at least it was far more satisfactory to the rude minds of that period than either of the others, in which perjury and deception were palpable. Another mode, which was much in vogue among the Anglo-Saxons, and which was maintained for a long period in the English law, was the compurgation before alluded to. Whether the compurgators were the same as the sectatores spoken of in the Saxon laws is uncertain. It has been supposed by some writers that they had a function somewhat similar to that of the juratores of a subsequent period. In one respect they were alike, inasmuch as they stated upon oath their opinion of the case, which opinion was not founded upon evidence, but upon some private knowledge which they were supposed to have of the matter in controversy. There was probably a distinction, however obscure; the one (the juratores) became the modern jury, the other (the compurgators) continued to be called rather as witnesses, though they testified only to belief in what the party had sworn. The proceeding by compurgators was called wager of law, which took the name from the formality of giving gage or security that the party would at a certain day make his law, that is, that he would take an oath and bring 11 compurgators to swear that they believed him. In modern practice it seems to have been admitted only in an action of debt, instances of which may be seen in 2 Salk. 682, and 2 Barn. and Cress. 538; but at the period of which we speak it was a method of proceeding in criminal as well as civil cases. The juratores appear to have been in the first instance charged with the preliminary inquiry as to the guilt of any person charged with certain crimes, and upon their finding him guilty he was put to the ordeal or compurgation. This seems to have been the practice in the reign of Henry II. But we learn from Bracton, who wrote in the reign of Henry III., that the practice then was to commit the decision of the case finally to the jury, unless there was a demand of combat by one of the parties, or unless the defendant elected to wage his law. There was still, however, nothing like the modern proceeding upon a jury trial. The jurors were not expected to decide upon evidence produced by the parties, but upon their own knowledge or information collected by them. The direction of the judge was, that whereas such a man is charged with such a crime, the jury are to make known the truth thereof. Pros ecutions for crime were usually upon appeal of a private party. Any one of legal capacity to sue could prosecute for treason, but ordinarily only near kindred by blood were admitted to bring suit for homicide; a woman could prosecute only for the death of her husband, or for a rape committed upon herself, and the appeal in the former case is said by Bracton to have been only de morte viri inter brachia interfecti. In other cases the party injured was in general the prosecutor. There was, however, as before mentioned, another mode of charging a person with crime, viz., per famam patriæ, a

sort of indictment by the patria or jury. It does not appear how the prosecution was conducted in such a case; but as there was never any attempt to determine facts according to rules of evidence, it is probable that the first finding or indictment was conclusive, unless the party accused purged himself or took some exception to the jury. It would exceed our limit to pursue the history of the English criminal law through all its changes. Passing to its present state, we find forms of proceeding eminently adapted to sound judicial investigation. The function of the patria, or jury of inquisition, spoken of by Bracton, is now performed by a grand jury, not less than 12 nor more than 23 in number, upon whose indictment most criminal cases are brought before the courts for trial. The exceptions are: 1, cases of homicide where a coroner's inquisition has been returned; 2, actions which, by statute, may be brought by a private prosecutor, or informations by the master of the crown office upon the relation of a private individual; 3, informations filed ex officio by the attorney-general in cases of atrocious misdemeanor endangering the government. All criminal prosecutions, except the few cases where by statute a common informer is authorized to bring an action, are in the name of the king, and conducted by his law officers. Private suits for crimes, which were formerly allowed under the name of appeals of felony, were long since practically abandoned, and were finally abolished by statute 59 George III., c. 46. So also the wager of battle by the same statute, and wager of law by 2 and 4 William IV., c. 42. The indictment, which is the basis of the arraignment and trial of criminals, was formerly required to be drawn with great technical strictness, and was often quashed for defect of form. Thus it was necessary to set forth the full name of the person charged and a designation of his business and place of residence, also the time and place when and where the offence was committed. Certain technical words were also required, as descriptive of the crime charged, as (when pleadings were in Latin) the words proditorie et contra ligientiæ sua debitum, in treason; murdravit, in an indictment for murder; rapuit, in rape; and so in other cases. No expressions equivalent in meaning could be substituted; and after the pleadings were, by statute 4 George II., c. 26 (1730), converted into English, the corresponding vernacular terms, as "murdered," ravished," &c., were retained with the same strictness. And so in felonies it was necessary to charge that the act was done felonice; in burglary, burglariter. In indictments for murder it was required also to state the dimensions of the wound, and in all indictments the value of the thing which was the subject of the offence, as in larceny, or with which the offence was committed, as in murder. In the former case, it was said to be required in order to distinguish whether it was grand or petty larceny; in the latter case, because the

