selves and allowing belligerent countries to restrain it there is no difference.

On July 23, as we saw in Chapter VI, the British answered with a complete refusal our protest of March 30 against the blockade. The essence of its contention was necessity, and the application of the inapplicable Civil War cases.

In addition to this general denial of our contentions, we received a specific denial. On July 15 we protested against the seizure and continued detention of the Belgian cargo of the American steamer Neches.

She

In our July 15 note, the issue was first stated. The American steamer Neches with a general cargo sailed from Rotterdam for the United States. was held up at the Downs, taken to London and compelled to discharge goods which belonged to American citizens. The British had justified the seizure on the ground of the March 11 Order in Council, prohibiting German commerce from moving via neutral ports. (The Neches cargo was of Belgian origin and as Belgium was in German hands this was considered as German commerce.)

Our note stated that we considered the Neches case an illustration of the international invalidity of the March 11 Order in Council. We declared illegal the seizure of goods from a neutral port merely because they originated with an enemy of Great Britain. Our Ambassador was requested to communicate to England our desire that goods on the Neches, the

property of American citizens, be expeditiously released and forwarded to destination.

The unsatisfactory British answer was sent on July 31. With regard to what Britain considered its legal rights, this note referred us back to the British communication of July 23. Our attention was called to the inhumanity of Germany's submarine warfare on merchant vessels and it was asserted that this contrasted with the humane British procedure with regard to vessels seized. It was stated that Britain was unaware, except for the published correspondence of America and Germany, to what extent neutrals had demanded damages for the unlawful acts of submarines. So long as this German warfare continued, the note went on, Britain could hardly be expected to abandon her rights and allow goods of German origin to pass freely through waters patrolled by British cruisers.

However, it was stated that in particular cases of hardship in neutral countries England was willing to examine the facts with a spirit of consideration for the interests of neutrals. England declared herself willing so to proceed, if the Neches were held to be such a special case.

In preventing a stoppage of imports our government has an especial interest, because customs duties furnish the largest single item of our national revenue. In recent years we have collected each year approximately $700,000,000 in the form of taxes, nearly one-half of this sum, about $300,000,000, being duties levied on imported goods. German

goods are, as a rule, manufactures; they are thus subject to duty and are sources of revenue to the Federal Government. In the last four years Germany has furnished 102 per cent of all of our imports. She has furnished 142 per cent of our imports subject to duty.

Precisely how much revenue is collected upon imports from Germany it is impossible to say. The statistics of the customs service are not kept in such a manner as to show import revenues by countries, nor can the figures be so combined as to produce this result. However, it is possible to get a fairly close estimate of the amount so collected.

We know our total imports from Germany, and we know the value of our imports of a certain number of the leading articles in this trade, thirteen in all, some of them dutiable and some of them free. In the calendar years 1912, 1913 and 1914 these specified articles represented one-half of all imports from Germany. The average rate of duty applicable to these goods was 25 per cent in 1912, and 26 per cent in 1913 and 1914. It is a fair assumption that the average duty we collect on all German imports is 25 per cent. Before the war we were importing from Germany at the rate of $120,000,000 per year. A 25 per cent duty on this amount would yield us an annual revenue of $30,000,000. In reality we probably collect more than this. Germany sends us 1412 per cent of all the dutiable goods that we import. If these goods pay the average rate of duty they would yield 1412 per cent of the total we collect. That

total is over $300,000,000 per year. So the German imports would contribute over $45,000,000. The true amount lies somewhere between the estimates of $30,000,000 and $45,000,000.

It may be objected that imports from Germany would in any case have fallen off during the war, and that our revenues from these imports would inevitably have decreased even if Britain did not interfere with our trade. In a degree, that is true. In the 'eight months ending March 1, when the Order in Council went into effect, we imported $76,000,000 of goods from Germany, compared with $127,000,000 in the same period of the previous year. That is, our imports were 60 per cent of normal. Presumably we were collecting that proportion of the normal amount of duties or at the rate of $20,000,000 per year on German goods.

No

But with an absolute stoppage of German imports, our revenues will decline from $20,000,000 to nothing. And this $20,000,000 is a sum whose prospective disappearance has concerned those in the Federal Government who must take care of our revenue. one will be popular who suggests taxes to meet a $20,000,000 deficit, which is the contribution England demands that our government should pay towards the enforcement of a non-intercourse policy, though that policy, we officially contend, violates our rights and our neutrality.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PRACTICABILITY OF STARVING GERMANY

A sentiment has existed among many people, not excessively partisan in their views as to the general merits of the war, in favor of allowing England a free hand in the treatment of commerce for Germany. They feel that a policy on the part of Great Britain which would tend to end the struggle quickly by bringing to bear upon Germany not only the force of heavy military odds but also the force of severe economic pressure ought, perhaps, to meet the approval of neutral countries, even though these countries might suffer in their own material interests.

This point of view is expressed in an editorial of the New York Journal of Commerce of March 2, the day after the British announced their ban on our trade with Germany.

"If it is in the power of the Allies to keep from Germany the supplies which would enable it to maintain its hostile operations against them indefinitely, whether these supplies are intended for the direct support of armies or to replace those taken for their support from such as would otherwise sustain the civil population, that may be the most effective and humane means of shortening the ruthless process of slaughter, desolation and misery, the destruction of