sovereign States that could enforce the rules of the Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any member of the Family of Nations from becoming omnipotent. The history of the times of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. shows clearly the soundness of this principle.1 And this principle is particularly of importance in time of war. As long as only minor Powers, or a few of the Great Powers, are at war, the fear of the belli gerents that neutral States might intervene can, and to a great extent does, prevent them from violating funda mental rules of International Law concerning warfare and the relations between belligerents and neutrals But when, as during the World War, the Great Powers are divided into two camps which are at war, and the neutral States represent only a negligible body, there is no force which could restrain the belligerents, and compel them to conduct their warfare within the boundary lines of International Law. The existence of the League of Nations makes a balance of powe not less, but all the more necessary, because a omnipotent State could disregard the League o Nations. (2) The second moral is that International Law car develop progressively only when international politics especially intervention, are made on the basis of rea State interests. Dynastic wars belong to the past, a do interventions in favour of legitimacy. It is neithe to be feared, nor to be hoped, that they should occu 1 Attention ought to be drawn to the fact that, although the necessity of a balance of power is generally recognised, there are some writers of great authority who vigorously oppose this principle, as, for instance, Bulmerincq, Praxis, Theorie und Codification des Völkerrechts (1874), pp. 40-50. On the principle itself see Donnadieu, Essai sur la Théorie de l'Équilibre (1900) Kaeber, Die Idee des europäische Gleichgewichts (1907); Dupuis, I Principe d'Equilibre et le Concer européen (1909); Hoijer, La Théor de l'Equilibre et le Droit des Gen (1917); Ter Meulen, Der Gedank internationalen Organisation (1917) pp. 38-60. See also below, § 136 n. again in the future. But if they did, they would hamper the development of the Law of Nations in the future as they have done in the past. (3) The third moral is that the progress of International Law is intimately connected with the victory everywhere of constitutional government over autocratic government, or, what is the same thing, of democracy over autocracy. Autocratic government, not being responsible to the nation it dominates, has a tendency to base the external policy of the State, just as much as its internal policy, on brute force and intrigue; whereas constitutional government cannot help basing both its external and its internal policy ultimately on the consent of the governed. And although it is not at all to be taken for granted that democracy will always and everywhere stand for international right and justice, so much is certain, that it excludes a policy of personal aggrandisement and insatiable territorial expansion, which in the past has been the cause of many wars. (4) The fourth moral is that the principle of nationality is of such force that it is fruitless to try to stop its victory. Wherever a community of many millions of individuals, who are bound together by the same blood, language, and interests, become so powerful that they think it necessary to have a State of their own, in which they can live according to their own ideals, and can build up a national civilisation, they will certainly get that State sooner or later. What international politics can, and should do, is to enforce the rule that minorities of individuals of another race shall not be outside the law, but shall be treated on equal terms with the majority. States embracing a population of several nationalities can exist and will always exist, as many Framples show. 1 See below, § 568h. (5) The fifth moral is that every progress in the development of International Law wants due time to ripen. Although one must hope that the time will come when war will entirely disappear, there is no possibility of seeing this hope realised in our time. The first necessities of an eternal peace are that the surface of the earth should be shared between States of the same standard of civilisation, and that the moral ideas of the governing classes in all the States of the world should undergo such an alteration and progressive development as would create the conviction that arbitral awards and decisions of courts of justice are alone adequate means for the settlement of international differences. Eternal peace is an ideal, and in the very term 'ideal' is involved the conviction of the impossi bility of its realisation in the present, although it is a duty to aim constantly at such realisation. The Per manent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, established by the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, is an institu tion that can bring us nearer to such realisation thar ever could have been hoped. And codification o parts of the Law of Nations, following the codification of the rules regarding land warfare, will in due tim arrive, and will make the legal basis of internationa intercourse firmer, broader, and more manifest tha before.1 (6) The sixth moral is that the progress of Inter national Law depends to a great extent upon whethe the legal school of international jurists prevails ove the diplomatic school.2 The legal school desires Inter national Law to develop more or less on the lines o Municipal Law, aiming at the codification of firm, deci 1 See Oppenheim, Die Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1911), where some progressive steps are discussed which the future may realise. 'I name these schools 'diplomatic' and 'legal' for want of better denomination. They must however, not be confounded with th three schools of the Naturalists 'Positivists,' and 'Grotians,' de tails concerning which will be give below, $$ 55-57. sive, and unequivocal rules of International Law, and working for the establishment of international courts for the purpose of the administration of international justice. The diplomatic school, on the other hand, considers International Law to be, and prefers it to remain, rather a body of elastic principles than of firm and precise rules. The diplomatic school opposes the establishment of international courts, because it considers diplomatic settlement of international disputes, and failing this arbitration, preferable to international administration of justice by international courts composed of permanently appointed judges. There is, however, no doubt that international courts are urgently needed, and that the rules of International Law require now an authoritative interpretation and administration such as only an international court can supply. (7) The seventh, and last, moral is that the progressive development of International Law depends chiefly upon the standard of public morality on the one hand, and, on the other, upon economic interests. The higher the standard of public morality rises, the more will International Law progress. And the more important international economic interests grow, the more International Law will grow. For, looked upon from a certain standpoint, International Law is, just like Municipal Law, a product of moral and of economic factors, and at the same time the basis for a favourable development of moral and economic interests. This being an indisputable fact, it may, therefore, fearlessly be maintained that an immeasurable progress is guaranteed to International Law, since there are eternal moral and economic factors working in its favour. Fore runners of Grotius. III THE SCIENCE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS Phillimore, i. Preface to the first edition-Lawrence, §§ 22-29-Manning, § 52. The science of the modern Law of Nations commences from Grotius' work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, libri iii., because in it a fairly complete system 1 of International Law was for the first time built up as an independent branch of the science of law. But there were many writers before Grotius who wrote on special parts of the Law of Nations. They are therefore commonly called 'Forerunners of Grotius.' The most important of these forerunners are the following: (1) Legnano, Professor of Law in the University of Bologna, who wrote in 1360 his book, De Bello, de Represaliis, et de Duello, which was, however, not printed before 1477; For a good analysis of the work of Grotius, see Walker, History, pp. 284-329. 2 Newly edited in Scott's Classics of International Law, by Holland, together with an English translation by Brierly (1917). |