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instrument with which a homicide was committed was forfeited as a deodand. This absurd regard to mere form has been, however, abrogated: 1st, by statute 7 George IV., c. 64, which prohibited an arrest of judgment or a reversal on writ of error for any of these formal defects, but which still left the objections to be taken advantage of by demurrer; and finally, by 14 and 15 Victoria, c. 100 (1851), commonly called Lord Campbell's act, by which the court is directed to disregard the omission of mere formal words, as "with force and arms," or "against the peace," &c., or any mistake in time or place; and a statement of the manner or means by which the deceased came to his death is dispensed with, and amendments of indictments either in matters of form or substance are allowed upon such terms as the court shall deem reasonable. As to the designation of crimes and their punishments, the English law was, until a recent period, in a chaotic state. Statutes had been accumulated according to the exigencies occurring at different times, until, by their number, such was the difficulty of determining what was obsolete and what in force, and of reconciling apparently conflicting provisions, that practically the common people had no knowledge of the penal laws to which they were subject, and cases were constantly occurring of the trial and conviction of criminals charged with offences, the nature of which, as defined by law, and the penalties prescribed therefor, they were entirely ignorant of; their ignorance, according to the old maxim, ignorantia juris non excusat, being no defence. So also the extreme and disproportioned severity of ancient laws enacted in a turbulent period, or in an unsettled state of society, still prevailed in England at the beginning of the present century. According to Blackstone, there were 160 offences which by various acts of parliament had been declared felonies without benefit of clergy, that is to say, punishable by death. It will be sufficient to mention the cases of grand larceny, or stealing above the value of 12 pence; embezzlement of a master's goods by a servant; burning stacks of corn, hay, &c., in the night time; killing horses, sheep, and other domestic animals; breaking down dikes or bridges, or breaking away the banks of fish ponds; cutting down trees in an avenue, or growing in an orchard; the malicious tearing or defacing of the garments of a person passing in the street; all of which, and various other acts of no greater degree of criminality, were thus punished. The origin of this severity in the majority of such cases was no doubt owing to the great prevalence of a particular grievance in some locality, and, according to the former mode of reasoning, the frequency of an evil called for increased severity of punishment; but it has happened that when the emergency has ceased the law remained. Common humanity was outraged by the continuance of such a system of criminal law in a civilized community; public attention was at last directed to the necessity of reform, and a revision has

