1 P determining its position in International Law. And up The Panama Canal, it is well known, was taken for construction by the United States as a government enterprise, on account of the generally accepted belief that private capital could not command sufficient resources for the completion of such an enormous work.1 Another point that seems to be equally ineffectual in determining the legal position of the waterway is the fact that the canal is constructed in territory that does not belong to the nation engaged in the opera 1 Mr. Roosevelt summarises thus one of the reasons why the United States undertook the completion of the Panama Canal: "It is not worth while belonging to a big nation unless the big nation is willing when the necessity arises to undertake a big task. When we acquired the right to build the Panama Canal, and entered on the task, there were worthy people who came to me, and said they wondered whether it would pay. I always answered that it was one of the great world works which had to be done; that it was our business as a nation to do it, if we were really to make good our claim to be treated as a great world power; and that as we were unwilling to abandon the claim, no American worth his salt ought to hesitate about performing the task." (Speech of Mr. Roosevelt delivered at the Mansion House, The Times, June 1, 1910.) tion. If this fact has any importance at all from the international standpoint, it is in showing that the general interest awakened with reference to the question is such that it has attracted foreign activity on account of the national resources being too poor for the magnitude of the work undertaken. Finally, it may be submitted that the two last facts discussed—that is, the governmental character of the enterprise and the actual carrying out of the plans in foreign territory-may in some way influence the political history of the waterway, but with regard to its legal position they afford no clue, especially when there exist conventional agreements that purport to define its status. CHAPTER III. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO GIVE TO THE PANAMA CANAL AN INTERNATIONAL STATUS. IT has been hinted at, though not expressly stated, that the neutralisation attached to a certain region, when considered apart from conventional agreements, mainly depends on the following three facts:1_ I. The geographical position of the place in tion; II. Its history, and 1 ques III. The interest that the world at large may have in it. It is clear, however, that these questions, which we now consider as separate from each other, are not really so from a different point of view, for one of them may at once depend on, or result from, the others. Thus the geographical position that a certain place occupies may account for its history and for the special interest that mankind takes in it, and the result of this interest may be reflected in the conventional agreements of certain nations. But it will be convenient for our purpose to deal with them separately. The above facts will be discussed in their order. I. GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF THE PANAMA CANAL. It is well known that the canal is being built in the narrowest stretch of land-less than fifty miles wide that connects North and South America. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to enter here into a long description of its geographical peculiarities in order to emphasise the importance of the route, not only from the economical, but also from the political and strategical standpoints. The canal when terminated will be in the nature of an artificial strait connecting the two great oceans. Its position is such that it will necessarily alter the international thoroughfares. It is not intended, nor will it be relevant to the subject, to enter here into a detailed and accurate account of the extent to which the Panama Canal will shift the centre of gravity in relation to the world routes, or what will be the advantages that the artificial waterway will have over the natural or actual condition of things. But some remarks on the subject will be germane to the present inquiry. It is obvious that the route between New Zealand and European countries on the Atlantic will be appreciably shortened. Japan, Australia, and New Zealand will be within. more easy reach of the ports on the Atlantic coast of the American continent. Thus the new canal will make the travelling distance by sea between New York and Yokohama some 3400 miles less than under present conditions. There will also be a comparatively rapid maritime communication between Europe and the Pacific states of the New V World, as well as between the latter and those on the Atlantic littoral. These are the main points to be considered in dealing with the extraordinary possibilities and opportunities that will be brought into being by the opening of the canal. It is possible, indeed probable, that a host of problems of a commercial, political, or strategical nature will be created that will not fail to affect a large number of the members of the international family. II. HISTORY OF THE PANAMA CANAL. It will not be necessary to repeat here what has been said in this connection when dealing with the policy of the United States towards the canal question. Throughout the whole history of trans-isthmian communication in the New World we can see that the territorial power has never intended to make of the canal a monopoly. If this could bring some advantages, the disadvantages and the difficulties that it would entail would be so great that in fact it would not be worth while to attempt it. Other nations have not been slow in recognising this fact; hence it is that, as has been remarked by Professor Latané, all the arrangements in reference to the canal contemplate some sort of neutralisation.1 As early as 1866, New Granada, to which power then belonged the territory through which the canal was to be constructed, passed a law declaring the perpetual neutrality of the ports at each end of the canal and of its waters. In 1875 another law was passed for the same 1 Op. cit. and loc. cit. ; cp. also pp. 13, 16, 18, 28, 30, 37, supra. |