vitals, there might be found, in that state of things, some reason for avoiding occasions of bitter social agitation, such as calling hard names, putting the ban on social intercourse, etc.; but that one portion of the community entertaining very decided opinions as to the incapacity of the official agents of Government, and the baleful tendency of both their principles and their practice, should sit quietly down and let the car of Juggernaut roll over and grind its thousands, is like expecting the paterfamilias to be easy and content, whilst the robber and murderer are in the house, ready for their deeds of blood. No matter though he should be mistaken, and those in the semblance of robbers should prove to be angels in disguise, yet, believing as he did, would he be guilty of the blood of his children, if he hesitated to call the watch, and himself to resist, meanwhile, as he could.

The text of the article is, that there must be no change of the Republican for a Democratic administration, nor even of the present members of the Cabinet. This text is not, indeed, formally announced at the beginning, as in a sermon, but immediately follows the prefatory remarks on the state of war. Arguments both precede and follow the text. The 'spirit of patriotism' is the initiative and the potent spell which solves the riddle of the hour. This is

not an expository discourse, and therefore terms are left undefined, and the reader may easily imagine patriotism to be, not love of country, but sustentation of a policy adopted by the President and his Cabinet. This spirit of patriotism, a substitute for love of country, very readily settles the whole difficulty, and makes the Presidential election the most facile thing possible. But if A and B differ in their views of what constitutes love of country, how is the difficulty met? If, although A think the theories and practice of the administration the very essence of patriotism, B entertains a totally variant opinion,

what then? Suppose B to hold it among his deep convictions, that consolidation, centralization, annihilation of State Rights and Federal union, do not represent the ideas of his country, derived from the action of the Fathers, and that the tendency of measures of administration is strongly in that direction, whilst A's patriotism consists in adopting into his axioms those very ideas and giving his whole soul to those measures, must not the 'spirit of patriotism' in the one dictate a course opposite to that of the other? How, then, is it to solve all the difficulty of a 'Presidential election?'

The position, therefore, is not accepted by us, that patriotism demands the support of the administration, nor, consequently, that he cannot be a very good patriot who does not. The term government is uniformly employed by such writers as the author of this article, as the synonym of administra tion; and hence, not to approve the latter is not to 'uphold the arm of the Government.'

Mr. Webster, as well as Mr. Seward, both recognize and make a clear distinc tion. In measures of policy, even in a civil war, it is entirely competent for us to dissent decidedly from those of the President, and yet uphold the Govern ment proper. In so far as it is clear that the policy is simply that which is essential to the maintenance of the Constitution and the Federal Union, so far are we bound to sustain it, for to both these are we pledged by compact, and they are our life. This, too, is loyalty, in the only proper sense of the word, fealty to law or Constitution.

But if a policy is adopted, in carrying on the war, totally adverse to the Federative bond, and subversive of all real union, then no more is it either loyalty or patriotism to abet it, but rather to endeavor to avert it.

It is not, then, so palpable, that the only policy of voters at the coming Presidential election, which will sustain the arm of Government, and be patri

otic, is to either stay at home in quiet submission, or else to swell the number of ballots for Mr. Lincoln. To vote for another, even for a Democrat, is not at all necessarily to abandon either the war or the country.

If the main policy, that of securing the unity of the country, and establishing law and order among the people, be maintained, it is not so very apparent as to need only the statement, that Government cannot be 'strengthened' without reëlecting Mr. Lincoln.

It is conceded by the writer just here that the feeling of dissatisfaction with the Administration was very deep in 1862, and had the election then occurred, would have resulted in its defeat, and inadvertently it is also implied that the recovery of lost ground in 1863, was owing to the prominence given to Mr. Vallandingham. Very well. What does this prove? Not that the people put their stamp on the acts and deeds of Mr. Lincoln as constitutional, or necessary, or right, but only expressed their dissatisfaction with representatives of extreme measures in the other direction. Even in Ohio, where Brough's majority over Vallandingham was so overwhelming, the Democracy can now show a solid phalanx of nearly 200,000 voters.

Yet, in order to preserve peace at home,' that is, in the North, it is boldly asserted that that which was done in Ohio, not seven months since, must be done in the nation (the North) not seven months hence.' An overwhelming majority must, in other words, be given for Mr. Lincoln in the nation, as for Mr. Brough in his State. The declaration is here plainly made that peace at home, and respect abroad, too, can only thus be preserved. Should this not, then, be the result, and Mr. Lincoln not be retained in power, who is to disturb the peace? We should be sorry to be obliged to think it a part of the Administration or Republican programme, to hold power at all hazards, to disturb the quiet of the North by

war, in case of defeat at the polls. And yet it seems here to loom up; for surely the Democrats in power could not but desire the preservation of peace.

