this way cannot be said to have any legal force. The rights which states have inter se would be necessarily altered by the process, and hence they cannot be restricted without their consent. A state is unable by its sole declaration to impose the obligation on other states to respect its neutrality by the mere fact that it has decreed that its territory or part of it is to be neutralised. In 1856 the Khedive declared that the Suez Canal and its ports should be considered as neutral. But this unilateral statement was not regarded as sufficient to render the seizure of the canal by Great Britain in 1882 an offence against the law of the civilised world.

In dealing with the important subject of a unilateral declaration of neutralisation, we must be careful in our way of reasoning so as to avoid a confusion between the political and the juridical view of the question. In order to obtain cogency and precision in our conclusions, let us examine the opinion of M. F. de Martens, the learned Russian Professor. He considers that the view taken by the majority of international jurists to the effect that an act of neutralisation must necessarily be signed and approved by the Great Powers is absolutely inadmissible. He goes on to observe that in private life nobody contests our right to declare once for all that it is our intention to keep a perfect neutrality in the quarrels of our neighbours and acquaintances; that, therefore, in the political or international life, the same right should be recognised to states so that they may declare urbi et orbi, and for all time, that they have decided to remain out of all international complications and will not take part in the conflicts.

arising between nations.1 Now the premises of the famous jurist are perfectly sound, but the conclusion which he makes them to yield, we respectfully submit, is entirely false. True it is that a nation is at liberty to proclaim far and wide that she has decided to abstain from all international conflicts in the future; nobody has suggested that Colombia or Egypt were committing a breach of law by declaring in their municipal regulations the "neutrality" of certain parts of their territories. The real question is whether such unilateral declarations would have any legal force in International Law, so that other nations would respect, and abide by, the decision; that is to say, whether the unilateral declaration would be sufficient to create an obligation in law. As no other seems to be the suggestion of the learned professor, we venture to subscribe our opinion in the negative for the following two reasons: (i) From the point of view of general jurisprudence nobody can impose on himself a legal obligation, for this would mean that he himself would seek its enforcement; if he imposes it on himself he could also liberate himself from it at will, and hence it cannot be legally binding.2 (ii) A state cannot impose on others an obligation without their consent. This would be against the very nature of International Law.3

For identical reasons we feel compelled to dissent also from the view of M. Descamps. He equally

4

1 F. de Martens, "La Neutralisation du Danemark," Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 15, 1903.

2 See Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence, 11th ed. p. 192.

3 See supra, pp. 89, 90.

4 La Neutralité de la Belgique. Étude sur la constitution des États pacifiques à titre permanente, 1902, pp. 304 et seq.

suggests the existence of a "neutralité permanente érigée en maxime d'État." This view, as has been pointed out by M. Hagerup,1 partakes more of a political than of a juridical conception. Similarly two or three states are incapable of effecting the neutralisation of a certain area. In view of this, we venture to suggest that the provision of the treaty between Argentine and Chile, 1882, providing for the neutralisation of the Straits of Magellan, has not in itself any validity in International Law so as to constitute any interference with it an offence against the public law of nations. If there exists a tacit understanding on the part of the more important maritime nations to respect and uphold the engagement, then and then only can the Magellan's Straits be deemed to have a definite status in International Law. But as long as there is no evidence in this direction, any nation at war with either of the contracting parties would be absolutely free to disregard the declaration.

It would seem perfectly clear from the succinct analysis which has been made, that although neutralisation cannot be said to have arrived at its final stage on account of the comparatively short time that has elapsed since the first attempt to neutralise, yet the process undoubtedly establishes a definite status for the states, persons, or things on which the neutral character is bestowed. As soon as this status has been properly apprehended the difficulties and intricacies of the subject would be diminished when it is sought to discover whether a given object bears that character. It is possible that

1 La Neutralité permanente, 1905.

an imperfect apprehension of the true meaning of the notion may lead diplomatists to use the term as applied to certain things which, in fact, owing to the special circumstances of the case, do not bear that character. It is also conceivable, on the other hand, that the term may not be used in describing the international position of states, persons, or things, and yet there may be no doubt whatever that they have this particular status on account of the peculiar advantages and restrictions that have been granted and imposed, and also for the object that has been intended to secure.1 It is then the business of the International lawyer to examine these cases under the light of legal theory, and discriminate between real and mistaken examples of neutralisation.

1 Thus in the convention that definitely establishes the international position of the Suez Canal, the word neutralisation and its kindred terms do not appear, yet there cannot be any doubt as to the status of this waterway.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF THE NEUTRALISATION OF WATERWAYS.

AFTER the brief examination of the theory of neutralisation, it would be profitable to discuss certain general principles applicable to artificial maritime routes, so that we may be enabled to bring the question of the Panama Canal under their light, and then proceed to draw our inferences as free from ambiguities and vagueness as it is possible. It has been seen what neutralisation is, as well as the purposes for which it is accomplished and the manner of making it effective. But instead of proceeding immediately to apply the principles thus observed to the case of the interoceanic waterway, it might be expedient to deal with other more specific factors that are considered to bear an intimate relation to the matter in hand, and which may greatly contribute to explain the ultimate position which the canal is made to assume.

It is hardly necessary to point out that maritime problems are of transcendent value to all peoples. If the sea is considered from the point of view of serving as a highway between the different nations of the globe, its great importance is immediately