provide no check, the legislature can go on to strip the executive of all his power. Then is it not necessary, for the well being of government, to vest a salutary check in some other department? A contrary doctrine, I am satisfied, is dangerous and absurd. In the constitution of the United States, and in several of the other states, you have a provision precisely similar to that for which we are now contending. Although amendments to the federal constitution have been proposed from almost every part of the union, still against that provision we have never heard a murmur. That provision was avowedly copied from the constitution of Massachusetts, where its utility has never been questioned. Maine lived under it for nearly forty years, and on being separated into an independent state, has adopted the same provision. The late Convention in Massachusetts affords one of the strongest evidences that a patriotic people can give, in favour of this provision. This Convention was composed of their wisest and best men, selected without reference to party, and embracing almost the whole body of the talents of that state. They were two months in session, and in the course of all their debates, not a word of complaint was uttered against this part of the constitution.

Sir, such is the superior force and influence of legislative power-such is the reverence and regard with which it is looked up to, that no man in the community will have the temerity, on ordinary occasions, to resist its acts, or check its proceedings. I cannot illustrate this position more strongly than by a reference to the constitution of England. There the executive is a branch of the legis lature, and has an absolute negative. Surrounded as he is with prerogative, and placed far beyond the reach of the people, yet since the year 1692, no objection has been made by the king of Great Britain to any bill presented for his approbation. Rather than produce the excitement and irritation which, even there, would result from the rejection of a bill passed by the parliament, he has resorted to means which have degraded the government, and dishonoured the nation, to prevent the passage of bills which he should feel it his duty to reject. In the declaration of independence, in the catalogue of wrongs under which our fathers had been suffering, one of the most prominent was, that the king had exercised his prerogative, and had refused his sanction to salutary laws. Gentlemen may therefore rest satisfied, that very little danger is to be apprehended on this subject. There is, besides, a proposition to reduce the term of service of the governor, from three years to one. Is it possible, then, that when thus made immediately responsible to the people, there can exist any well founded causes of alarm?

I hope, sir, we shall adopt the report of the committee, for these, and many other reasons which I shall not tire the patience of the committee by detailing. It is a common remark, that in alterations in government, people are apt to go from one extreme to the other. And, sir, are not gentlemen now going upon extremes? We have abolished the council of revision, and weakened the revisory power, and by the amendment offered by the gentleman from Dutchess, (Mr. Livingston) we destroy it altogether. True, the governor can return a bill with his objections. But what will it avail? A bare majority can pass the bill notwithstanding, and as his reasons will probably be those which the legislature have already considered, can it be believed, sir, that his recommendation will have any effect? Can it be supposed for a moment, that the members of the legislature would to-day record their names on the journals in one way, and to-morrow record them in a different way? And will not the governor be restrained from exercising that power, when he knows it is vain and idle?

We have heretofore had the revisory power in the hands of the judiciary and executive united; and now, because the people call for its separation, shall we destroy it altogether? Shall we go to the other extreme, and have no restriction whatever? I cannot perceive the benefits to result from such a course; I am persuaded of its impropriety. We have decided on abolishing the council of revision, in a manner that will redound to our credit; and I had flattered myself from the promptness with which that decision was made, that the passage of the amendment would have followed without opposition. Let us not agitate and excite the fears of the community. They have expected an alteration of the legislative check, but not an abandonment of the principle. A portion of the

people of this state, believe the council of revision to have been wisely institu ted, and of great practical utility. There are others, who think a change is necessary, and that the judiciary should have no connection with the other branches of government. Adopt the proposition of the gentleman from Dutchess, and what will be the consequence? You alarm those two great bodies of our citizens, and hazard the rejection of your proceedings. If we would inspire the people with confidence in our acts-if we would ensure their approbation-if we would effect those wise and salutary amendments which the public voice and the public interest demand, we should beware of vibrating to extremes, and of introducing an innovation so hazardous and unexpected, as that which we are discussing.

