Eminent domain, § 53 private purpose.

exercise for

5. The power of eminent domain may be exercised only for a public purpose, and not for a private purpose.

[See 10 R. C. L. 27; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 968; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 650; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 539; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 596.]

Eminent domain, § 54 - incidental public purpose.

6. The power of eminent domain cannot be delegated for an essentially private purpose, even though a public purpose will be incidentally served thereby.

Eminent domain, § 55 private benefit.

incidental

7. A use which is in itself of a public character justifying the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not lose its character as such by the fact that the exercise of the power for such use will incidentally result in a private use or benefit.

[See 10 R. C. L. 32, 33.]

Eminent domain, § 56 exercise for private purpose.

8. Where the intention to confer a private use or benefit forms the purpose, or a part of the purpose, of the proceeding or taking, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised.

[See 10 R. C. L. 27; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 968; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 650; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 539; 6 R. C. L. Supp. 596.]

Trial, § 302 — motion for judgment evidence considered.

9. Under a motion for judgment on plaintiff's evidence, the court should consider only the evidence tending to sustain the complaint.

[See 26 R. C. L. 1062; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 1490; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 1694; 5

The facts are stated in the opinion Messrs. Samuel D. Miller, Frank C. Dailey, William H. Thompson, Albert L. Rabb, Thomas D. Stevenson, and Perry E. O'Neal, for appellant:

The estate vested in the city was a determinable fee, which ended upon the happening of the event "that such lands or any part thereof shall hereafter be abandoned or cease to be used for such purposes."

Aldred v. Sylvester, 184 Ind. 542, 111 N. E. 914; Mendenhall v. First New Church Soc. 177 Ind. 336, 98 N. E. 57; Boling v. Miller, 133 Ind. 602, 33 N. E. 354; Pulse v. Osborn, 30 Ind. App. 631, 64 N. E. 59; Carter v. School Twp. 70 Ind. App. 604, 123 N. E. 645; Malone v. Kitchen, 79 Ind. App. 119, 137 N. E. 562; Fall Creek School Twp. v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. Ē. 677.

Upon the happening of the event upon which the city's estate was limited, to wit, "that such lands or any part thereof shall hereafter be abandoned or cease to be used for such purposes," the land immediately reverted to and vested in plaintiff, without any act on her part or other act on the part of the city to accomplish the reversion.

Fall Creek School Twp. v. Shuman,

supra.

The reverting of the strip to plaintiff was not affected by the fact that a highway was involved. The abandonment of the land resulted from the es

of the court.

tablishment of a new course for Pleasant Run parkway.

Kelley v. Augsperger, 171 Ind. 155, 85 N. E. 1004; Brook v. Horton, 68 Cal. 554, 10 Pac. 204; Hamilton v. Cooper, 149 Ga. 669, 101 S. E. 909; Brockhausen v. Bochland, 137 Ill. 547, 27 N. E. 458; Stahr v. Carter, 116 Iowa, 380, 90 N. W. 64; Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 90 N. E. 978; Com. v. Boston & A. R. Co. 150 Mass. 174, 22 N. E. 913; Britton v. Morris, 59 Okla. 162, 158 Pac. 358; Heiple v. Clackamas County, 20 Or. 147, 25 Pac. 291; State ex rel. Schroeder v. Behnke, 166 Wis. 65, 162 N. W. 443; State v. Reesa, 59 Wis. 106, 17 N. W. 873; Hark v. Gladwell, 49 Wis. 172, 5 N. W. 323.

The reversion resulted merely from cessation of use as a parkway, without regard to any question of formal abandonment.

Jordan v. Goldman, 1 Okla. 406, 34 Pac. 371; Fall Creek School Twp. v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. E. 677; 18 C. J. 112; Carter v. School Twp. 70 Ind. App. 604, 123 N. E. 645; Malone v. Kitchen, 79 Ind. App. 119, 137 N. E. 562.

The record affirmatively shows the establishment of the new boulevard and the abandonment and cessation of use of the old one, and that these things were done by the park board. The presumption is that they were regularly done.