been made by several different statutes, chiefly the following: 7 and 8 Geo. IV., c. 27 (1827), for repealing various statutes relating to benefit of clergy and for other purposes; 7 and 8 Geo. IV., c. 29, for consolidating and amending laws relating to larceny; 7 and 8 Geo. IV., c. 30, for consolidating and amending laws relating to malicious injuries to property; 9 Geo. IV., c. 31 (1828), 1 Victoria, c. 85 (1837), which is a revision of the last preceding act, in respect to attempted homicide; 1 Victoria, c. 86, in respect to burglary and stealing in a house; 1 Victoria, c. 87, respecting robbery and attempting to rob; and 1 Victoria, c. 89, as to burning dwelling houses and other buildings, destroying vessels, exhibiting false signals, &c. From examination of these statutes, it is apparent that it was difficult to make a thorough change at once, and many successive efforts against ancient prejudices were required. Thus by one of the acts of 1827 the distinction between grand and petty larceny was abrogated, and every theft which had come under either denomination was declared to be simple larceny, punishable only by transportation or imprisonment, with the addition of whipping, in the discretion of the court. Yet by the same statute stealing from the person was punishable by death; so also the breaking into a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, or breaking in and stealing from a dwelling house a chattel of any value, or stealing from a dwelling house and at the same time putting any one in fear, or stealing to the value of £5, stealing a horse, cow, &c., or killing with intent to steal the carcass or skin, were all punished by death; so also, by the act of 1828, an attempt to murder by administering poison, or by suffocating, or strangling, or by shooting with loaded weapons, or stabbing, &c. In the amendatory acts of 1837, transportation or imprisonment was substituted in most of the cases in which capital punishment had been retained by the previous acts. By the existing laws of England, the cases in which the penalty of death is inflicted are the following: treason; murder; burglary with intent to kill, or accompanied with violence to any person; robbery, if at the same time any injury be done by a weapon; burning a dwelling house, there being a person therein at the time; crimes against nature, called buggery and sodomy; casting away a vessel, whereby the life of any person is endangered; exhibiting false signals, with the intent to bring vessels into danger. In all other cases, the penalty is penal servitude or imprisonment for different periods, according to the degree of the offence. In the United States, by the federal laws, capital punishment is inflicted, in cases within the jurisdiction of the U. S. courts, for treason, murder, arson, rape, piracy, robbery of the mail (if it be with jeopardy to the life of any person), rescuing a person convicted of a capital crime, burning a vessel of war, and corruptly casting away or destroying a vessel belonging to a private owner. The severity of the punishment in the case of rape is because

the offence of which the U. S. courts would have cognizance must be committed on board of a vessel on the high seas or in foreign parts. By the laws of the several states capital punishment is generally limited to three cases, viz.: treason, murder, and arson.-It remains to speak of some principles recognized in criminal law as to the nature of crime in respect to individuals and to the community, the degree of guilt of the person accused, and the rules of evidence by which the offence is proved. I. It is common to divide wrongs into private and public injuries, and it has been erroneously supposed that when the offence is of such magnitude as to become the subject of a public prosecution, the private right is merged. As respects some lesser crimes, as assault and battery, obtaining money by false pretences, libel, and the like, there is a right of private action independent of the proceeding by indictment, and it is not necessary that the individual injured should procure a criminal conviction at all. In cases of larceny, robbery, and other wrongs affecting property, it is generally assumed that there must first be a conviction of the crime before there can be a civil suit for a recovery of the property taken, or damages in lieu thereof. The only reason assigned for this in the English law is, that the injured party may thereby be more strongly induced to procure a conviction of the offender for the benefit of society. It seems, however, not to be admitted in this country as satisfactory. In the state of New York, by statute, the right of private suit is not in any manner affected by the fact that the wrong complained of was a felony (2 R. S. 292). Provision is made by law in England and in the United States for the restoration of property to the owner which had been stolen or otherwise obtained by a criminal act, upon conviction of the offender (21 Henry VIII., c. 11; 2 Rev. Stat. N. Y., 746, § 31); and in the state of New York, redress is given for all other private injuries by a suit against the trustees of the estate of a convicted felon (2 Rev. Stat. 700). In England, as felony worked a forfeiture of the personal estate of the convict, including estates in land for life or a term of years, there was usually nothing to look to as an indemnity for private injury; yet the right of prosecuting for such injury after conviction of the offender is admitted in some old cases; and so after acquittal, if there has been no collusion, an action for damages can be maintained (12 East. 409). II. As to the degree of guilt of the persons accused. This involves several inquiries, the first of which is capacity of mind. There must be the mens doli capax; for although ignorance is not in general admitted as an excuse for crime, yet this is to be understood of such only as have sufficient understanding to distinguish between right and wrong. The precise limit of capacity cannot be defined. A vicious life undoubtedly produces hardness and insensibility, and there is often to be seen such natural depravity as is wholly inconsistent with the existence of any

