CHAPTER XXV.

Correspondence of the Delegates.......Questions arising from the Treaty of Peace........ Cincinnati........Letters concerning that Institution.........Military Establishment.

THE assembly of statesmen, who in the congress of 1783 conducted the executive and legislative concerns of the United States, continued to act more in the capacity of ministers from independent sovereignties than as the council of a single nation. That the good of the parts could be best promoted by the welfare of the whole, seemed a principle more generally acceded to in theory than adopted in practice. That the states had common duties, obligations and objects, and a common weakness which rendered union indispensable for security, were obvious facts; but that they had diverse, separate and sometimes conflicting interests, was beginning to be felt now that the pressure of a foreign enemy was taken off, and more steady attention given to domestic concerns.

Each state had on all occasions one vote without regard to its population or the number of its delegates, provided only that the number of delegates to whom it had confided the power of giving such vote were present for the purpose. Each

state was, therefore, on the floor of congress on a perfect equality. Each state continued to pay the expenses of its own delegation in its own way, so that off the floor of congress the personal equality of the members was destroyed. The states themselves exercised the same right of direction to their members as congress itself exercised towards its diplomatic agents abroad.

In Massachusetts at one time the delegates were ordered to correspond with the governour, and to write to him at least once a fortnight. On 11th July 1783, a committee was appointed by the legislature to correspond with the delegates, who were expected to be minute in their accounts not only of what was done but of what was omitted to be done by congress. The appointment of this committee was officially announced to the delegates, and followed by the following letter.

MR. SAMUEL ADAMS TO MR. GERRY.

MY DEAR SIR,

BOSTON, SEPT. 9, 1783.

This is the first letter I have been able to write since I had the pleasure of seeing you, excepting a short one to our delegates, informing them that the general court had appointed a committee to correspond with them. Mr. Appleton and Mr. Rowe are my colleagues in this business. The

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correspondence is to be very extensive. Any other important matter which relates to the being and welfare of the United States!" My bodily illness has prevented my engaging in it. I wish the delegates would begin. The welfare, and perhaps the being of the United States, in my opinion, depends much upon congress possessing the confidence of the people at large; that upon the administration of public affairs being manifestly grounded upon principles of equality and justice, or upon the people being assured that congress merit their confidence. The war is now over, and the people turn their eyes to the disposition of their money, a subject, which I hope congress will always have so clear a knowledge of, as to be able at any time to satisfy the rational enquiries of the people. To prevent groundless jealousies, it seems necessary not only that the principal in that department should himself be immaculate, but that care should be taken that no persons be admitted to his confidence but such as have the entire confidence of the people. Should a suspicion prevail that our high treasurer suffers men of bad principles or of no principles to be about him and employed by him, the fidelity of congress itself would be suspected, and a total loss of confidence would follow. I am much concerned for the reputation of congress, and have laboured to support it because that body is and must be the cement of the union of the states. I hope, therefore, they will

always make it evident to reasonable men that their administration merits the public applause. Will they be able to do this, if they should cease to be very watchful over men whom they trust in great departments, especially those who have the disposition of the public moneys? Power will follow the possession of money, even when it is known that it is not the possessor's property. So fascinating are riches in the eyes of mankind! Were our financier, I was going to say, even an angel from heaven, I hope he will never have so much influence as to gain the ascendency over congress, which the first lord of the treasury has long had over the parliament of Britain; long enough to effect the ruin of that nation. These are the fears which I expressed in congress when the department was first instituted. I was told, that the breath of congress could annihilate the financier; but I replied, that the time might come, and if they were not careful it certainly would, when even congress would not dare to blow that breath. Whether these fears are the mere creatures of the imagination you will judge.

My regards to Dr. Holten son, if he is still in congress.

and Mr. Higgen

Pray write to me

often.

Adieu.

SAMUEL ADAMS.

Hon. Elbridge Gerry.

The delegates, who arranged among themselves the periods of their attendance at congress, never left the state or returned to it without communicating the fact to the legislature, and in a personal interview or by letter giving information of the past, or receiving instructions for their future conduct. The implicit recognition of this diplomatic character is contained in a letter of Messrs. Gerry, Holten and King, of 18th August 1783, in language, which shows that at that period it was not the subject of discussion.

"We have delayed," the letter proceeds, "any communication with congress upon the subject of your letters, with an intention to state to your excellency our sentiments upon the probable tendency and consequences of the measure, should it be adopted by congress and acceded to by the

states.

"We are sensible that our duty points to a prompt obedience to the acts and instructions of the legislature; but if a case arises, wherein we discover most clearly consequences so fatal, that had they been known, perhaps, the measure adopted would not have been proposed, it may not be improper to delay a final execution until we have the further instructions of the legislature, after such pernicious consequences of the measure shall have been submitted to them.

"But this may be a questionable opinion; we will therefore ask the advice of the supreme ex