Coffee and others vs. Newsom.

in his lifetime, nor of his executor since his death, to make or secure to them legal and sufficient titles to the said settlement of lands; and that the lots and parcels of lands to which the said executor was wholly unable to make good and sufficient titles, were of essential importance and value to the said settlement, and the loss of which rendered the residue of said settlement of comparatively little value.

The bill farther charged, that the aforesaid representations of the said Batts, to induce them to purchase said settlement, he knew, at the time, were false in the foregoing particulars.

The complainants offered to said Batts in his lifetiv his executor since his death, to pay the notes upon re titles, after deducting therefrom the value of the g-house, &c. ing good with which they refused to comply.

There were other charges made in the bill, which it is not necessary to mention.

The bill showed the subsequent death of Batts Newsom, and the qualification of his executor.

The complainants in the bill were sued upon the notes, and the cases were pending upon the appeal. The bill concluded with a prayer, that the Court would decree a rescission of the contract; or if it should appear that defendant could make good titles, that they might be allowed the amount of the damages sustained by them, as a deduction from the amount of the notes.

The defendant, by his answer, admitted that his testator and Peter H. and John B. Coffee entered into a contract as evidencedin writing, and which is set forth in the bill, in reference to the purchase of the settlement of land lying in Pulaski and Telfair Counties, but rejects the idea that his testator made any false representations as to the quality, location, boundary or title of the land sold. He had no knowledge of what preceded the contract, but presumes it embodies the understanding of the parties. The defendant appended a schedule to his answer, containing a list of all the lots, aud parts of lots constituting the possession of land sold by his testator to complainants, as far as he has any knowledge, information or belief. Defendant admitted that the memorandum or schedule, furnished the complainants by his testator, was prepared by him at his testator's request, who could not write; that it was prepared with the title deeds before him, but

Coffee ond others vs. Newsom.

upon subsequent examination he found it was not accurate, and contained several mistakes.

Defendant admitted that the gin-house and running geer were burnt, as also the gin, which was not carried off as charged in the bill; but denies that it was the result of gross negligence of his testator or of his agent.

In regard to the exhibition of the lands sold to the complainants by the defendant's testator, the defendant denied knowing any thing, except "his testator told him that when he rode into the fields in cultivation with them, he was ashamed to show them, as they had been so badly cultivated by his son in charge of the premises; farther than this, he had neither knowledge or information."

The defendant admitted that the complainants had offered to pay the notes to him, if he would make a deduction for the destruction of the gin-house; but denied that they said any thing. about the titles to the land, or any part thereof.

The defendant admitted the death of Batts Newsom, and his. executorship; that suits had been instituted upon the notes.

Defendant could not answer as to the sufficiency of the titles in his custody, or which came to his possession, farther than that he considered them valid.

At the October Term of said Court, 1847, counsel for defendont moved to dissolve the injunction, upon the ground that the, answer of the defendant denied the equity of complainants' bill.

At the April Term, 1850, the motion was heard and sustained, and the following order was passed by the Court: "It is in consideration of the fact, that the answer of the defendant is as fulland as responsive as his representative character will enable him to make; as, also, that there is no sufficient reason apparent to the Court for retaining any longer said injunction, Ordered, that the same be dissolved."

To which said ruling and decision of the Court, counsel for plaintiff in error excepted, and has assigned error.

COLE and DONNELLY, for plaintiff in error.

I. L. HARRIS, for defendant.

Coffee and others vs. Newsom.

By the Court.-LUMPKIN, J. delivering the opinion.

An injunction was obtained in this case, upon the fraud charged against the testator of the defendant. Is the answer of the executor, who admits his ignorance as to the principal allegations in the bill, but expresses his belief that they are untrue, sufficient to dissolve the injunction?

Believing that in the decisions of Courts, as well as the arguments of counsel, the chief of all perfections is, to be plain, pertinent and brief, I shall endeavor, in the present instance, to conform my practice to my principles.

1.] We understand the general rule to be, that a denial in the answer from information and belief, is not sufficient to dissolve the injunction. Apthorpe vs. Comstock, Hopkins, 148. Ward vs. Van Bokkellen, 1 Paige, 100. Poor vs. Carleton, 3 Sumner, 78. [2] And that where the equity of an injunction bill is not charged to be within the knowledge of the defendant, as is the case before us, and the defendant merely denies all knowledge and belief of the facts alleged therein, the injunction will not be dissolved on the bill and answer alone. Rodgers vs. Rodgers, 1 Paige, 426. Quackenbush vs. Van Rosser, 1 Saxton's N. J. R. 476. Fulton Bank vs. New York & Sharon Canal Co, 1 Paige,

311.