moral discrimination. Yet the law does not take into account any such perversity of nature, if there is any intellectual power, which is rather vaguely denominated reason. In what degree this power must exist is not susceptible of being defined by any general rule, and is often the subject of perplexing doubt in the application of the rule to particular cases. Children before the age of discretion are exempt by law from responsibility for crime, but the exact period when such discretion shall be pronounced to commence is not fixed. By the Saxon laws the age of 12 was fixed as the earliest possible development of legal understanding; between that and the age of 14 there might be guilt according to the actual capacity. But the rule of the English law now is, that capacity is not to be judged by age in any case, except that under the age of 7 a child cannot be held guilty of felony; but there is a reported case of a child of 8 years of age who was convicted of arson and hanged; so a girl of 13 was convicted and executed for killing her mistress. In all cases capacity is to be judged by actual proof. Idiocy and lunacy excuse from the guilt of crime. If there was a total want of reason at the time the act was committed, whether the deprivation be permanent or temporary, the law acquits from all guilt; but if there be partial reason, as if there is thought and design, or faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, then there will be legal responsibility for every act. Intoxication is not admitted as an excuse for criminal misconduct. In this respect the rule of the common law is different from that of the civil law. By the latter, capital punishment was never inflicted for acts committed in a state of ebriety. The 2d ground of exemption is where there was no criminal intent, but the act has been committed either by accident, mistake, or necessity. Accident excuses, except where it has happened when a man was engaged in the commission of some unlawful act. A distinction is also made in respect to such unlawful act, as whether it was what is termed by the law malum in se, or only malum prohibitum, the criminality being less for any accident occurring in the latter case than in the former. There was much good sense in the rules of the Roman law in respect to culpability for accident. Gross negligence was held as culpable as a wrong intent (non minus ex dolo quam ex culpa quisque hac lege tenetur). Thus, if a man was lopping a tree near the road, and it should fall and kill a person passing by, he was held guilty if he had omitted to give proper warning. If a soldier exercising in a place appointed for that purpose should accidentally kill a slave by throwing a javelin, he was without fault; but if it had happened in a place where he had no right to exercise, he was held guilty. Mistake is admissible when it relates to a fact, though, as before mentioned, mistake of law is no excuse; as if a person should kill another that he supposed was breaking into his house, and it should turn out to be a member of his own fam

ily, he would be excused on the ground of having mistaken the person. Necessity, as a legal excuse, includes that class of cases which the law designates as duress. In the English law one other case is also included, viz.: the criminal misconduct of the wife by the command or in the presence of her husband. The reason given in this case is, that the wife is supposed to be under the power of her husband; but a better reason may probably be derived from the old law, by which the husband had the benefit of clergy if he could read, but the wife had not, and the rule was introduced from a motive of humanity. The exemption was allowed only in felonies other than treason and murder, but was not admitted as a defence to a charge of any misdemeanor less than felony. As the reason of the rule does not exist in this country, it may be presumed there is no such exemption other than what may arise from actual coercion. Duress is compulsion by the menace of death or other bodily harm, or by actual force. Blackstone limits the expression "bodily harm" to mayhem, or loss of limb, according to which the fear of being beaten would be no duress, so neither would the fear of imprisonment. In this country, on the contrary, a threat of any bodily harm, or even of the destruction of property, would be held to be a duress in that connection. But when it is set up as a justification for the commission of a criminal act, perhaps nothing less than the fear of losing life, or of some permanent bodily injury, would be admitted as a legal excuse. As to the law relating to principals and accessories, there is less discrimination than is called for by our natural sense of justice, as well as by a due regard to public policy. An accessory before the fact, who is one that has procured or advised the commission of the crime which is the subject of prosecution, is properly held liable in equal degree with the principal for the act which has been committed, and all its natural consequences, but not for another and distinct crime which may have been committed by the principal while engaged in the commission of the offence to which he had been instigated. As if A procures B to beat C, and in consequence of such beating C should die, A is guilty of murder; but if A hires B to beat a man, and he should set fire to his house, this being a distinct offence, A is not indictable for it as accessory. An accessory after the fact is one who, knowing a felony has been committed, receives, relieves, and assists the felon. The rule of the common law, by which even furnishing necessaries to a felon will render a man an accessory after the fact, is unreasonably severe. By statute of the state of New York, only he is held as an accessory afer the fact who has aided the criminal to avoid arrest, conviction, or punishment (2 R. S. 699). The criminality of an accessory after the fact is in England and this country deemed less than that of the principal. The punishment is imprisonment only, even if the offence committed by the principal is punishable by death. III. The rules of evidence and mode of proceed

