whale, being infested, retired from the coast, they followed him further and further into the ocean, enlarging their vessels, with their adventures, to sixty, one hundred, and two hundred tons. Having extended their pursuit to the Western Islands, they fell in, accidentally, with the spermaceti whale; and the distinction now first arose between the northern and southern fisheries, the object of the former being the Greenland whale, which frequented the northern coasts, and that of the latter, the spermaceti whale, which was found in the southern seas. At the commencement of the Revolution the Americans had one hundred and seventy-seven vessels in the northern, and one hundred and thirty-two in the southern fishery.

At that period, our fishery being suspended, the English seized the opportunity of monopolizing the business, by a series of artful measures. They conferred extravagant bounties on their whale ships; invited the fishermen of the United States to conduct their enterprises; and prepared the way for effectuating their offer by imposing such a duty on our whale oils as amounted to a prohibi

tion.

The fishermen of the United States, left without resource by the loss of their markets, began to think of accepting the British invitation, and of removing, some to Nova Scotia, others to Great Britain, postponing country and friends to high premiums.

The government of France could not be inattentive to these proceedings. They saw the danger of permitting four or five thou sand seamen, the best in the world, to be transferred to the marine strength of a rival nation, and carry with them an art which they possessed almost exclusively. They therefore adopted the plan of extending a counter invitation to American seamen, to remove and settle in Dunkirk, backing their invitation with heavy premiums, and many other advantages. This was in 1785. Mr. Jefferson being then at Paris, endeavored to prevail on the French ministry to vary their policy, first by abating the duties on American oil, and afterwards by closing their ports to all foreign fish oils, of every nation, except the produce of the whale fisheries of the United States. This was accordingly done; but they continued their endeavors to increase their share in the fisheries themselves, by the aid of our fishermen, and by giving large bounties to their own.

Such was the weight of competition against which the United States had to struggle, for the resumption and continuance of their

whale fisheries. Against prohibitory duties in one nation, and bounties to the adventurers of both of those which were contending with each other for the supremacy, the Americans had nothing to oppose but poverty and rigorous economy. The business, unaided, was a wretched one, but infinitely too important, in a national point of view, to be overlooked by the government. Besides being peculiarly fitted by nature for becoming a source of revenue to the United States, it was a valuable nursery for forming American seamen. On the island of Nantucket alone, which was capable of maintaining, by its agriculture, only about twenty families, between five and six thousand persons were profitably employed in these fisheries before the war.

These considerations rendered it indispensable, in the opinion of the author, that some effectual relief should be administered for re instating the business upon its ancient basis. And he recommended the interference of the government in three ways-A remission of duties on the articles used in the fisheries-A retaliating duty on foreign oils coming in competition with ours-Free markets abroad, which was the principal object.

France was the only nation which needed our surplus; and it was important that she should continue to view us, as heretofore, not in the light of rivals, but as co-operators against a common rival. Friendly arrangements with that nation, and accommodations to mutual interest, rendered easier by amicable dispositions on both sides, might long secure to the United States, this important resource for their seamen. Nor was it the interest of the fishermen alone, which called for the cultivation of friendly relations with France. Besides five-eights of our whale oil, and two-thirds of our salted fish, they received from us one fourth of our tobacco, three-fourths of our live stock, a considerable and growing portion of our rice, and great supplies, occasionally, of our grain. It was also a free market for our ships and ship-timber, potash and peltry. England was the market for the greater part of our spermaceti oil; but they imposed such a duty on all our oils, as, to the common kind, was a prohibition, and to the spermaceti, but little less; and not long since, by a change of construction, without any change of law, they excluded our oils entirely from their ports, when brought in our own vessels ;

"This serves to show, that the tenure, by which we hold the admission of this commodity in their markets, is as precarious as it is hard. Nor can it be announced, that there is any disposition on their part to arrange this or any other commercial matter, to mutual convenience. The exparte regulations, which they have begun, for mounting their navigation on the ruin of ours, can only be opposed by counter regulations on our part. And the loss of seamen, the natural consequence of lost and obstructed markets for our fish and oil, calls, in the first place, for serious and timely attention. It will be too late, when the seaman shall have changed his vocation, or gone over to another interest."

This sound and energetic Report was submitted to Congress on the 4th of February, 1791. It was accepted, published, and applauded by the great majority of the people. The policy so urgently recommended by Mr. Jefferson, was adopted; and its utility was soon demonstrated, by the restoration to the United States, upon a prosperous and permanent footing, of one of their most important branches of domestic and maritime industry.

