never be lawfully exercised in the ordinary contingencies of the confederation. Only in extreme cases, where the treaty-making power is called upon to accept the fact of conquest, or to save the whole body from ruin by surrendering a part, could such an exercise of power be justified." 1

Mr. Woolsey strikes the nail on the head when he says that the power might be exercised "in order to save the whole body from ruin;" it is only in such a case that the power would be exercised to its full extent; certainly if it became necessary to save the balance of the Union by surrendering a portion of it, the power exists so that it can be exercised and the safety of the Union thus insured.

§ 476. Conclusions deduced from the settlement of this 5 Downes vs. Bidwell (Insular regard to cession of territory, see Cases), U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901, 182 pp. 315, et seq. See also extracts U. S. 244, BROWN, J. For concur- from this opinion in INSULAR CASES ring opinion of WHITE, J., in which APPENDIX at end of volume I. SHIRAS and MCKENNA, JJ., united, $ 475. and GRAY, J., concurred in substance see p. 287, and for views in

1 Woolsey's International Law, 6th ed. p. 161.

controversy. The relations between this country and Great Britain had become so greatly strained owing to the disputes as to the Northeastern boundary that the only way to prevent war was to absolutely relinquish all title to the northeastern corner of Maine; even if any interested State had refused to grant its consent to the cession, and even if opposition had been interposed, as fortunately was not the case, the Central Government of the United States could certainly have ceded to Great Britain all that it did cede by the treaty of 1842, and thereby perform an act inuring to the benefit of every State of the Union, including the States affected by the new boundary line.

If it be said only a part of a State was involved in that case, and that although the power might possibly be exercised as to a part of a State, an entire State could not have been ceded away, the answer can only be that if the salvation of every other State in the Union depended upon the boundary line being so fixed that an entire State should be included in British possessions, and in default thereof the Union might have been plunged into a war resulting in its destruction, undoubtedly the treaty-making power in the Central Government would have been able to accomplish that result, and it might have been just as necessary to exercise it, as at times it has been necessary to amputate a limb in order to save the life itself; in such extreme cases (and it is to be hoped they will never occur) the full extent of the power would have to be exercised-regretfully indeed but nevertheless effectually.

§ 477. Argument of strict construction not applicable to Constitution.-There is an argument which has many times been brought forward in regard to the treaty-making power, as it has been in regard to the other powers delegated to the Central Government by the Constitution, which is that all provisions in the Constitution delegating power to the Central Government must be strictly construed; the Constitution, however, has not yet been, and it is hoped never will be, construed as a penal statute; the principle of broad construction, and extension of power, rather than of narrow construction and contraction of power, is one of the doctrines of the Supreme Court which was formulated by its greatest spokes