[3.] And it is always a good answer to an application to dissolve an injunction upon bill and answer, that the equity of the bill, upon which the injunction rests, is not denied by the defendant, whether from ignorance of the facts or any other causë. Watkinson vs. Gillespy, 5 Paige, 112.

Rodgers vs. Rodgers, supra, was a bill filed against the personal representatives, to restrain proceedings at law, on notes given to the testator. The equity of the bill on which the injunction was granted, was not charged to be in the knowledge of the defendants, and they put in au answer denying all knowledge or belief as to the principal facts on which it rested; and the Chancellor held, that in such a case, the injunction could not be dissolved on the bill and answer alone. This case is, in every feature, the one at bar.

[4] Roberts vs. Anderson, (2 Johns. Ch. R. 202,) is also similar to it. There the bill charged fraud in the title to the premises

Coffee and others vs. Newsom.

in controversy, and the injunction was issued to restrain the defendant from proceeding at law. All the denial contained in the answer was, that the defendants were not privy to any fraud, and that they believed the conveyance was good. But Chancellor Kent said, "This is leaving the question of fraud as unsettled as when the answer came in. It is true, the defendants may have given all the denial that is in their power, but the fraud may exist notwithstanding, and consistently with their ignorance, or the sincerity of their belief. It appears to me, then, that until the cause is brought to a hearing and decided on the merits, the injunction ought not to be dissolved, and that the case does not fall within the reason of the general rule, that an injunction is to be dissolved when an answer comes in and denies all the equity of the bill."

What, I ask, is the sum of the defendant's answer in the case before us? It is, that he disbelieves the material allegations in the bill, but that he knows not whether they are true or false; that they relate not to his own acts, but to those of his testator; that he was no party to the material transactions, but, on the contrary, a stranger to them. This surely can constitute no good foundation for a motion to dissolve the injunction. The bill and answer may both be true, and still the controversy be not in any wise affected. The contract with the testator may have been grossly fraudulent, and yet the present defendant, in good faith, not only aver his ignorance of the fact, but his total disbelief of -it, from his entire confidence in the integrity of his testator.

[5.] In some particular cases, the Court will continue an injunction, though the defendant has truly answered the equity set up. 2 Ves. 19. Wyatt's P. R. 236. The injunction, then, ought not surely to be dissolved under the circumstances of this case.

VOL VIII 57

Cravy es. Rawlins.

No. 72.-ELIZABETH G. CRAVY, by her next friend, William Megill, plaintiff in error, vs. JAMES W. RAWLINS, defendant.

· [1] An instrument by which, for love and affection, A conveys certain negroes to B, with this condition" Nevertheless, I (the donor) have the full use of said negroes during my natural lifetime, and at the time of my death, the said negroes and their increase shall rise and be the property of the said B, her heirs, &c. firmly by these presents:" Hold to be a will and not a deed.

In Equity, in Telfair Superior Court. Tried before Judge HANSELL, April Term, 1850.

This bill was filed by the plaintiff in error against the defendant, in Telfair Superior Court. The bill charges, that on the 17th day of September, in the year 1838, Elizabeth Paramore, in contemplation of her marriage with James W. Rawlins, the defendant in error, and with his knowledge and consent, for and in consideration of "the love, good will and affection which she bore towards Elizabeth G. Cravy," conveyed to the said Elizabeth, (who is an tnfant under the age of twenty-one years,) certain negro slaves, "by a certain deed, gift or conveyance in writ ing," of which the following is a copy:

"Georgia,

TELFAIR COUNTY.

September 17th, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight handred and thirty-eight:

"Know ye, that Elizabeth Paramore, of the State and County aforesaid, of the one part, and Elizabeth G. Cravy, of the same place and State aforesaid, of the other part, for the consideration of love and good will and affection, and for value received, which I have for the said Elizabeth G. Cravy, I have given and sold unto said Elizabeth G. Cravy, herself, her heirs, executors and administrators, jointly, by these presents, three negroes, named as follows: Barcus, junior, a man about twenty years of age, and Patience, a woman about twenty-three years of age, and her child, named Jack, one year and six months of age. Nevertheless, I, the said Elizabeth Paramore, hath the full use of said negroes during my natural lifetime, and at the time of my death, the said negroes and their increase shall rise and be the property