Pine Tree Lumber Co. v. Fargo, 12

N. D. 360, 96 N. W. 357; 10 R. C. L. 880; McDonald v. Neilson, 2 Cow. 139, 14 Am. Dec. 431; Cyr v. Walker, 29 Okla. 281, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 795, 116 Pac. 931; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455, 114 N. E. 965; Cohasset v. Moors, 204 Mass. 173, 90 N. E. 978; 22 C. J. 130.

The question whether the actual purpose for which the defendants sought to take plaintiff's land was a public purpose was a question open to judicial investigation, and not foreclosed by any determination of the municipal officers or of the general assembly itself.

Great Western Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 66 N. E. 765; Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas, 175 Ind. 319, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 646, 94 N. E. 406; Sexauer v. Star Mill. Co. 173 Ind. 342, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 609, 90 S. W. 474; Beemis v. Guirl Drainage Co. 182 Ind. 36, 105 N. E. 496; Rensselaer v. Leopold, 106 Ind. 29, 5 N. E. 761; Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co. 14 Ind. 199, 77 Am. Dec. 63; Ligare v. Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 32 Am. St. Rep. 179, 28 N. E. 934; Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394; Southern R. Co. v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. 267, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 828, 148 S. W. 662, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 153; Walker v. Shasta Power Co. 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 725, 87 C. C. A. 660, 160 Fed. 856; Opinion of Justices, 118 Me. 503, 106 Atl. 865; Hirsh v. Block, 50 App. D. C. 56, 11 A.L.R. 1238, 267 Fed. 614; State ex rel. Olcott v. Hawk, 105 Or. 319, 208 Pac. 709, 209 Pac. 607; Hart v. Bothe, Mo. App. 247 S.

W. 256.

The board had no power to condemn for another a private right of way over plaintiff's land, because the power of eminent domain may be exercised only for public purposes, and may never be exercised for a private purpose.

Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind. 372, 8 L.R.A. 58, 24 N. E. 135; Stewart v. Hartman, 46 Ind. 331; Wild v. Deig, 43 Ind. 455, 13 Am. Rep. 399; Kansas City V. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639, 113 Am. St. Rep. 766, 96 S. W. 201; Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394; Lewis v. Bunnell, 190 Ind. 585, 131 N. E. 386; F. W. Cook Invest. Co. v. Evansville Terminal R. Co. 175 Ind. 3, 93 N. E. 279; Kinney v. Citizens Water & Light Co. 173 Ind. 252, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 195, 90 N. E. 129; Smith v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 170 Ind. 382, 81 N. E. 501; Cincin

nati, I. & W. R. Co. v. Connersville, 170 Ind. 316, 83 N. E. 503; Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 15 L.R.A. 505, 29 N. E. 1062; Allen v. Jones, 47 Ind. 438; Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co. 14 Ind. 199, 77 Am. Dec. 63.

The taking of private property for other than public use violates the constitutional rights of the owner. Such a taking is regarded as unconstitutional because the Constitution speaks only of a taking for public use, and it is therefore presumed that private property cannot be taken for a private use; or because the taking of private property for other than public use amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. New Keystone Copper Co. 16 Ariz. 257, 144 Pac. 277; Connecticut College v. Calvert, 87 Conn. 421, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 485, 88 Atl. 633; Great Western Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 30 Ind. App. 557, 66 N. E. 765; Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. 204 Ill. 576, 63 L.R.A. 582, 88 Am. St. Rep. 235, 68 N. E. 522; Riley v. Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. 142 Ky. 67, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 636, 133 S. W. 971, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 230; Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 70 L.R.A. 497, 61 Atl. 413; Rockingham County Light & P. Co. v. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 66 L.R.A. 581, 58 Atl. 46; Grande Ronde Electrical Co. v. Drake, 46 Or. 243, 78 Pac. 1031; Anderson v. Smith-Powers Logging Co. 71 Or. 276, L.R.A.1916B, 1089, 139 Pac. 736; Pennsylvania Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, 88 Atl. 904; Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate Co. 120 Tenn. 260, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 701, 113 S. W. 410; Boyd v. C. C. Ritter Lumber Co. 119 Va. 348, L.R.A.1917A, 94, 89 S. E. 273; Gauley & S. R. Co. v. Vencill, 73 W. Va. 650, 80 S. E. 1103; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403, 41 L. ed. 489, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 130; State ex rel. Schubert v. Rockford, 102 Minn. 442, 120 Am. St. Rep. 640, 114 N. W. 244.