ing in criminal trials can be but briefly referred to. The most important principle of the English and American law, and what chiefly distinguishes it from the criminal codes of other countries, is that the person accused is not compelled to testify. In the preliminary examination upon arrest, where the arrest precedes indictment, he is indeed allowed to make his statement, and such statement may be used as evidence against him. But he is usually informed by the magistrate that he is not bound to answer the charge unless hé chooses to do so. Another rule, which follows naturally from the preceding, is that it is not necessary to prove the guilt of the accused by more than one witness, except in the case of treason and perjury. In the tribunals of some other countries a different rule prevails, because it is the general practice to put the accused under rigid examination; and if he denies the crime, it is an oath in his own favor, which ought not to be overbalanced by a single oath against him. It was the ancient practice in England not to allow the accused to produce witnesses; and when the courts so far relaxed this strictness as to hear witnesses for the defence, it was still without oath, and the evidence was therefore of less weight. But by statute 1 Anne, c. 9, witnesses are required to be examined on oath for the prisoner as well as against him. The privilege of defence by counsel was, until a recent period, denied in the English courts in trials for treason and felonies, while by a strange inconsistency it was allowed in trials for misdemeanor. In cases of treason, which was a class of trials in which there had been the greatest outrage of common rights, relief was given by statute 7 and 8 William III., c. 3, which allowed counsel to be assigned to the prisoner upon his request; and in cases of felony, by statute 6 and 7 William IV., c. 114, by which all persons arraigned upon a criminal charge are allowed to make defence by counsel. In the United States, this right was thought of such importance that it was secured by article 6 of the amendments to the federal constitution, and in the several states a similar provision has been made either by the constitution or by law. In France, the practice formerly was to hold the accused to answer in person without the aid of counsel; but it is now an admitted right that every person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to the aid of counsel for his defence, and it is made obligatory upon the judge to assign counsel when the accused has none. (See Code des délits et des peines, art. 187 and 321; Code d'instruction criminelle, art. 294, 295.)

CRINOÏDEA (Gr. κpivov, a lily, and eidos, shape), animals in shape like a water lily, consisting of an expanded or spreading disk upon the end of a long, slender, jointed stem. The name was given by Mr. Miller, author of an elaborate work, entitled "Natural History of the Crinoidea, or Lily-shaped Animals." They constitute an extinct family of echinoderms of the radiated division of animals, and in the forms of the encrinite and pentacrinite were

wonderfully abundant in the limestones of the silurian period. Their remains now constitute the great portion of the material of strata which extend over large districts of country, and are several feet thick.

CRISPIN AND CRISPINIAN, the tutelary saints of shoemakers, put to death about A. D. 287. The tradition is that they were brothers belonging to a noble Roman family; that, becoming converts to Christianity, they took refuge in Gaul from the persecution under Diocletian; and that they preached the gospel at Soissons by day and exercised the trade of shoemakers by night. They had converted multitudes before their martyrdom under Maximian. Their names are found in the principal early martyrologies, and their festival is observed on Oct. 25. They were the patrons of the religious community of Frères cordonniers, founded in Paris in 1645, suppressed in 1789, and which has since reappeared and been dissolved.

CRISSA, an ancient town of Phocis, called "the divine" by Homer. It occupied a beautiful situation at the foot of Mount Parnassus, with lofty mountain heights towering above it, and with the beautiful Crissæan plain spread out beneath it. The modern town of Chryso, occupying the same site, contains some few remains of this interesting city. Crissa and Cirrha were long regarded by scholars as but different names for the same place, but Ulrichs, Leake, and Grote have shown that Cirrha was the port town of Crissa. The taxes which Cirrha levied upon pilgrims on their way to Delphi caused the first "sacred war," which resulted in the destruction of the town. The fate of Crissa itself is not known.

