the opportunity of voting for the union with Denmark. Prussia, however, intentionally neglected her duty, Austria did not insist upon her right, and finally relinquished it by the Treaty of Vienna of 1878.1 So the matter stood until the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Articles 109-114) again stipulated for a plebiscite within a certain area of Northern Schleswig. The assertion 2 that, although individuals cannot be subjects of International Law, they can nevertheless acquire rights and duties from International Law, is untenable as a general proposition. International Law cannot grant international rights to individuals, for international rights and duties can only exist between States, or between the League of Nations and States. International Law cannot give municipal rights to individuals, for municipal rights and duties can only be created by Municipal Law. However, where International Law creates an independent organisation-for instance, the proposed International Prize Court at the Hague, or the European Danube Commission, and the like certain powers may be granted to commissions, courts, councils, and even to individuals concerned. These powers are legal powers, and are therefore justly called rights, although they are neither international nor municipal rights, but only rights within the organisation concerned. Thus the unratified Convention XII. of the second Hague Peace Conference provided for an International Prize Court to which-see Articles 4 and 5 individuals could bring an appeal.3 Thereby It ought to be mentioned that the opinion presented in the text concerning the impossibility for individuals to be subjects of International Law, which is now mostly upheld, is vigorously opposed by Kaufmann, Die Rechtskraft des internationalen Rechtes (1899), §§ 1-4, and a few others. 2 See Diena in R. G., xvi. (1909), pp. 57-76; Rehm and Adler in Z. V., i. (1907), pp. 53 and 614; Liszt, § 5; Kohler in Z. V., ii. (1908), pp. 209230. The position of individuals in this case is discussed by Wehberg, Das Seekriegsrecht (1915), pp. 362364. See also Lammasch, Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtbarkeit (1913), pp. 158-161, and Borchard, § 9. Individuals Objects of the Law of a right would be given to individuals; but it would be neither an international nor a municipal right, but only a right within the independent organisation 1 intended to be set up by Convention XII. § 290. But what is the real position of individuals in International Law, if they are not subjects thereof? The answer can only be that they are objects of the Law Nations. of Nations. They appear as such from many different points of view. When, for instance, the Law of Nations is seen to recognise the personal supremacy of every State over its subjects at home and abroad, these individuals appear as objects of the Law of Nations just as does State territory in consequence of the recognised territorial supremacy of every State. When, secondly, the recognised territorial supremacy of every State is seen to comprise certain powers over foreign subjects within its boundaries with the exercise of which their home State has no right to interfere, these individuals appear again as objects of the Law of Nations. And, thirdly, when it is seen that, according to the Law of Nations, any State may seize and punish foreign pirates on the open sea, or that belligerents may seize and punish neutral blockade-runners and carriers of contraband on the open sea without their home State having a right to interfere, individuals appear once more as objects of the Law of Nations.2 § 291. If, as stated, individuals are never subjects but always objects of the Law of Nations, then nationality is the link between them and the Law of Nations. It is through the medium of their nationality only that 1 The organisation created by the Covenant of the League of Nations is another example. The rights and duties of the Council, the Assembly, and the Secretariat are neither international nor municipal rights and duties, but only rights and duties within the organisation set up by the Covenant. 2 Westlake, Papers, p. 2, maintains that in these cases individuals appear as subjects of International Law; but I cannot understand upon what argument this assertion is based. The correct standpoint is taken up by Lorimer, ii. p. 131, and Holland, Jurisprudence, P. 341. Indi and the Nations. individuals can enjoy benefits from the existence of Nationthe Law of Nations. This is a fact which has conse- Link ality the quences over the whole area of International Law 1 between Such individuals as do not possess any nationality enjoy viduals no protection whatever, and, if they are aggrieved by Law of a State, they have no way of redress, since there is no State which would be competent to take their case in hand. As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, apart from morality, there is no restriction whatever to cause a State to abstain from maltreating to any extent such stateless individuals.2 On the other hand, if individuals who possess nationality are wronged abroad, it is their home State only and exclusively which has a right to ask for redress, and these individuals themselves have no such right. It is for this reason that the question of nationality is very important for the Law of Nations, and that individuals enjoy benefits from this law, not as human beings, but as subjects