Where the intention to confer a private benefit forms a part of the purpose of the proceeding, if not the entire purpose, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised.

Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546; Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist. 204 Ill. 576, 63 L.R.A. 582, 98 Am.

St. Rep. 235, 68 N. E. 522; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Galt, 133 Ill. 657, 23 N. E. 425, 24 N. E. 674; Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co. 97 Minn. 429, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 638, 107 N. W. 405, 7 Ann. Cas. 1182; Columbus Waterworks Co. v. Long, 121 Ala. 245, 25 So. 702; Webster v. Susquehanna Pole Line Co. 112 Md. 416, 76 Atl. 254, 21 Ann. Cas. 357; Berrien Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48, 103 Am. St. Rep. 438, 94 N. W. 379; Re Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 12 N. Y. Supp. 506; Miller v. Pulaski, 109 Va. 137, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 552, 63 S. E. 880; State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Ct. 42 Wash. 660, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 672, 85 Pac. 666, 7 Ann. Cas. 748; Wisconsin River Improv. Co. v. Pier, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 538, note.

It is only when the public and private purposes may be separated that the proceeding may be permitted to be taken as to that part which is public in character.

State ex rel. Harlan v. CentraliaChehalis Electric R. Power Co. 42 Wash. 632, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 198, 85 Pac. 344; Lake Koen Nav. Reservoir & Irrig. Co. v. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 65 Pac. 684; Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co. 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 199.

The public use is, if it exists at all, incidental to the private use, and the power of eminent domain cannot lawfully be exercised to execute such a combination of purposes.

Thom v. Georgia Mfg. & Pub. Serv. Co. 128 Ga. 187, 57 S. E. 75; Lorenz v. Jacob, 63 Cal. 73; Re Eureka Basin, Warehouse & Mfg. Co. 96 N. Y. 42.

Where the proceeding amounts to a fraud upon the plaintiff, the motives of the municipal officers may be shown on the issue of public purpose.

Henderson v. Lexington, 132 Ky. 390, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 20, 111 S. W. 318; State ex rel. Hunt v. Montevideo, 142 Minn. 157, 171 N. W. 314.

Mr. Telford B. Orbison, for appellees:

The taking of plaintiff's property by the board of park commissioners was for a public use, viz., "park purposes,' as shown by resolution No. 21 on its face. Such taking is constitutional.

Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 37 L. ed. 170, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361; Atty. Gen. v. Williams (Knowlton v. Williams) 174 Mass. 476, 47 L.R.A. 314, 55 N. E. 77.

Judicial investigation will not be extended to inquire into the motives of

the park board in the taking of private property, in the absence of direct charges of fraud and sinister scheming.

Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345, 14 L.R.A. 481, 24 N. E. 358; 1 Lewis, Em. Dom. 3d ed. p. 396; Coverdale v. Edwards, 155 Ind. 374, 58 N. E. 495; Downey v. State, 160 Ind. 578, 67 N. E. 450; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 787, 121 Am. St. Rep. 385, 80 N. E. 632; Gardiner v. Bluffton, 173 Ind. 454, 89 N. E. 853, 90 N. E. 898, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 713.

With the necessity, propriety, expediency, reasonableness, or policy of taking private property for the public use, the courts have naught to do.

Chicago, D. & V. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268, 14 Am. Rep. 99; Richland School Twp. v. Overmyer, 164 Ind. 382, 73 N. E. 811; Phillips v. Watson, 63 Iowa, 28, 18 N. W. 659; Kitchel v. Union County, 123 Ind. 540, 24 N. E. 366; Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364.

Acquisition resolution No. 21 which states that the taking of plaintiff's property is a taking for "park purposes" is conclusive upon the court, and precludes any attempt at inquiring into or going behind said resolution, in the absence of any direct charges of fraud. And this is true, whether the inquiry be directed at the motive of the board of park commissioners, or the so-called “real purpose" of the resolution.

