dominant, in the Council. But although the Great Powers are predominant, it will be impossible for them to abuse their position, because the Council as a rule can only act if it is unanimous, with the consequence that the representatives of the four minor Powers in the Council are as a rule able to prevent action on the part of the Council. Nor does the permanent representation of the Great Powers in the Council violate the legal equality of all States. It is acknowledged that the Great Powers are politically superior to the minor Powers, and it is on this account that the Great Powers are predominant in the Council.

(3) A third objection put forward against the constitution of the League is that it does not render it a super-State with a Government and Parliament of its own, and an international Army and Navy to serve as a police force. Indeed, there is no trace of a super-State in the League, for not even the most vivid imagination could see in the Council of the League an international Government, or in the Assembly an international Parliament with power to legislate by a majority; and there is no provision in the Covenant for an international Army and Navy. However, it may safely be asserted that, whatever may be the merits of a League creating a super-State-(the author considers it to be a Utopia) -not a single civilised State would at the present time have given its consent to the establishment of a League of Nations involving a super-State.

(4) A fourth objection has been made, namely, that the League is a league of Governments, and not of peoples, and is therefore not democratic. This objection is based on the fact that the Assembly of the League consists of representatives who will no doubt be deputed by the Governments of the member-States, and that each member, though it may depute three representatives, has only one vote. However, the

delegates of Governments are necessarily also delegates of peoples, because autocracy has almost everywhere disappeared, and constitutional democratic government has taken its place. So the Government of almost every member-State of the League is really representative of the people, being either parliamentary party government or-as in the United States of Americaa Government directly elected by the people. Moreover, Article 3 of the Covenant does not lay down how the several members shall select their respective representatives; they might, for instance, be selected by Parliament or even directly by the people.

(5) Lastly, it has been objected that the constitution of the League is obviously not strong enough to secure peace, because otherwise neither would Article 10 of the Covenant stipulate that the members of the League guarantee to one another their territorial integrity and existing political independence, nor would defensive alliances and separate treaties of guarantee be admissible within the League, as they are without doubt according to Article 21. This objection is based on the wrong presumption that the League was intended to be something like a super-State which could with absolute certainty secure the maintenance of peace. It overlooks the fact that the League is nothing else but the organised Family of Nations, and that the protection which the League can afford to its members depends in every case entirely upon the readiness of the members to fulfil their obligation under the Covenant not to resort to war without having referred a dispute either to arbitration or to the Council for inquiry. Of course, it is possible that a member might not do so, but might make a sudden attack upon another member. Then the attacked State would in the first instance have to rely upon its own forces, because the League could only after the lapse of time send forces to its assistance.

It is for this reason that the members of the League guarantee to one another, according to Article 10 of the Covenant, their territorial integrity and existing political independence against external aggression, a guarantee which is all the more necessary since members are to reduce their national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety.1 Every member is to be assured that since it is to reduce its armaments, the other members will come to its assistance in case of aggression.

Now it may happen that a member is not satisfied with this general assurance of assistance against aggression, and would like to secure more speedy help in case of need. In such case there is nothing to prevent it either entering into a defensive alliance with one or more other members, or securing the special protection of one or more members by a special guarantee of its independence or territorial integrity. Such defensive alliances and guarantee treaties would, like all other treaties, have to be registered with the Secre-, tariat and published, according to Article 18, and for this reason they would not vitiate the Covenant, but would confirm and supplement it with regard to the particular cases concerned. Thus, upon the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, France was at once desirous of securing the speedy assistance of Great Britain, as well as of the United States, in case the stipulations of the treaty concerning the left bank of the Rhine should be violated by Germany, and therefore entered into two special treaties of alliance with Great Britain and the United States respectively, by which these Powers agreed to come immediately to the assistance of France, in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression by Germany.2

of the

§ 1678. While the foregoing objections in general to Defects the constitution of the League are unfounded, there is Constino doubt that there are a number of real defects.

tution

of the

(1) The first defect is that the membership of the League. League is notifiable (Article 1, paragraph 3), and that a member may be expelled (Article 16, paragraph 4), or may cease to be a member through signifying its dissent from an amendment ratified in accordance with Article 26. Since the League is intended to be allembracing, and to represent the organised Family of Nations, there ought to be no possibility for a member to leave the League, or to be expelled therefrom. A recalcitrant member should, if necessary, be coerced by force to submit to the decisions of the League, and to fulfil its duties. However, it may be hoped that the stipulations concerning the withdrawal and the expulsion of members will disappear in consequence of a future recasting of the constitution.

(2) Another defect is that there is no provision for a separate and individual Council of Conciliation. According to Articles 12 and 15, it is to the Council that disputes are to be referred for inquiry, and it is this Council which will investigate the dispute, and make recommendations for its settlement. Yet the Council is, and must be, a political institution in which, according to Article 4, the Great Powers have a political preponderance; and so the political interests of the Great Powers must influence the Council in their recommendations. There is great danger that in a dispute between a Great Power and a minor Power, or even in a dispute between two minor Powers, the Council will be prejudiced. Apart from this, paragraph 9 of Article 15, according to which the Council may refer a dispute to the Assembly, and shall do so at the request of either party to the dispute, is quite unworkable. The Assembly will be a very large body, and it will hardly ever be possible

to obtain a unanimous report from it; yet since such a report is not a matter of procedure, concerning which, according to Article 5, a decision may be given by a majority vote, unanimity will be required. For this reason, to withdraw a dispute from the Council and transfer it to the Assembly is to appeal from a more competent to a much less competent body. What is urgently needed is the establishment of a Council of Conciliation, as independent of the Council of the League as the International Court of Justice. The functions of the Council of the League ought to be exclusively political, and confined to the consideration of mere executive measures. On the other hand, the functions of a Council of Conciliation would consist in an impartial inquiry into the cause and elements of a dispute, and in recommendations for its settlement. It is only if the parties were not inclined to carry out their recommendations that appeal should be made to the Executive Council of the League. The British official commentary on the Covenant points out1 that there is nothing to prevent the Council from setting up a permanent Council of Conciliation. This is no doubt true; but Article 15, as it stands, contemplates the settlement of disputes by the Executive Council of the League, and not by an independent Council of Conciliation.

(3) The third defect is the absence of a stipulation in the Covenant, according to which the settlement of judicial disputes by an International Court of Justice is made compulsory, in case the parties do not succeed in settling them by other means. Indeed, Article 14 foreshadows the establishment of an International Court of Justice, and paragraph 2 of Article 13 names a few kinds of disputes as generally suitable for submission to arbitration,' but there is no compulsion on the

1 Misc., No. 3 (1919), Cmd. 151, p. 16.