of States which are members of the Family of Nations. Their position in this respect is so different from that of stateless individuals and of subjects of States outside the Family of Nations, that it has been correctly characterised as a kind of international indigenousness,' a VölkerrechtsIndigenat. Just as municipal citizenship procures for an individual the enjoyment of the benefits of the Municipal Laws, so this international 'indigenousness,' which is a necessary inference from municipal citizenship, procures the enjoyment of the benefits of the Law of Nations. of Nations § 292. Several writers maintain that the Law of The Law Nations guarantees to every individual at home and and the abroad the so-called rights of mankind, whether he be Rights of stateless or not, and whether he be a subject of a memberState of the Family of Nations or not. Such rights are 1 See below, § 294. 1 See below, § 312. 'See Stoerk in Holtzendorff, ii. p. 588. Bluntschli, §§ 360-363 and 370; Mankind. said to comprise the right of existence, the right to protection of honour, life, health, liberty, and property, the right of practising the religion of his choice, the right of emigration, and the like. But such rights-they could only be municipal and not international rights-do not in fact at present enjoy any guarantee whatever from the Law of Nations.1 But there are certain facts which cannot be denied at the background of this erroneous opinion. The Law of Nations is a product of Christian civilisation and represents a legal order which binds States, chiefly Christian, into a community. It is therefore no wonder that ethical ideas, some of which are the basis of, and others a development from Christian morals, have a tendency to require the help of International Law for their realisation. When the Powers stipulated at the Berlin Congress of 1878 that the Balkan States should be recognised only under the condition that they did not impose any religious disabilities on their subjects, or when in several treaties which constitute the resettlement after the World War the Principal Allied and Associated Powers secured the insertion of clauses to protect minorities, they lent their arm to the realisation of such an idea. Again, when the Powers after the beginning of the nineteenth century agreed to several international arrangements in the interest of the abolition of the slave trade, they fostered 1 The matter is treated with great lucidity by Heilborn, System, pp. 83-138. 2 It is incorrect to maintain that the Law of Nations has abolished slavery, but there is no doubt that the conventional Law of Nations has tried to abolish the slave trade. Three important general treaties were concluded for that purpose during the nineteenth century, after the Vienna Congress - namely (1) the Treaty of London, 1841, between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia; (2) the General Act of the Congo Conference of Berlin, 1885, which in Article 9 dealt with the slave trade; (3) the General Act of the anti-slavery Conference of Brussels, 1890, which was signed by Great Britain, AustriaHungary, Belgium, the Congo Free State, Denmark, France (see, however, below, § 517), Germany, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Norway, the United States, Turkey, and Zanzibar. See Queneuil, De la Traite des Noirs et de l'Esclavage (1907), and Hershey, No. 216. 1 the realisation of another of these ideas. And the innumerable treaties between the different States as regards extradition of criminals, commerce, navigation, copyright, and the like, are inspired by the idea of affording ample protection to life, health, and property of individuals. Lastly, there is no doubt that, should a State venture to treat its own subjects or some of them with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion of the rest of the world would call upon the Powers to exercise intervention 1 for the purpose of compelling such State to establish a legal order of things within its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence more adequate to the ideas of modern civilisation. However, a guarantee of the so-called rights of mankind cannot be found in all these and other facts. II NATIONALITY Vattel, i. §§ 220-226-Hall, §§ 66 and 87-Westlake, i. pp. 220, 238-240Halleck, i. p. 401-Taylor, §§ 172-178-Hershey, No. 223-Moore, iii. $$ 372-376-Bluntschli, §§ 364-380-Stoerk in Holtzendorff, ii. pp. 630650-Gareis, § 54-Liszt, § 11-Ullmann, §§ 108 and 109-Bonfils, Nos. 433-454- Despagnet, Nos. 329-333- Pradier-Fodéré, iii. No. 1645Rivier, i. p. 303-Nys, ii. pp. 256-262-Calvo, ii. §§ 539-540-Fiore, i. Nos. 644-658, 684-712, and Code, Nos. 643-646-Martens, i. §§ 85-87Hall, Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction (1894), § 14-Cogordan, La Nationalité au Point de Vue des Rapports internationaux (2nd ed. 1890)— Zeballos, La Nationalité au Point de Vue de la Législation comparée, etc., 2 vols. (1914)-Borchard, §§ 4 and 5, and 198-227-Gargas in Z. V., v. (1911), pp. 278-316 and 478-509. tion of § 293. Nationality of an individual 2 is his quality of Concepbeing a subject of a certain State, and therefore its citizen. NationIt is not for International, but for Municipal Law to ality. determine who is, and who is not, to be considered a subject. And therefore it matters not, as far as the See above, § 137. The nationality of corporations is entirely a matter of private Inter- |