CRITIAS, an Athenian, pupil of Gorgias the Leontine and of Socrates. He was a man of uncommon energy of character, possessed high and varied culture, but was absolutely wanting in moral principle. He was at once politician, poet, and orator. Some fragments of his elegies are still extant; a work of his on politics is sometimes mentioned, and Cicero tells us that some of his speeches, then extant, would place him as an orator by the side of Pericles. The moral instructions which he received from Socrates, however, seem to have produced but lit tle impression upon his corrupt nature. He is now known in history mainly as the cruel and vindictive leader of the 30 tyrants. In that memorable but brief reign of terror which immediately succeeded the Peloponnesian war, he rioted in slaughter and blood. He was conspicuous among his colleagues for rapacity and violence, and punished with death the suggestion of moderate measures. He was slain in an engagement with Thrasybulus, who with his band of patriots marched to the relief of the city (404 B. C.).

CRITO, a friend and disciple of Socrates, whom he is said to have supported with his fortune. He made every arrangement for the escape of his master from prison, and used every argument which ingenuity or affection could

suggest to induce him to save his life by fleeing from his persecutors. His eloquence was, however, in vain, and Socrates drank the fatal cup. Crito is a prominent interlocutor in one of Plato's dialogues, which is named after him. He was himself a voluminous writer on philosophical subjects, but all his writings have perished. CRITOLAUS, a celebrated Achæan demagogue, who incited his countrymen to insurrection against the Romans. He commanded the Achæan army at the battle of Scarphæa, 146 B. C., and when overthrown by Metellus, he either committed suicide or perished in the marshes of the coast.

CRITTENDEN. I. An E. co. of Ark., separated from Tenn. by the Mississippi river; area, 994 sq. m.; pop. in 1854, 3,459, of whom 1,032 were slaves. Its western border is formed by the St. Francis river. The surface is level and alluvial, and part of it often overflowed by the Mississippi. Portions of the land are quite swampy, but the rest is generally fertile. In 1854 the productions were 217,500 bushels of corn, and 1,275 bales of cotton. Capital, Marion. ÍI. A W. co. of Ky., formed in 1842; area estimated at 420 sq. m.; pop. in 1850, 6,351, of whom 848 were slaves. It is separated from Ill. by the Ohio river, and bounded by the Cumberland on the S. W. It has a level or gently undulating surface, except in the eastern part, where it is hilly. The soil is generally good. Hard coal, lead, and iron are found in great abundance. In 1850 the productions were 386,705 bushels of corn, 5,759 of wheat, 45,460 of oats, 505,637 lbs. of tobacco, and 12,545 of wool. There were 14 churches, and 600 pupils attending public schools. Capital, Marion.

CRITTENDEN, JOHN JAY, an American statesman, born in Woodford co., Ky., about 1785. While he was still young, his father, who was a farmer, was killed by the fall of a tree, leaving his mother to bring up, with slender means, a large family of children, among whom several were noted for intellectual ability. Mr. Crittenden commenced life as a lawyer in Hopkinsville, but soon removed to Frankfort, where he enjoyed an excellent practice and won distinction as an advocate. In 1816 he was elected from Franklin county to the Kentucky house of representatives, of which he was for several years speaker. He took his seat in the U. S. senate, Dec. 1, 1817, his term commencing at the same date with the presidency of Mr. Monroe, whom he supported. During his 2 years of service, he moved the reimbursement of fines under the sedition law of 1798, which he pronounced unconstitutional; spoke warmly in favor of a bill introduced by Mr. Morrow of Ohio, which was designed to open the public lands to actual settlers; and as chairman of a committee to whom a house bill, putting fugitives from labor on the same footing with fugitives from justice, was referred, reported it back with several amendments, one of which provided that the identity of the alleged fugitive should be proved by other evidence than that of the claimant. From 1819