this fact, justly says that "it is difficult to see why the declaration of the United States delegate should be considered to have a bilateral effect, and the principle that 'silence gives consent' be invoked in so important a matter."1 It is universally accepted, and rightly so, that the Doctrine belongs to the domain of politics and not to that of law. From the foregoing brief sketch of the Monroe Doctrine, it becomes evident that the majority of the utterances of the Department of State in connection with trans-isthmian communication are devoid of legal force. But we have entered into a discussion of the views entertained by certain American statesmen, simply because they may serve as an indication of the ultimate results that may be reached in the subject of a canal across Central America. We have noted, on the one hand, the occasional endeavour of the United States to obtain the use of the waterway for their exclusive benefit as a development of the Monroe Doctrine; while, on the other hand, the interest taken by the other maritime powers, especially by Great Britain, in such communications has prompted them to attempt to counteract that tendency. To find out what has been the result of this controversy, that is to say, what legal principles will bè made to apply to the Panama Canal, will be the subjuct of the succeeding chapters. 1 Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 174. CHAPTER I. NEUTRALISATION IN GENERAL. IN entering into the foregoing historical sketch of the interoceanic canal question, it has been with the intention of discovering the different views that have obtained in connection with the status of this maritime communication. The political aspect of the subject only, therefore, has been studied. It is intended now to attempt the solution of the problem from a purely legal standpoint. As both in the Hay-Pauncefote and in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaties the words "neutrality" and "neutralisation" are used with reference to the juridical position of the canal, it would be well to define as accurately as possible the meaning of these terms, so that we may be able to avoid the misconceptions and ambiguities that would naturally result if a different course were followed. If absolute truth were not necessarily to be attained in this way, we may at least circumscribe within narrow limits the many possibilities for error that are generally attendant on all questions in which technical terms play an important part. Among the nations of old, belligerents never recognised an attitude of impartiality on the part of the states which had no active part in the hostilities. Some kind of assistance was always expected from those countries which were near the theatre of war; and if the expected aid was not forthcoming such states were regarded as actually hostile. But in the course of centuries a principle of impartiality on the part of those states foreign to the struggle has been developed, and to-day the body of rules which go to form that principle constitute one of the most important chapters of International Law. A state is, generally speaking, free to abstain from, or take part in, the hostilities when there is a state war; but if it chooses to abstain from acts of war it is said to be neutral, that is to say, that it takes no part in the contest and remains carrying on pacific intercourse with the belligerents. It follows, therefore, that the condition of neutrality in this sense can only exist in time of war, and applies only to those states which, of their own free will, abstain from taking part in the contest, observing thereby an attitude of impartiality towards the belligerents. But there are states and things, which have a neutral character, without having the option to join in the struggle or abstain from it. These are neutralised states and neutralised things, and the process by which they have acquired this character is technically known as Neutralisation. Such states or things cannot have a belligerent nature. In the words of Professor Holland, "to neutralise is to bestow by convention a neutral character upon states, persons, and things which would or might otherwise bear a belligerent character." 2 As a 1 Cp. Lawrence, Essays on International Law, pp. 143 et seq. |