MR. KING. Although the subject has been ably discussed, I ask the committee to allow me to state, a little more at large, an important principle, which no one denies, and on the right application of which the question turns.

All admit that the source of our free government is found in the people, who have established a representative republic, the powers whereof are deputed to agents, and are never exercised by the collective body of the people. Accordingly the people by the constitutional act, have assigned to several great depart ments, such portions of power as under certain limitations, are deemed sufficient for the purposes for which governments are founded.

The people reserve to themselves the appointment, directly or indirectly, of all the agents, or deputies, by whom the government is to be administered, taking themselves no direct agency in such administration.

Thus the constitution has established a legislative department who are to make laws for the general welfare; provided that the same be not contrary to the limitations imposed on the law makers.

In like manner it has established an executive department, and a judicial department: the one to interpret, and the other to execute the laws.

Each of these departments possess separate and independent powers, and can、 not lawfully interfere with the duties of the other.

These powers are not only separate and independent, but they all are alike derived from the people, and created for their benefit.

The legislature is composed of deputies of the people: but they not more so than the executive and the judiciary. It must therefore be an error to suppose that the legislature are the people; for the executive and judiciary in their se veral departments, may as well think and call themselves the people, as the legislature within their department, may consider and call themselves so.

The legislature and the executive are elected by the people for fixed periods, and at the expiration of their appointed terms, return to the people, who rechoose them, or clect others in their place. The judiciary is not elected by the people, but appointed in the manner that they have provided by the constitution;-and instead of a short and fixed term, they hold their offices during good behaviour, or until a certain age.

The legislative department are the most numerous. They impose taxes, establish all salaries, including those of the other departments, and possessing other great powers, are first in importance among the departments. They moreover keep watch over them, and for the misdemeanors of one, and the misbehaviour of the other, may prosecute, try, convict, and remove the executive and judiciary from office.

Not only the greater power of the legislature, but also the superintendence and parent control which they have over the other department give them a pretension to the highest rank. Their intimate communication with, and residence among, the people, also impart to this department great strength, and aturan enough inspire them with more confidence in their own discre tion and wisdom than is felt by any other department.

for these considerations, and in order to preserve a poise and balance betw The great departments of government, the people have by the constitution, established a body of magistrates called the council of revision, and given to them power, and made it their duty, to object to bills passed by the legisla ture, in violation of the constitution, or of the public good. And no such bills can become a law unless repassed by the legislature, by two-thirds of the mem hers of each branch.

The powers and duties of the council of revision are established by the people, in order to superintend and control the acts of the legislature.-Experience has shewn that without such control, the legislature is too prone to overstep the limits of their own powers, and to encroach upon, and in the course of time, to swallow up the legitimate powers of both the executive and judiciary.

It is not now fit,-it is too late, to enter into the reasons which have produced a general opinion throughout the state that the present council of revision should be superseded; the Convention having unanimously voted to abolish it. This opinion and vote, have in no sort been influenced by any doubt concerning the importance and necessity of a revisionary power, but from the conviction that the judiciary should no longer be vested with any portion thereof.

The report of the committee proposes that the power heretofore vested in the executive and the judicial departments, should henceforth be transferred to the executive alone. The amendment of the member from Dutchess, while it assents to such transfer, proposes that the exercise of the power by the executive, should have no other effect than to require a majority of all the members elected to the senate and house of assembly, (instead of two-thirds as heretofore, of the members of the respective houses) to pass any bill to which objections shall have been made.

In favour of this amendment, it is urged that a number of the states have omitted altogether to establish a revisory power, or have given to the objections of such body, the power of requiring a majority of the whole members instead of twothirds of those present, to repass a bill to which objections shall have been made.

And that the vesting so great a power as the report proposes in the executive alone, may make it too formidable, and seems to imply that a single individual may possess more wisdom than a majority of the legislature.

