Canal, § 183a. The Kiel Canal, which connects the Baltic The Kiel with the North Sea, was constructed by Germany, mainly for strategic purposes. It runs wholly through German territory, and before the World War, although Germany in fact kept it open to vessels of other nations, she controlled navigation, and could at any time have closed it to them, apart from any special treaty relations. But by Articles 380-386 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is provided that the canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality, and that only such charges shall be levied as are intended to cover in an equitable manner the cost of maintaining or improving the conditions of navigation. Germany is bound to ensure that good conditions are maintained, to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation, and to refrain from works of a nature to impede it. The League of Nations is to institute a jurisdiction' to hear disputes as to the interpretation of these articles, and complaints of their violation; but small questions are to be determined in the first instance by a local authority at Kiel. Panama § 184. Already in 1850 Great Britain and the United The States, in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1 of Washington, Canal. had stipulated the free navigation and neutralisation of a canal between the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean proposed to be constructed by the way of the river St. Juan de Nicaragua and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua and Managua. In 1881 the building of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama was taken in hand, but in 1888 the works were stopped in consequence of the financial collapse of the company under 1 See Martens, N. R. G., xv. p. 187, and Moore, iii. §§ 351-365. According to its Article 8 this treaty was also to be applied to a pro- taking its construction. After this the United States came back to the old project of a canal by the way of the river St. Juan de Nicaragua. For the eventuality of the completion of this canal, Great Britain and the United States signed, on February 5, 1900, the Convention of Washington, which stipulated free navigation on, and neutralisation of, the proposed canal in analogy with the Convention of Constantinople, 1888, regarding the Suez Canal. This convention was not ratified, because the Senate made amendments which Great Britain could not accept. 1 In the following year, however, on November 18, 1901, another treaty was signed and afterwards ratified. This so-called Hay-Pauncefote Treaty applies to a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by whatever route may be considered expedient, and supersedes the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Under it the United States has the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal, and a number of rules, substantially as embodied in the Suez Canal Convention, are adopted as the basis of the neutralisation' of the canal. It is to be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these rules on terms of entire equality; 2 it is never to be blockaded, nor shall any right of war be exercised 1 See Moore, iii. §§ 366-368. 6 6 2 This provision that the canal is to be free and open to the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise,' was held by the British Government to be violated by the fifth section of the Panama Canal Act of August 24, 1912, which gave preferential treatment to the vessels of the United States. Thus arose the lengthy 'Panama Canal Conflict,' which was amicably settled through the passage of new legislation in 1914. The literature upon it was very voluminous. See Parl. Papers, Misc., No. 12 (1912), Cd. 6451; Oppenheim, The Panama Canal Conflict (2nd. ed. 1913); Richards, The Panama Canal Controversy (1913); Root, The Obligations of the United States as to Panama Canal Tolls (1913); and articles in the Law Magazine and Review, xxxviii. (1912-1913), A.J., vi. (1912), and vii. (1913), R.I., 2nd Ser. xiv. (1912), Z. V., vi. (1913), Z.I., xxiii. (1913), Jahrbuch für Völkerrecht, i. (1913), and the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vii. (1913). or any act of hostility be committed within it. The United States is, however, at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.1 The transit of belligerent vessels and prizes through the canal is to be effected with the least possible delay, and they may not revictual, or take any stores, except so far as may be strictly necessary. No belligerent is to embark or disembark troops or munitions of war in the canal, or in the waters within three marine miles of either end of it. A belligerent war vessel may not remain in such waters for more than twenty-four hours at any one time, except in distress, and may not depart within twenty-four hours from the departure of a war vessel of the other belligerent. All works necessary to the construction, operation, and maintenance of the canal are to enjoy immunity from attack and injury in time of war as in time of peace. 