Richland School Twp. v. Overmyer, 164 Ind. 382, 73 N. E. 811; Schmidt v. Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 787, 121 Am. St. Rep. 385, 80 N. E. 632; Downey v. State, 160 Ind. 578, 67 N. E. 450; Coverdale v. Edward, 155 Ind. 374, 58 N. E. 495; Lilly v. Indianapolis, 149 Ind. 648, 49 N. E. 887; Gardiner v. Bluffton, 173 Ind. 454, 89 N. E. 453, 90 N. E. 898, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 713; Waterloo Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345, 14 L.R.A. 481, 28 N. E. 358; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Com. ex rel. Elkin v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 53 L.R.A. 837, 85 Am. St. Rep. 801, 49 Atl. 351; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. p. 258, note; Kansas & T. Coal R. Co. v. Northwestern Coal & Min. Co. 161 Mo. 288, 51 L.R.A. 936, 84 Am. St. Rep. 717, 61 S. W. 684.

Plaintiff in collaterally attacking the findings of the board of park commis

sioners can only question the jurisdiction of said board.

Brown v. Central Bermudez Co. 162 Ind. 452, 69 N. E. 150; Shank v. Smith, 157 Ind. 401, 55 L.R.A. 564, 61 N. E. 932; Curless v. Watson, 54 Ind. App. 110, 100 N. E. 576; McEneney v. Sullivan, 125 Ind. 407, 25 N. E. 540.

No evidence was introduced by plaintiff which shows a legal cause for an injunction against defendants, nor was any evidence introduced which showed a valid defense to the taking of her property.

Richland School Twp. v. Overmyer, 164 Ind. 382, 73 N. E. 811; 26 R. C. L. p. 1061.

Martin, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant sued to enjoin the city of Indianapolis and its board of park commissioners from taking under the power of eminent domain, a triangular strip of ground, 163 feet long and containing .073 acres, abutting on the Pleasant Run parkway, within said city, and constituting the north part of a plot owned by appellant.

In 1911 the strip of ground was conveyed to the appellee city by appellant's remote grantor, "for parkway and boulevard purposes and for such purposes alone," with a provision in the conveyance that if it should, in the future, "be abandoned or cease to be used for such purposes," it should "thereupon immediately revert." Prior to May 10, Prior to May 10, 1923, the course of the boulevard was changed because of the construction of a new bridge over Pleasant run, and as a result of such relocation the triangular strip of ground was left vacant and unused. On that date the board of park commissioners by resolution abandoned said strip and turned it back to appellant, who thereupon fenced it in and planted shrubbery upon it.

Appellees do not dispute appellant's points that a determinable fee was vested in the city (Aldred v. Sylvester [1915] 184 Ind. 542, 561, 111 N. E. 914), that the same was thus ended, and that by the "possibility of reverter," of which appellant was the grantee, she then

became vested with title to the strip of ground (13 C. J. 1017; Fall Creek School Twp. v. Shuman [1913] 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. E. 677).

On September 1, 1923, the board of park commissioners adopted a resolution seeking to retake and reappropriate for park purposes this strip of ground, and, upon the hearing, appellant appeared and remonstrated in writing against such taking. The board ratified the resolution and appointed appraisers who in due time filed their report.

Appellant's complaint, in two paragraphs, alleged in part that the avowed purpose of the board's resolution was to compel and force appellant to grant to a private owner of property which abuts said strip on the east a wider right of way from said property to the Pleasant Run parkway and boulevard. Appellant also alleged that should the strip be taken she "will be deprived of her property for private and not for public use and benefit

and without due process of law." The issues were joined by general denials.

The cause was tried by the court, and at the conclusion of appellant's evidence the appellees moved for a judgment in their favor, and stood upon their motion. The court found for the appellees and rendered judgment in their favor. Appellant as signs as error the overruling of her motion for a new trial. Among the reasons therein set out are the following: That the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence; that it is contrary to law; and that the court erred in sustaining appellees' motion for judgment in their favor and for dissolution of a temporary injunction which had been issued.

It appeared in evidence that lot 9, appellant's lot and lot 11, the lot immediately east thereof owned by a Mrs. Miller, both abut on the south on Audubon drive, and that appellant's lot abuts on Pleasant Run parkway, as did also lot 11 before. the triangular strip was abandoned by the city; that the city owns