And though an overwhelming vote for the war policy should be a sine qua non for securing respect abroad, and damping all hopes in the Confederacy South, yet does it not follow, it is a non sequitur, that only a vote for Lincoln can be a vote for the support of the war.'

Indeed, it might be well argued, that the election of a war Democrat must be the most powerful support of the war, for the Republican vote would be necessarily so, and that added to the Democratic majority would be most effectually and effectively doing 'in the nation seven months hence, what was done in Ohio seven months since.'

The next great dogma announced is, in fact, the text of the discourse: 'The Democratic party should not be restored to power, happen what may.' That is, ex cathedra, a Papal Bull. As already remarked, part of the argument pre ceded the theme; the rest follows.

Whilst conceding the 'loyalty and patriotism' of the Democratic party, it is contended that there should be no change, either in the position of parties or in the personnel of the Government, that is, the Administration. The doctors here, in consultation over the 'sick man,' are evidently not homoeopathic, but disposed to prescribe and administer quite heavy doses of disagreeable drugs. The prescription, however, like many others, when the doctor's back is turned, will probably lie on the shelf. The patients, for whom the prescription is given, after grave and deliberate consultation, are not likely to take it; chiefly because they have lost all confidence in the physicians who have undertaken the

case.

Should it be swallowed by some, it would probably soon show its poisonous ingredients, in making the patients sick unto death.

But, seriously, how simple it is to presume that the leaders and masses of the

Democratic party can be wheedled into submission to power, by such manifestations of subserviency, and of determination to hold the reins of government at all hazards, or be so blinded by sophistical reasoning as to go quietly hoodwinked into nonentity. It is asking a great deal of that great party to ask it to regard itself as naught, to surrender its prestige and its moral power, to confess that its silence is essential to the welfare of the Union, its triumph equivalent to its knell.

But, says the wizard author, to 'replace the Democratic party in power would be a restoration, of all things the worst in times of civil commotion.' One might suppose that the Democratic party was an essential tyrant, notwithstanding the mild, genial success with which it has so long administered the government of this country. We are led to think of a Charles, or of a Robespierre or worse, when it is intimated that the replacement of the Democratic party in power would be of all things the worst; worse even than slavery, which Mr. Lincoln has lately pronounced the sum of all villainies; for, if slavery is not a sin, then nothing is a sin,' a monstrous, un theological, anti-Biblical dogma.

No other restoration surely can here be meant than that of the assumption of the reins of Government by the Democratic party. This arguing is really like attempting to frighten children with a bugbear, and not reasoning with men of intelligence. To show some semblance of reason at least, it is however contended that no reliance is to be placed on the Democratic party, because it would necessarily be governed by its most violent members.' It is by no means unnatural that such a presumption should lie as a fact in the mind of such writers as the author, since it is very evident that Mr. Lincoln, by his own recent confession, and the Republican party, have been brow-beaten and controlled by the extremist wing of that party, by its 'most violent members.' That wing, with them, has the vigor, the boldness, the persist

ence, the sagacity, which secure predominance; but there is no parallelism here with the Democratic party, because the intelligence, courage, and sagacity here belong to the abettors of gentle manners, mild treatment, and, above all, constitu tional rights and duties. A restoration in this case would simply be taking the reins out of the hands of drivers like Jehu, and putting them into the hands of those used to both the horses and the roads; would be only replacing the inexperienced with men of experience and of tried statesmanship. Such a restoration is a consummation most devoutly to be wished, and may God grant it to our almost ruined country!

This European idea of restoration is followed by a most dramatic and tragic representation of the horrors to settle on the land, in consequence of this awful restoration! Why, there would be a 'proscription quite as bad as any thing known to the Romans!' 'deeds that would make our country a by-word, a hissing!' 'an end of all our fine hopes!' 'prosperity would never return!' 'our constitutional (?) polity would give way to a cannonarchy!' 'the Confederacy would become the greatest power in North-America!' and so many other tearfully tragic issues are to come out of this restoration, that they defy quotation, and even startle us in the very reading. If some Republican manager will only take the material and work it up into form and figure, bring it out on the stage with sympathizing actors, we promise a full house, and should the spectators also be sympathetic, a tearful, dolorous, tragic house.

For our part, we had thought that this very restoration is to be the only averter of all these ills, most of them already upon us; the only restorer of health and life and vigor to the bleeding, mangled body of the State.

The only remaining argument consists in replying to the oft-repeated saying, that the rebels would lay down their arms and return into the Union on the restoration to power of the Democratic