3 On November 18, 1903, the so-called Hay-Varilla Treaty 2 was concluded between the United States and the new Republic of Panama, according to which, on the one hand, the United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama, and, on the other hand, the Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity for the construction, administration, and protection of a canal between Colon and Panama the use, occupation, and control of a strip of land required for the construction of the canal, and, further, of land on both sides of the canal to the extent of five miles on either side, with the exclusion, however, of the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbours 1 The question whether the United States had a right to fortify the Panama Canal was much discussed before the World War. See Hains and Davis in A.J., iii. (1909), pp. 354-394 and pp. 885-908, and Olney, Wambaugh, and Kennedy in A.J., v. (1911), pp. 298, 615, 620. 2 See Martens, N. R. G., 2nd Ser. xxxi. p. 599. That this grant is really cession all but in name, was pointed out above, § 171 (4); see also below, § 216. adjacent to these cities. According to Article 18 of this treaty the canal and the entrance thereto shall be neutral in perpetuity, and shall be open to vessels of all nations as stipulated by Article 3 of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. The Panama Canal was opened in 1914,1 and rules for its operation and navigation were issued by the United States. After the outbreak of the World War, on November 13, 1914, a proclamation was issued prescribing rules for its use by belligerent vessels,2 and when the United States had entered the war a further proclamation was issued on May 23, 1917.3 VI MARITIME BELT Grotius, ii. c. 3, §§ 9-12—Vattel, i. §§ 287-290—Hall, §§ 41-42—Westlake, i. pp. 187-196-Lawrence, § 87-Phillimore, i. §§ 197-201-Twiss, i. §§ 144, 190-192-Halleck, i. pp. 167-179-Taylor, §§ 247-250-Walker, § 17— Wharton, i. § 32-Moore, i. § 144-152-Wheaton, §§ 177-180-Hershey, Nos. 191-194-Bluntschli, §§ 302, 309-310-Hartmann, § 58-Heffter, § 75-Stoerk in Holtzendorff, ii. pp. 409-453-Gareis, § 21-Liszt, § 9 -Ullmann, § 87-Bonfils, Nos. 491-494-Despagnet, Nos. 403-414– Mérignhac, ii. pp. 370-392-Pradier-Fodéré, ii. Nos. 617-639—Nys, i. pp. 540-569-Rivier, i. pp. 145-153-Calvo, i. §§ 353-365-Fiore, ii. Nos. 801-807, and Code, Nos. 267-271, 276-278, 1030-Martens, i. § 99 -Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris and Quaestiones Juris publici, i. c. 8 -Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer (1856), i. pp. 150-175-Heilborn, System, pp. 37-57-Imbart-Latour, La Mer territoriale, etc. (1889)— Godey, La Mer côtière (1896)-Shücking, Das Küstenmeer im internationalen Rechte (1897)-Perels, § 5-Fulton, The Sovereignty of the 1 By a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, signed at Washington on August 5, 1914, and ratified on June 22, 1916, Nicaragua granted to the United States, in return for a sum of $3,000,000, the exclusive right to construct and manage an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua. (See A.J., x. (1916), Supplement, p. 258.) It does not seem that the United States Government has any present intention of building another canal, but merely desires to hold an option over the only other available routes to prevent any possibility of competition with the Panama Canal. (See Finch in A.J., x. (1916), pp. 344-351.) A.J., ix. (1915), pp. 167-175. 3 A.J., xi. (1917), pp. 165-168. Sea (1911), pp. 537-603-Raestad, La Mer territoriale (1913), and in R.G., xix. (1912), pp. 598-623, xxi. (1914), pp. 401-420-Schramm, Das Prisenrecht (1913), pp. 66-74-Barclay in Annuaire, xii. (1892), pp. 104-136, and xiii. (1894), pp. 125-162—Martens in R. G., i. (1894), pp. 3243-Aubert, ibid. pp. 429-441-Engelhardt in R.I., xxvi. (1894), pp. 209-213-Godey in R.G., iii. (1896), pp. 224-237-Lapradelle in R.G., v. (1898), pp. 264-284, 309-347-Balch in the Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vi. (1912), pp. 132-141 - Barclay and Charteris in Reports of the International Law Association, vol. xxvii. (1912), pp. 81-127-Kraemer in Z. V., vii. (1913), pp. 123-152-Salmond in the Law Quarterly Review, xxxiv. (1918), pp. 235-252. perty of tested. § 185. Maritime belt is that part of the sea which, State Proin contradistinction to the open sea, is under the sway Maritime of the littoral States. But no unanimity exists with Belt conregard to the nature of the sway of the littoral States. Many writers maintain that such sway is sovereignty, that the maritime belt is a part of the territory of the littoral State, and that the territorial supremacy of the latter extends over its coast waters. Whereas it is nowadays universally recognised that the open sea cannot be State property, such part of the sea as makes the coast waters would, according to the opinion of these writers, actually be the State property of the littoral States, although foreign States have a right of innocent passage for their merchantmen through the coast waters. On the other hand, many writers 1 of great authority emphatically deny the territorial character of the maritime belt, and concede to the littoral States, in the interest of the safety of the coast, only certain powers of control, jurisdiction, police, and the like, but not Sovereignty. This is surely erroneous, since the real facts of international life would seem to agree with the firstmentioned opinion only. Its supporters rightly maintain 2 that the universally recognised fact of the exclusive Their arguments are very ably stated by Lapradelle in R.G., v. (1898), pp. 273-284 and 309-330. Hall, p. 155. The question is treated with great clearness by |