In respect to the constitutions of other states, it may be answered, that a plurality of the state constitutions provide a partial negative, equivalent, or nearly so, to that proposed by the report; and examples might be mentioned of the irregular proceedings of certain states where no power, or an inefficient one, has existed, to check certain proceedings of the legislature.

The recent constitution of Connecticut, in which the revisionary power is similar to that proposed by the member from Dutchess, is urged as an authority, and recommended to our imitation. But, as has been suggested, it will be recollected that Connecticut is not a large state-that her numbers are not great, nor her territory extensive-that her ancient manners remain without much alteration, and her population being unmixed, is without the collision which a population suddenly collected from different quarters will present.

As respects the power of the executive, the object of placing the same in this department should be rightly understood. To exhibit the greatness or comparative importance of the executive can never be a motive with the people to give large powers to this department. But as very large powers are given to the legislature which may be, as they have been, abused-the people for their own security, and in order that the powers placed by them in the executive and judiciary may not be trampled on, will vest in the executive a power that may be adequate to protect the people, as well as the judiciary and the executive departments, against the irregular acts of the legislature.

It is therefore for the safety of the people, and in order that the three departments of government which they have established, may be protected against the unjust proceedings of the legislature, that this power is proposed to be lodged in the executive.

It is not the man who may chance to be governor, but the people themselves, who, through him, interpose their authority to check the irregularities of the legislature.

Will it be either respectful, or safe, upon such interposition, for the legislature to repass the bill to which objections shall have been made, by a bare majority of all the members? Will not such provisions prove ineffectual, and operate to draw the executive into contempt, instead of proving a check upon the irregularities of the legislature?

This is not a new question, but has been often in review; and the princi

ples, and exactly the same provisions, as are contained in the report before us, are contained in the constitution of the United States-every part of which was fully and carefully considered, and has been confirmed and adopted by every state in the union. Though difficulties occurred in the first formation of this constitution, and mutual concessions were found necessary, yet the vesting in the person of the president the power to object to bills, and requiring the consent of two-thirds of the members of both houses of congress to their afterwards becoming laws, was not matter of compromise, but was consented to with as little scruple, and as great unanimity, as almost any other article of the constitution.

The authority of the constitution of the United States, to which all the states which may have differcut state constitutions, have unanimously consented, outweighs that of certain of the states, that, which from peculiar circumstances, may have either omitted or diminished the revising power. Is it then fair to say there has been a diversity in opinions of the states, when in fact all have approved of the provisions of the report ?

The example of the United States seems to be more fit for our imitation than that of any single state; especially of one limited in territory, as well as in numbers.

The state of New-York is already a great state; exceeding in its population any other state in the union. Its territory is large and fertile-its commerce extensive, its manufactures respectable, and its wealth and resources not inferior to those of any of her sister states.

If such be our condition, and such the government which we require at this time, will not the future demand an equally vigorous one? Will the simple rules that may be useful and sufficient in one neighbourhood, be adequate for the government of this great state, when it shall have arisen to that elevation, to which it is advancing with its mixed population, and its diversified interests? These are considerations which call for provisions that shall prove sufficient not only to maintain a due balance between the powers of the great departments, but to protect the people from their united usurpation.

It is well to remember that we are called to act, not only for the present time, but for futurity, and that what is passed, is in no other respect to be regarded, than that our experience should be united with our sober reflections in debating and settling the provisions which are to be proposed in amendment of the constitution.

Instead of danger from the power proposed by the report to be vested in the executive, is there not much reason to fear, that the power will be more rarely used than it ought to be?

MR. BROOKS. I do not rise to enter into a discussion of the subject now before the committee. It has been already ably debated; and my only object is to give some explanation of the vote which I am about to give. The honourable chairman of the committee, (Mr. Tallmadge,) to whom this subject was referred, has stated, that the report of that committee was adopted by them unanimously. That statement is correct; so far as it relates to the general subject matter of the report; the object of which was to furnish a substitute for the third article of the constitution.

