It was received with cordiality by the leaders of the opposition in the colony of Massachusetts Bay on account of his preeminent qualifications. No man at that period had acquired higher military reputation. In other not less necessary qualifications for a commander of such an army, in prudence, judgment, high moral worth, weight of personal character, and in the stake of private property which he had in the contest, no individual in the nation had at the time of his appointment a claim to this dangerous distinction over the eminent officer on whom it was conferred.

Policy would have reconciled the patriots of New-England to the appointment. It was important to enlist the feelings and the interest of their southern brethren in a controversy, which then but remotely involved them in its consequences; and this could not better be done than by giving to their most distinguished citizen the command of the national force. It drew to the standard of the country those whom the personal character of the general could not fail to attract to any cause in which he was engaged, and it was the evidence of a generous confidence in common exertions for a common cause.

The imputation of less worthy motives than can be derived from an honourable attachment to the great cause of the people is disingenuous and unfair. It is supported by no proof, and is refuted by that personal devotion to the public service,

which marked all the public and private sacrifices of men, who constantly exhibited evidence that they had no other object than the general welfare.

That the delegates of Massachusetts were, as the Italian writer asserts, the most zealous partizans of the revolution, is certainly true; but that they on that account "were far from approving the moderation of the commander in chief," is an inference, that does not follow from the premises, and is entirely without corroboration from extrinsic circumstances.

The commander in chief was at no time chargeable with moderation, in the offensive sense which the term supposes. In a warm and zealous disposition to prosecute the war with energy and effect, in solicitous and importunate efforts to excite congress to early and permanent measures for a display of military force, in constant remonstrances against the dangers of short enlistments and the inefficiency of the departments of the army under their immediate direction, the last accusation which could be urged with any plausibility against general Washington, was an unreasonable moderation.

The Fabian policy, which he adopted at times of discouragement and depression, was not, it is true, surrounded by the splendour and fascination of a more adventurous and enterprising course, but the delegates of Massachusetts were not wanting in that maturity of judgment, which appreciated

the full value of his prudence and decision. The clamour that arose proceeded from men, who either felt less intensely than they did for the final success of the great cause in which they were engaged, or saw with less perspicuity than marked the Massachusetts delegation, the necessity of measures, which, if they did not equal their wishes, were commensurate with their means.

It happens, however, in further contradiction of the imputations of the writer before alluded to, that at the time of the movements in congress connected with the commander in chief, two principal members of the delegation of Massachusetts were absent from that body. Mr. Samuel Adams and Mr. John Adams left Philadelphia for Massachusetts on the 11th November 1777. Mr. Gerry, Mr. Dana and Mr. Lovell remained to represent the state. Had any measure, having so extensive and important an operation as the expression of disaffection to the leader of the national army been then in preparation, it is hardly to be imagained that these eminent men would have retired from their post. Nor can it with the least propriety be imagined that in the absence of their distinguished colleagues, the remaining representatives of Massachusetts, two of them new members, would have been instrumental in promoting so hazardous an experiment.

But it rests not on conjecture or argument. In the intercourse which was maintained between

Mr. Gerry as a member of the committee of congress and the commander in chief, and in his letters to other correspondents concerning the military affairs of the country, there is abundant evidence that no feeling of hostility existed in his mind; and we are sure that general Washington reposed with great security on his esteem and friendship and unremitted support.

The disaffection of some individuals in congress towards the commander in chief, was suggested in conversation by Mr. Gerry to his particular friend general Knox, the gallant commander of the American artillery, known by the strong feelings of personal friendship, which not less than official duty bound him to his distinguished leader, and certainly the last man in the army to have been intrusted with a secret cabal or intrigue against Washington.

General Knox being separated by the sudden movements of the army from the vicinity of Mr. Gerry, addressed to him a letter upon the subject. Unwilling to put upon paper the nefarious design which his generous attachment made him desirous of investigating, he writes in a style that without explanation might not easily be understood, but which by reference to the time and circumstances, it is easy to see relates to movements in congress hostile to the commander in chief.

GENERAL KNOX TO MR. GERRY.

ARTILLERY PARK, GREAT VALLEY, JAN. 4, 1778.

DEAR SIR,

When we parted I expected soon to have had the pleasure of some conversation with you, but the movements of the enemy prevented.

The subjects then started appeared to me of such magnitude and pregnant with such consequences, that I freely confess I wished to have had my mind relieved from some painful apprehensions, which possibly might have been taken up without sufficient information. You then seemed to think the matter which was mentioned improbable and impossible, and it appeared so to me too; but intrigue, misinformation, caprice and unsuccessful efforts combined, may very probably have bad effects on the minds of good men. How far these have been practised you best know. I think from the conversation general G. and we had together, you will be able to recollect enough to have a clue to this paragraph, which may otherwise be obscure.

It is a matter of consequence, that those in the senate should be well acquainted with the sentiments that pervade the army and community at large. The prepossessions of the army in favour of the character hinted at, are founded upon a thorough experience of his ability, judgment, cour