From the early days of August, 1914, England attempted by means lacking all legal recognition to shut off the movement of grain, flour and provisions to Germany. The frank object of the action was to bring such pressure to bear upon the entire people of Germany that it would sue for peace. In March the "attrition" campaign was given an outer appearance of legitimate practice by what is generally described as a blockade of the German coast, but what is in reality nothing more than an indefinite extension of the law of contraband.

The control of England over the food supply of the nations of the world was exercised at once after the declaration of war. Britain ordered to her own ports every British steamer on the seas then carrying foodstuffs to Europe. Their cargoes were unloaded and sold in the British market, which became glutted with grain. English vessels were carrying most of the world's trade. The diversions not only threw into the British market all German-bound grain, but also all neutral-bound grain in British steamers, and assisted the government materially in exercising pressure upon the neutral countries to comply with certain policies of the British Ministry which will require later attention.

After this initial measure to get control of grain that might be moving to Germany even via neutral countries, the British Government, in its August 20 Order in Council, altered the status of foodstuffs in international trade in war time. This alteration took the form of a modification of the Declaration of Lon

don, which England by that Order "accepted" as its code of naval warfare, and with whose terms we are already familiar.

It is recalled that the Declaration classified articles of commerce as absolute contraband, conditional contraband or free. Absolute contraband might be captured if moving to an enemy either in direct trade or via neutral countries. Conditional contraband might be captured if moving direct to the enemy's country, provided it could be proven destined to the enemy's armed forces. The destination of conditional contraband might not be questioned if it were moving to the enemy via a neutral; that is, conditional contraband so moving would be immune. Goods on the free list could move unhindered to the enemy's country in either direct or indirect trade. Goods from the enemy's country might not be stopped except by an effective blockade.-Foodstuff's were conditional contraband.

Translated into terms of the present war, the Declaration prescribed that no interference should occur in trade between the United States and Holland, or Scandinavia, except in the case of ships which could be proven to carry absolute contraband, like arms and ammunition-with ultimate German destination.

There could be no interference with the movement into Germany of such goods on the Declaration's free list as cotton, rubber and hides. There could be no hindrance of our export to Germany of conditional contraband like grain, flour and provisions,

unless it could be proved by England that such shipments were destined for the German state or its armed forces. All foodstuffs moving to the civilian population of Germany were immune from capture. This question of army or civilian destination could not be raised if the food were moving to Germany via Holland or Scandinavia.

The Declaration prescribed that there could be no interference in the movement of any goods from Germany to the United States unless in the event of an effective blockade of Germany.

The things which by the Declaration of London Great Britain was obligated not to do gradually came to constitute a fairly good record of what she actually did. Step by step, the British. Admiralty interfered with the shipment to neutral countries of the most innocent goods, like cotton, requisitioning the cargoes for British purposes. Rubber was haled into the absolute contraband list; hides were eventually made absolute contraband. Neither food nor other conditional contraband was allowed to get to Germany, either by direct sailing or via neutral ports. Without the maintenance of a genuine blockade, the export of all goods from Germany to the United States was finally made impossible.

The first of these serious "modifications" of the Declaration of London, appearing in the British August 20 Order in Council, was a change in the Declaration's contraband lists. Aeroplanes were made absolute contraband; they were conditional in the Declaration. The change was unimportant in

itself but it introduced a policy that led to the greatest abuses.

The second and more dangerous change was in the treatment of conditional contraband, which was lawfully liable to capture only if it could be shown destined to the enemy state or its armed forces. The obligation of proof, as always under international law, lay upon the captor. Such hostile destination, the Declaration specified, might be presumed if the foodstuffs were consigned to the enemy authorities or to a contractor in enemy country publicly known to supply the enemy; or if the foodstuffs were sailing to a fortified place or base serving the armed enemy forces. That is, food ships consigned to ordinary merchants, not army purveyors, and sailing to commercial ports, were to be immune. As the Declaration says, "In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent."

So much for the law regarding conditional contraband. What did its British "modification" provide? It provided that destination for the hostile forces might be "inferred from any sufficient evidence" and experience proved that a mere suspicion in the mind of the British naval captain was sufficient evidence to detain ships. Moreover, in the new British-made law, destination for enemy forces was to be presumed if the goods were consigned to or for an agent of the enemy state or to or for a merchant or other person under control of the authorities of the enemy state." This "modification" made direct shipment of foods to Germany impossible. It abolished the difference

between absolute and conditional contraband; henceforth neither could move. The prize court judges who must administer this new sort of international law were thereby prevented from allowing the civilian population of Germany to get foodstuffs from America. Such foodstuffs must obviously be shipped to someone. There is no one in Germany or any other land who is not either "an agent of the enemy state or a merchant or other person in control of the authorities of the enemy state."

To be sure, the shipment might be consigned “to order," but events showed that the "evidence" would then be "sufficient" to "infer" destination to the enemy's forces.

Yet this did not exhaust the sweep of the British change in international law as brought forth in the Order in Council of August 20. There still remained the possibility of provisioning Germany by shipping to Rotterdam, Copenhagen, Gothenburg or Genoa, and thence forwarding into Germany. Against interference with conditional contraband so moving, stood the clear and unmistakable provisions of the Declaration of London. It read:

"Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy . . . and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port."

If food is to be discharged in a neutral port, its destination is not subject to suspicion.