"We are simply forced to take the action because of the fact that some $800,000 worth of our copper was held at Gibraltar, and also because some of the representatives of our leading competitors, resident in England, signed the Agreement some two months in advance of our signing. We held out as long as we could, chiefly because we did not wish to give up our position of independence in the matter of trading where and when it suited us best, without having to consult with the British Government."

Getting no relief from the official action of the State Department the copper men had finally asked the State Department to authorize them to deal with the British Ambassador directly. Authorization was given.

Soon after the middle of March an Agreement between the Americans and His Majesty's Government was made.* It recited that England would do her best to keep copper from Germany but did not desire to hinder exports to neutral countries whose re-export embargoes were found effective. While England could not forego her right of search, she was willing to let copper proceed to destination if the terms of this Agreement were fulfilled. Shipments were to be made only to named consumers (not to merchants) in the neutral countries and copies of bills of sale were to be forwarded to the Admiralty. Bills of sale were to recite that the shipment was for neutral consumption. Under these conditions copper could be exported to Italy or

* For text of Agreement, see Appendix, p. 324.

Scandinavia. Exports to other neutral countries were not to be made except subject to permit of the British Admiralty. "Shipments of copper to Great Britain or her Allies may be made without restriction."

This was the contract signed by American copper exporters. This was the consummation of the

British detention campaign.

What was the result on German military operations of all this organized system of annoyance, detention and loss, designed to keep copper from reaching Germany?

Economic pressure was no more effective in the case of copper than in the case of cotton. From London and from Copenhagen, Geneva and Amsterdam, via London and Paris, pathetic tales were forwarded of schoolboys in Germany begging door knobs for the military, housewives being stripped of copper kettles and pans, and roofs being de-coppered. But those who had been in Germany told no such tales.

German copper consumption in 1913 was 256,000 long tons. In order to keep the works operating, the German factories carry a stock of three months' supplies, about 64,000 tons. Because of large imports in the months just preceding the war, it is likely that on August 1 a supply much larger than 64,000 tons was on hand at the factories. In addition to this, on August 1 there were on hand in German warehouses 10,000 tons. German raw copper production in 1913 was 50,000 tons, and no

doubt it was largely expanded after the war began by intensive working of the mines. Probably there were readily available not less than 50,000 tons of old metal. This made a total of at least 174,000 tons available for the first year. Further, the needs were reduced by the halting of Germany's large exports of copper products, amounting in 1913 to 125,850 tons, and the interruption of internal electro-technical developments.

There is a very large supply of old copper in Germany. The average annual consumption in recent years has been 225,000 tons of raw copper and average exports have not exceeded 100,000 tons, leaving 125,000 tons every year in the country. In case of need, this supply would care for military uses for an indefinite period.

A vast amount of scrap metal is brought forth by a rise in prices. At the end of 1914 the German price quoted was 200 marks per kilo, or at the then rate of exchange, 2034 cents per 100 pounds. Scrap was pouring on the market just as it did in the eighties when Secretan's copper corner failed. Secretan got control of the world's supply of raw copper, but those who backed him could not finance the purchase of the huge amounts of scrap copper brought forth by the higher prices which the corner was causing.

A large quantity of copper has been recovered from used ammunition, and taken from positions captured from the enemy. No one has yet thought of requisitioning the hundreds of thousand tons of

copper wire on the street railways of Germany. Before they are touched, the wiring and roofs of Belgium and Northern France will be stripped.

Invention of substitutes provide still another resource. It has been reported that Krupp has invented a soft steel which serves very well in place of copper.

One is tempted to subscribe to the opinion of one of the leading copper dealers of America, expressed at the end of December:

"Without denying the fact that the cutting off of the supplies of copper is annoying to the highly developed German industry, I believe it is of minor importance for the German army and navy, but I am sure the principal sufferers are the mine owners, miners and smelters in this country who are deprived of their best market.

"When 1914 statistics are going to be available you will find that while American copper production has been materially reduced owing to the war conditions, England and her colonies have continued to produce without any serious interruption; in other words, America though neutral and disinterested has to foot the bill for England's efforts to starve Germany, while the real profit goes into the pockets of the German copper mining companies and scrap dealers.

"England has gained little, America has lost much, while Germany is annoyed without being hurt."

CHAPTER XI

THE EXPORT SITUATION

A discussion of the effect of the Great War upon American interests would be lacking if it were not to include a consideration of our war exports. They demand attention for several reasons. There is general misinformation regarding their nature and extent and regarding the prosperity which they promise the country. The large extent of our exports during the war period has been frequently cited in the notes of Great Britain, both openly and by implication, as a factor which should influence the minds of the American public in their opinion regarding the stoppage of our normal trade with other belligerents in the war. Finally, the dependence of the Allies upon the United States for great quantities of war supplies, especially of munitions, gives us a vast economic power which might be used by this country, under clearly demonstrated necessity, for the protection of its proper rights and interests upon the seas.

During the greater part of the fiscal year 1915 (the year ended June 30), our exports were very large. The great extent of exports, together with a sharp falling off in imports-more marked than