grain and flour by domestic users. This was one of the less cheerful sides of the boom in the export food trade.

Indeed, the concern of the government was not to see that the miller and the farmer got their rights, but to see that the miller and the grain speculator did not rob the public. On August 18, 1914, an agent of the department of justice was a visitor at Minneapolis flour mills, inquiring as to the sudden rise in the price of flour. At the beginning of 1915 both New York and the Federal Government were investigating the sensational rise in the price of wheat, and trying to discover in it the machinations of speculators. It was found that the old law of supply and demand was operating. The usual Russian supplies were cut off from neutral countries. The Allies were consuming more heavily than ever, and their own crops were short. With everyone bidding for American wheat and flour, prices naturally advanced.

It is clear, therefore, that the American farmers and millers did not suffer because they did not ship to Germany. Had they been able to do this, wheat and flour would have been higher than they were and our citizens would have made still more money than they did, for Germany's demand would have been added to that of the rest of belligerent and neutral Europe. But our grain and flour people did fairly well.

Under these circumstances, naturally, no great agricultural interests went to Washington to clamor for freedom of foodstuffs shipments to Germany,

Yet the principle at issue was no less vital than if large losses had been involved. The historian of the future will find it difficult to reconcile our insistence on the movement of cotton because we needed the cotton money, with our acquiescence in the stoppage of the grain and provisions movement because we did not need the grain and provisions money.

Nor will it suffice to say that Germany, by selfdenial, did pull through, in spite of stoppage of food from America. Our rights and our duty were neglected, even if neglect of our rights did not mean distress to any of our citizens and even if neglect of our duty did not result in the starvation of Germany.

Moreover, the farmer will perhaps not find himself untouched. September wheat at less than $1.10 in New York in July, 1915, meant well under $1 per bushel on the farm. The contrast with the price the farmer received for his last year's crop will be striking. The contrast will be intensified if the Dardanelles fall and Russian wheat is let loose.

Above all, the final British measure, the "blockade" of Germany, has established a new practice, a new definition of blockade which may in the future be of the very greatest harm to the farmer. This feature of the question is reserved for Chapter V.

CHAPTER III

FOODSTUFFS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE OCTOBER ORDER IN COUNCIL

What we considered our rights in the matter of trading with belligerents was early in the war set forth in an announcement of our State Department declaring that such trade, except in contraband of war, was lawful and might go forward. On August 15, 1914, the State Department published the following:

"The existence of war between foreign governments does not suspend trade or commerce between this country and those at war. The right to continue to trade with belligerents is upheld by the well-recognized principles of international law.

"Conditional contraband consists, generally speaking, of articles which are susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace; in consequence, their destination determines whether they are contraband or non-contraband.

"Articles of the character stated are considered contraband if destined to the army, navy or department of government of one of the belligerents or to a place occupied and held by military forces; if not so destined, they are not contraband, as, for example, when bound to an individual or a private concern.'

This theoretical right of America to ship food to Germany, asserted August 15, was cancelled five

days later by the British Order in Council whose provisions we already know. In August and September of 1913 we shipped 4,700,000 bushels of wheat to Germany; in August and September, 1914, we shipped none. In August and September, 1913, we sent to Germany 20,500 barrels of flour; in August and September, 1914, only 65 barrels. In August and September, 1913, we sent to Germany $4,100,000 of lard; in August and September, 1914, not a dollar's worth. The comparatively small sales even in 1913 are of course no measure of what Germany would have taken in the war year 1914.

Noting the disappearance of shipments from oversea, Berlin protested in early October. In a note handed to foreign diplomats in Berlin on October 10, Germany called attention to the violations of the Declaration of London by the August Order in Council and the British September 21 contraband list. The protest was directed partly against Britain's absolute disregard of the contraband list established in the Declaration, especially against making rubber, hides, skins and certain kinds of iron ore contraband. However, the chief complaint was against the British "modification" which abolished the meaning and the privileges of conditional contraband and made it as impossible for food to move into Germany as for cartridges. Finally, the protest asked neutral nations what they were going to do about these attacks upon their rights, and intimated that Germany would not engage to abide longer by

the Declaration of London if Great Britain persisted in violating it.

The German protest was cabled to our government on October 22. Our answer was sent shortly after. We replied that the United States had withdrawn its suggestion, made early in the war, that for the sake of uniformity the Declaration of London should be adopted as a temporary code of warfare. We withdrew the suggestion because certain belligerents refused to adopt the Declaration without changes and modifications. Thenceforth, our reply continued, during the war, the United States and its citizens would rely for protection upon the existing rules of international law.

None of the rights of trade with belligerents is more firmly established by the well-recognized principles of international law than is the right to trade in food for the civilian population. This is a principle upheld by us in the past, and upheld with especial stress by the English Government, when Great Britain was a neutral. Continuously since the eighteenth century Britain has asserted that food was not contraband unless destined to a belligerent government or its military forces.

In 1885 China was at war with France. France declared rice contraband of war, with the purpose of starving China into submission. The declaration met with immediate, sharp and successful opposition from Great Britain. Lord Granville, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote the French Government that regarding foodstuff's "there must be cir