The strictures of this Report upon the British commercial and navigation system, and its demonstrations of the more liberal policy of France, though they could not be denied by Great Britain herself, in a single point, received a reluctant assent from the monarchical party in the United States; and served to place more in contrast before the public, the collisions of political sentiment between the heads of the State and Treasury department. This contrast was completed, and the division of sentiment rendered almost as perfect in the public mind, as it existed in the Cabinet, by

3. The Report of the Secretary of State on Commerce and Navigation. This paper was prepared in pursuance of a resolution of the House of Representatives, passed on the 23d of February, 1791, instructing him to report to Congress the nature and extent of the privileges and restrictions of the commercial intercourse of the United States with foreign nations, and the measures which he should think proper to be adopted for the improvement of their commerce and navigation.

The Report stated the exports of the United States to Great Britain at more than nine millions annually, and the imports from that nation at fifteen millions. The amount of exports to France was only about four and a half millions, and that of imports two millions. Notwithstanding the vast disproportion of our trade, in favor

of England, the restrictions imposed on it by that nation, were far more burthensome and oppressive than those imposed by France.

With respect to the navigation of the United States, our ships, though purchased and navigated by British subjects, were not permitted to be used even in the trade of that nation with us. While the vessels of other nations were secured by a standing law to carry to England any produce or manufactures of the country to which they belonged, which might be lawfully carried in any vessels, ours, with the same prohibition of what was foreign, were further prohibited by a standing law from carrying thither any of our domestic productions and manufactures. A subsequent act authorized the King to permit the carriage of our productions in our own bottoms, at his pleasure, which was given every year by proclamation; but this was so precarious a tenure, that our vessels were liable every moment to be interdicted from British ports. Our ships paid in their ports more than their own, except in the port of London, where they paid the same. In addition to all this, the greater part of our exports were re-exported from Great Britain to other countries, under the useless charges of a double voyage, and intermediate deposite. Instead, therefore, of supplying their wants merely, we were loading them with surpluses for transportation to other countries, and thus, besides helping them to command the commerce of the world, were pouring into their treasury extravagant duties, which might as well be paid to other nations who received our vessels comparatively free.

With respect to the navigation of the United States to the ports of France, our ships were free to carry thither all goods and productions which might be carried in their own or any other vessels, except tobaccos not of our own growth. Our vessels participated with theirs the exclusive carriage of our whale oils and tobaccos; and they were admitted naturalization in all their ports until lately. They and their Colonies were the actual consumers of what they received from us.

After enumerating the various restrictions on our commerce, in the form of duties on our articles of export, the Report proceeds to recommend the mode in which those restrictions should be removed, modified or counteracted. It proposed two methods: 1. By amicable arrangements, as being the most eligible in all cases, if practica

ble. 2. By countervailing regulations, where friendly arrangements could not be made.

"There can be no doubt but that of these two, friendly arrangement is the most eligible. Instead of embarrassing commerce under piles of regulating laws, duties and prohibitions, could it be relieved from all its shackles in all parts of the world, could every country be employed in producing that which nature has best fitted it to produce, and each be free to exchange with others mutual surpluses for mutual wants, the greatest mass possible would then be produced of those things which contribute to human life and human happiness; the numbers of mankind would be increased, and their condition bettered.

"Would even a single nation begin with the United States this system of free commerce, it would be advisable to begin it with that nation; since it is one by one only, that it can be extended to all. When the circumstances of either party render it expedient to levy a revenue, by way of impost, on commerce, its freedom might be modified, in that particular, by mutual and equivalent measures, preserving it entire in all others.

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"But should any nation, contrary to our wishes, suppose it may better find its advantage by continuing its system of prohibitions, duties and regulations, it behooves us to protect our citizens, their commerce and navigation, by counter prohibitions, duties and regulations, also. Free commerce and navigation are not to be given in exchange for restrictions and vexations; nor are they likely to produce a relaxation of them.”

The navigation of the United States, in the opinion of the Secretary, involved even higher considerations. As a branch of industry it was valuable; but as a bulwark of defence, indispensable. Its value as a branch of industry was enhanced by the dependence upon it, of so many other branches. In times of peace it multiplied competitors for employment in transportation; in times of war, if we had not the means of transportation, the belligerent nations would monopolize our carrying trade. But as a weapon of defence, it was inestimable. On the land the United States had nothing to fear, but on the ocean they were liable to injury at all times. Their commerce must be protected or lost, and with it, their seamen, ship artists, and establishments.

"Were the ocean, which is the common property of all, open to the industry of all, so that every person and vessel should be free to take employment wherever it could be found, the United States would certainly not set the example of appropriating to themselves, exclusively, any portion of the common stock of occupation. But