The State v. Bidleman. not the father of the bastard; a thing impossible to be proved, unless it should so happen that the defendant was absent in a foreign country, at the time of the conception; or some other special circumstances existed, utterly irreconcilable with the idea of his being the father of the child. In ordinary cases, where the parties reside in the same neighborhood, an order of filiation made by two Justices, although made without any legal evidence, or indeed, without any evidence at all, would be absolutely conclusive upon the accused, and render an appeal utterly useless, if it is to remain in force, until the appellant produces negative proof, sufficient to establish the fact, that he is not the father of the child. In The King v. The Inhabitants of Newbury, 4 T. R. 475, it was held that on an appeal from a poor rate, on the ground that the appellant had been over-rated, it was incumbent on the respondents first to establish their case. This was so ruled, notwithstanding it was urged that the practice at the Sessions had always been otherwise. The case of The King v. Knill, 12 East. 50, is on all fours with this. It was an appeal from an order of affiliation. The practice of the Sessions had uniformly been to require the appellant to begin and prove a sufficient case for quashing the order; but the Court of King's Bench ruled otherwise, upon the authority of the case in 4 T. R. 475, and in both those cases, the cause was remitted to the Sessions, to be proceeded in, heard and determined according to law. In this case the order of the Sessions affirming the order of filiation, and all the proceedings had upon the recognizance by scire facias, must be quashed and set aside, and the record must be remitted to the Quarter Sessions to be proceeded in according to law. We cannot, as the counsel for the defendant calls upon us to do, go further and quash the original order. It is true as he contends, that this Court are to make such order in the premises as the Court below should have made. But this means such order, as the Sessions ought to have made after a hearing upon the merits. The King v. Tenant, 2 Ld. Raym. 14, 23; S. C. 2 Str. 716; 1 Burn's Just. 213 tit. Bastards; Cro. Car. 350. In this case, the Quarter Sessions made no adjudication upon the merits; they did not require the respondents to give any evidence in support of the order. If they had done so, and the respond The State v. Bidleman. ents had failed to produce such evidence, and the Quarter Sessions had notwithstanding affirmed the order, this Court would undoubtedly, upon Certiorari, quash both orders. It is also objected by the defendant's counsel, that the proceedings on scire facias ought to be set aside, on the ground, that the paper writing set up as a recognizance, is a mere nullity: that it is not authenticated, either by the certificate of the Justice, or by the signatures of the recognizors, and is therefore nothing more than a piece of blank paper. It seems to me, that upon this point, the defendant may make his election, and consider himself as under recognizance or not, as he pleases. If he never did enter into such recognizance, then he never appealed, and in that case, the whole proceeding before the Sessions, was coram non judice and void, and the original order of filiation stands in full force. In this view of the case, the defendant will probably prefer to waive this objection, and consider himself as under recognizance to appear before the Sessions. It is stated in the brief handed up by the defendant's counsel, that it appears on the face of the original order, (which I have not seen) that the child was born in the township of Greenwich, in the county of Warren, and yet the order was made by two Justices of the county of Hunterdon, upon the complaint of the Overseers of the Poor of the township of Alexandria in that county. If this is so, it is undoubtedly fatal. Quick v. Overseers of Amwell, Penn. R. 1016 is conclusive upon this point; and the original order being now before us, on this Certiorari, we may look into it, and if erroneous and void upon the face of it, we may quash it at once, without sending it back to the Sessions, to have their judgment upon it. Rex v. Stanley, Caldecott's R. 172. If therefore upon inspecting the original order, the facts appear to be as stated, let that order and the order of Sessions affirming it, and also all the proceedings had on the scire facias, be quashed and for nothing holden. P. S. On inspection of the record, it appears that the birth of the bastard child, was in the township of Greenwich, in the county of Warren; and consequently both orders, as well the original order of the Justices, as the order of Sessions affirming the same, must be quashed and set aside. Den Whitenack v. Voorheis. Both orders and the proceedings on scire facias quashed and set aside. CITED in Dally v. Overseers of Woodbridge, 1 Zab. 493; State v. Overseers of ANONYMOUS. On Certiorari to Common Pleas in a case of insolvency. Matter of practice. Mr. J. S. Green enquiring of the Court, what is the rule as to the