As to the abstract question of the extent of the power to be given to the exccutive, the select committee were not unanimous. Before I entered into the deliberations of that committee, I was opposed to giving to the executive the power contemplated in their report, and proposed an amendment. I have not since discovered any good reason for changing my opinion, and shail vote for the amendment proposed by the honourable member from Dutchess.

MR. TOMPKINS, (the President.) He concurred fully, he said, in the propositions laid down by the honourable member from Queens. It was true that the people were equally represented in all the departments of government, the legislative, executive, and judicial: and he concurred also in the propriety and necessity of supporting and maintaining each in the full, safe, and independent exercise of the power and authority delegated to them respectively by the people. But, as to the means by which this was to be done, he had formed a diferent conclusion. The reasons, by which his mind had been influenced, had led him to a different result.

How was this provision introduced into our constitution? It was considered by a majority of the framers of the constitution, that a veto, even qualified in its character, placed in the hands of the executive alone, was an odious relict of royalty; that it was unsafe and unwise to place it there; and that it was therefore that the chancellor and judges had been associated with him; and the reasons why, even thus constituted, it had found a place in our constitution, was owing principally to the peculiar state of the times, and of the country, when it was framed. Our people had not yet been accustomed to self-government, and many of them retained strong predilections for the forms and checks of the government under which they had hitherto lived. The Convention, therefore, thought it prudent, in some respects, to assimilate our new government to that. They were apprehensive, if they departed too widely from what the people had been accustomed to, and introduced alterations and innovations very glaring, that they would alarm the jealousy and prejudices of some who were otherwise well disposed to the cause of freedom, and particularly some men of property and influence. A check, such as was contemplated by the report of the committee, he considered unnecessary. There can be no use for a veto on the passing of laws, but to prevent violations of the constitution; and for this purpose your judicial tribunals are sufficient. If laws, encroaching on the independence of the executive or judicial departments, should be enacted, or such as violated any private rights, they would be void, and it would be in the power of the courts to declare them so.

The constitution, as framed in 1777, had been a great blessing to the state; and for a time, it had proved sufficient for the beneficial purposes of government. Its defects had been gradually unfolded by experience, and a change of circumstances; these defects had become more and more manifest from the collisions and conflicts of party; and the time had arrived when it was expedient and proper that the people should mount their legitimate thrones, take the power in their own hands, and expunge from the constitution its imperfections and impurities.

We have been frequently and truly told, that the departments of government ought to be kept separate; and, from the correctness of this principle, a very strong argument against the judges being members of the council of revision, has been derived; because, as members of that body, they constituted a part of the law-making power. Why, then, transfer this veto to the cxecutive alone? Is it not as dangerous to blend the executive and legislative branches together, as to blend the judiciary with the latter?

The framers of our constitution meant, as he believed, to limit the veto of the council of revision to constitutional objections. This must appear obvious, as well from the language of the constitution, as from the fact that the chancellor and judges were, constituted members of that body; they were placed there because the terms by which they hold their offices render them an independent body; but more especially, and principally, on account of their supposed legal acquirements, and that they, therefore, would be most capable to judge of the soundness of constitutional objections. Another reason for believing that the framers of the constitution meant thus to limit this power, was the information he had received from those who had been members of that Convention. A different construction had indeed been given to this article of the constitution, and that the council of revision had the right to object to laws which they might deem inexpedient and contrary to the public good; and it was the consequences which had grown out of this construction, which had alarmed the people. The council had now in fact become a third branch of the legislature, with a control equal to two-thirds of all the representative branches; and it was, therefore, that its abolition has so loudly been called for. In speaking of the conduct of that body, he did not mean to allude to recent years or any particular members; he had reference to their conduct for a great many years past, and implicated himself among others who had belonged to that body; he had been a member of it for three years as a judge of the supreme court, and ten years as governor of the state; he had in common with others probably mingled political considerations with the proceedings of that body, without being conscious of it. He was willing to take upon himself a full share of blame, and acknowledge an equal share of frailty with others.