CHAPTER XI. JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN REGARD TO THE RELATIVE EFFECT OF TREATY STIPULATIONS AND STATE LAWS. SECTION 318-Subject reviewed thus far from historical and not from judicial standpoint. 320-Views of members of Consti tutional Convention not always followed by courts. 321-Construction and effect of constitutional provisions to be determined by courts; President Jackson's views as to personal construction. 322-Views of publicists and courts as to extent and scope of treaty-making power. 323-Treaty-making power to be considered as to scope and extent, its effect on State legislation, and the relative effect of treaties and Congressional statutes. 324 First important treaty case; Ware vs. Hylton. 325—Far-reaching effect of decision in Ware vs. Hylton; five opinions delivered. 326-Opinions of Justices Chase and Patterson. 327-Opinions of Justices Wilson and Cushing. 328 Justice Iredell's dissenting opinion. 329-John Marshall's defeat; personnel of the court. 330-Ware vs. Hylton the leading authority for over a century. SECTION 331-Fairfax vs. Hunter; Justice Story's opinion; State law and treaties, 1812. 332-Chirac vs. Chirac; Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, 1817. 333-The Pollard Case; Justice Baldwin's opinion; 1840. 334-Hauenstein VS. Lynham; Justice Swayne's opinion; 1879. 335-Geoffroy vs. Riggs; Justice Field's opinion 1889; the great extent of the treatymaking power. 336-The Chinese influx; legal questions and treaty rights involved. 337-This chapter devoted to State legislation and treaty rights. 338-Anti-Chinese legislation in Pacific Coast States. 339-Interference of Federal judi ciary to protect treaty rights of aliens. 340-Oregon statute prohibiting employment of Chinese laborers declared void. 341-California's constitution of 1879; anti-Chinese provisions declared void. 342-California anti-Chinese statutes declared void. 343-Justice Field's opinion in the Chinese Queue Case; 1879. SECTION 344-State statutes upheld; Chi nese Laundry Cases. 345-Numerous other decisions 346-Great practical advantages to State laws and treaties. 349-The rule in New York. 350-The rule in Illinois. 351-The rule in Iowa and Nebraska. SECTION 352-The rule in Tennessee. 354-The rule in Pennsylvania. 357-Police and taxing powers of the State sustained; The Slaughter House Cases; Justice Miller's opinion. 358-California decisions in conflict with general rules. 359-General rule, State statutes must give way when in conflict with treaty stipulations. $319. Subject reviewed thus far from historical and not from judicial standpoint.-So far the treaty-making power of the United States has been reviewed from historical and extra-judicial standpoints and not from the record of decisions of the courts. In deciding the extent and scope of that power the Federal and State courts have considered all of these historical points and, undoubtedly, have rendered their decisions in the light which history throws upon the subject; the opinions, however, of publicists, legislators, and even of framers of the instrument itself, have not always been adopted as the views of the courts. $320. Views of members of Constitutional Convention not always followed by courts. Even the views of those authors of the Federalist who participated so prominently in framing, and procuring the adoption of, the Constitution, have not always been accepted by the courts as the exact interpretation of the instrument which they themselves had assisted in framing;1 in this respect, it must be borne in mind that the interpretation of instruments framed by conventions necessarily depends upon the exact wording finally § 320. 1 See Alexander Hamilton's views as expressed in No. LXXV of The Federalist and comment thereon in § 247, p. 384, Vol. I, and § 313, p. 449, Vol. 1. adopted, and not upon the personal views, of the meaning thereof, of any members of the convention. This rule applies, not only to opinions subsequently expressed but also, in a large measure, to opinions expressed in the convention, although courts have decided that the record of debates may, to some extent, be taken into consideration in deciding the effect of a statute or resolution. In every convention antagonistic views exist on almost every subject. In construing the meaning of terms used to express the opinion of the body as finally adopted, the court must take into consideration the fact that many members must have voted without expressing their views and that they cannot be considered as having acquiesced in anything beyond the exact terms used; the interpretation therefore of all clauses must necessarily rest with the court as it is derived from the language itself in the final form adopted, and the court cannot be bound to interpret any clause in any instrument in accordance with the views contemporaneously or subsequently expressed either verbally or in writing by one or several members of the body adopting it. 2 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. 1895, 157 U. S. 429, FULLER, Ch. J. In this case (pp. 556-574) the debates of the Constitutional Convention are reviewed for the purpose of arriving at what the expressions direct and indirect taxes meant. The conclusion reached is stated on pp. 573-574 as follows: "From the foregoing (review of debates and decisions) it is apparent: 1. That the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of the Constitution and those who adopted it. 2. That under the state systems of taxation all taxes on real estate or personal property or the rents or income thereof were regarded as direct taxes. 3. That the rules of apportionment and of uniformity were adopted in view of that distinction and those systems. 4. (Referring to the Hylton Carriage case) that whether the tax on carriages was direct or indirect was disputed, but the tax was sustained as a tax on the use and an excise. 5. That the original expectation was that the power of direct taxation would be exercised only in extraordinary exigencies. See also Field vs. Clark, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1892, 143 U. S. 649, HARLAN, J., in which the effect of the entries in the Journal of the Houses of Congress is considered. In speaking of the debate in Congress in regard to the purchase of Louisiana, the Supreme Court says: "It is unnecessary to enter into the details of this debate. The arguments of individual legislators are no proper subject for judicial comment. They are so often influenced by personal or political considerations, or by the assumed necessi § 321. Construction and effect of Constitutional provisions to be determined by courts; President Jackson's views as to personal construction.-The construction of Article VI, of the Constitution of the United States, therefore, together with all other cognate clauses must be accepted only as it has been finally construed and become binding upon all the courts of the country, both Federal and State, as well as upon the various Departments of the Government. President Jackson, indeed, declared that it was the duty of each officer of the United States to interpret the Constitution according to his own conscience and to act according; that theory, however, might possibly lead to confusing, even disastrous, results, and at the present time, it can hardly ties of the situation, that they can the whole sanctioned by judicial hardly be considered even as the authority. deliberate views of the persons who make them, much less as dictating the construction to be put upon the Constitution by the courts. U. S. vs. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, p. 79." Opinion of Mr. Justice BROWN in Downes vs. Bidwell (Insular Cases), U. S. Sup. Ct. May, 1901, 182 U. S. 244. The rule is stated in Black on Interpretation of Laws, Hornbook Series, St. Paul, 1896, as follows, on page 28, in regard to "extraneous aids in construction of constitutions. If an ambiguity exists which cannot be cleared up by a consideration of the constitution itself, then, in order to determine its meaning and purpose, resort may be had to extraneous facts, such as the prior state of the law, the evil to be remedied, the circumstances of contemporary history or the discussions of the Constitutional Convention." In regard to the last point he cites on page 30 numerous authorities, Dwarris on Statutes; and Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 510, in which that author declares that it is a great stretch of principle but on The rules as stated by Black in regard to legislative debate on pages 224-230 are summarized in the captions as follows: "91. In aid of the interpretation of an ambiguous statute, or one which is susceptible of several different constructions, it is proper for the courts to study the history of the bill in its progress through the legislature, by examining the legislature journals. "92. Opinions of individual members of the legislature which passed a statute, expressed by them in debate or otherwise, as to the meaning, scope, or effect of the act, cannot be accepted by the courts as authority on the question of its interpretation, and if received at all are entitled to but little weight. "93. In the interpretation of statutes, it is not proper or permissible to inquire into the motives which influenced the legislative body, except in so far as such motives are disclosed by the statute itself." § 321. 1 President Jackson's "Protest" |