hearing of arguments in such cases, was directed by the Court to set it down on the paper. DEN WHITENACK v. VOORHEIS. Matter of Practice. On motion of Mr. Vroom, for a rule to file in the clerks' office of this Court, an affidavit to which is annexed an original notice, and both of which have been filed in the Somerset Circuit Clerk's office; and for leave to take said notice from the files of this Court, for the purpose of sending it for proof of service, attached to a commission to take depositions in the State of Ohio. PER CURIAM. Take your rule. New-Jersey Rail Road and Tr. Co. v. Suydam. THE NEW-JERSEY RAIL ROAD AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. ABRAHAM SUYDAM. On Certiorari to the Clerk of Middlesex county, to return the proceedings of Commissioners on assessing damages to landholders, &c. An award of such Commissioners, assessing damages for running, making and maintaining fences, without shewing, that the lands of the party, through which the road is run, are improved lands, is illegal and void. The charter authorizing such damages in case only of improved land. The rule is well settled that persons exercising a special delegated authority, must show upon the face of their proceedings, that they have acted within their prescribed limits. This Court will set aside the proceeding of such Commissioners, if they have adopted and acted upon illegal principles in making their valuation of land, and assessment of damages. To ascertain which fact, affidavits may be taken and read before this Court, on a Certiorari, although the merits of the case may not be inquired into. When the principle of valuation is ascertained, this Court is judicially to determine, not whether the assessment made thereon, was too much or too little, but whether the principle or rule was a lawful or unlawful one. A Certiorari lies in all cases unless taken away by express words of a statute; and not only where there is no other remedy, but even where an appeal is given upon the merits. J. P. Jackson and I. H. Williamson, for plaintiffs. J. W. Scott and P. D. Vroom, for defendant. J. P. Jackson for plaintiffs, insists that the award in this case was grossly extravagant, oppressive and unjust; was made on erroneous principles, and should be set aside. The plaintiffs must establish three positions, to entitle them to relief. I. The jurisdiction of the Court. II. Its right to vacate this award, if palpable injustice has been done, or if made on erroneous principles. III. That these objections to this award, are well founded in fact. I. This is the only tribunal that can give relief in the present matter, and there can be no wrong without a remedy; Coxe Rep. 247, 248, 251. A Court of Chancery cannot interfere, it appertains to the general supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme New-Jersey Rail Road and Tr. Co. v. Suydam. Court. Sax. C. R. 277; 4 John. C. R. 356; 15 John. R. 538; 2 Caines, 181; 16 John. R. 50. The authority of this Court to inspect the proceedings of Inferior tribunals, especially of statutory jurisdiction, exists in full vigor. 1 Green, 98; 2 Id. 39. No appeal is granted to the plaintiffs by their charter, (see 6th sec.) their only redress is by Certiorari at common law. This remedy cannot be denied, for "nothing short of express words, will deprive this Court of jurisdiction." 3 Green, 322. Justice Baldwin in Circuit Court United States, in a parallel case, laid down the law, that "so far as respects the legal objections to the assessment, which were the grounds of the Certiorari, they are properly cognizable in the Supreme Court of this State, in virtue of its general supervisory jurisdiction, over all inferior jurisdictions proceeding in a summary way; and over all commissioners and officers, appointed to execute a trust or power, general or special. This general superintending control, has not been taken away or impaired, in cases of the present descrip tion. II. This court have a right to examine the award, and set it aside, if palpable injustice has been done, or if made on erroneous principles; 8 Wend. 47; 10 Wend. 168, 179; 16 John. 49; 20 John. 432. Let it be established that there is no relief from exorbitant and oppressive assessments, and the commissioners would be clothed with despotic power. They could render inoperative any grant of the Legislature, and arrest the construction of any public work. Suppose an award of $100,000 for lands not worth $100; would not the fact itself, be evidence of erroneous principles of valuation, and that palpable injustice has been done? It is the proof of such facts, that enables the Court to perceive the erroneous principles of law, which governed the Commissioners. It is the flagrancy and enormity of the result, that makes the principles by which it is attained, illegal and unjust. In such a case, Commissioners exceed their powers, and their acts will be set aside, but the facts can only be ascertained, by examining witnesses to discover the truth of the complaints. 8 Wend. 63, 64; 2 Caines R. 182. III. The facts show the amount awarded to have been so ex |