-a bare falsehood. That is equivalent to saying that the student receiving the degree has graduated from the school; otherwise, how could he comply with the "prescribed requirements" which entitle him to a diploma from the institution? Fifty or sixty of these were issued to students who never had been in the school, and the evidence shows at least one instance where a diploma was issued to a student who was not shown to have been in any medical school. The instrument is not an

-sale of diploma

by medical school-insertion of word

“honorary”—ef

fect.

but a diploma to a doctor of medicine and master of sur

gery. It was strictly a sale of diplomas.

The evidence satisfactorily shows that the respondent has violated the law of its organization in at least two respects. It has been conducted for pecuniary profit, which that law forbids. It has misused its corporate powers in a manner which threatens serious injury to the public welfare.

Wherefore, it is ordered that the respondent, the Kansas City College of Medicine and Surgery, be dissolved as a corporation, and that its charter and franchise as hereinbefore granted be forfeited and revoked and for naught held, and that the relator herein recover of and from respondent the costs herein laid out and expended.

All concur, except Otto, J., not sitting.

A private corporation created by the legislature may lose its franchises by a misuser or nonuser of them; and they may be resumed by the government under a judicial judgment upon a quo warranto, or writ in the nature thereof, to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture. 7 R. C. L. 710.

This principle has been applied in several cases within the scope of the present annotation.

In the reported case (STATE EX REL. OTTO V. KANSAS CITY COLLEGE, ante, 1472) the advertising by the secretary and nominal head of a so-called medical school, of a four-year medical course, including preparatory and postgraduate schools, without any equipment whatever, and the sale of diplomas to men he had never seen or had as students, were held to constitute such misuse of the corporate powers as to endanger the public welfare and therefore to justify ousting the institution of its franchise.

So, where an incorporated medical college issues degrees for money upon the answering of a set of printed questions, without requiring attendance, and without furnishing instruc

tion in the science of medicine and surgery, merely for the purpose of furnishing incompetent persons a means of practising the profession in states where no examination is required, and where the practitioner need not be a graduate of a reputable medical college, it is guilty of such misuse and abuse of its franchise as to be ousted thereof on quo warranto. Illinois Health University v. People (1897) 166 Ill. 171, 46 N. E. 737, citing Edgar Collegiate Inst. v. People (1892) 142 Ill. 363, 32 N. E. 494, supra.

In the Independent Medical College v. People (1899) 182 Ill. 274, 55 N. E. 345, the issue of medical diplomas for a price without regard to the qualification or fitness of the applicant, and in many cases without any study of the required subject, was held sufficient ground for ousting an incorporated medical college of its franchise. The court said: "This information charges the grounds upon which a forfeiture of the defendant's charter is urged, with all the certainty required by the rules of civil pleading; and those grounds, if sustained by the proof, were sufficient, as held in Illi

nois Health University v. People (Ill.) supra, where we said, among other things: 'It is not consistent with the public policy of a state which enacts stringent laws for the preservation of the public health and for the protection of its people from quacks and ignorant pretenders to a knowledge of the science of medicine and surgery, to authorize or permit a pretended health university to turn anyone, whether known or unknown, qualified or unqualified, into a doctor of medicine, armed with a diploma and degree as one qualified to heal the sick, who may answer its prescribed list of questions and pay its prescribed fee.' And it was there held, for such abuse and misuser, the charter of the corporation should be revoked-citing Edgar Collegiate Inst. v. People (Ill.) supra. The health university, respondent in the above case, was practically the same institution as the one now before the court, and the only material difference in that case and this is that there the ouster was upon a demurrer to the information, whereas here there was a trial upon the issues of fact."

In State ex rel. Crow v. National School of Osteopathy (1898) 76 Mo. App. 439, where a diploma in osteopathy was issued to a graduate of two prominent medical schools without requiring him to attend the school for the statutory period, it was held that the corporation would not be ousted of its franchise, because of the good faith of the school officers in asking legal advice as to their procedure. The case turned on the fact that a wilful violation of law was not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, which was deemed necessary by the court to work a forfeiture of the franchise.

In People v. Geneva College (1830) 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 211, where a college by its charter was located in a particular place with authority to instruct pupils and to grant degrees in arts and science courses, it was held that it had no authority to establish a medical school in another place, and that it could be stopped from exercising

such unauthorized franchise by an information in the nature of a quo warranto.

Where the charter of an incorporated college declared that "the object of the association shall be to direct and cultivate the minds of the students in a thorough and scientific course of studies, particularly adapted to agricultural pursuits," it was held that the sale of the entire experimental farm by legislative authority, in order to secure funds to prevent the college from closing entirely, was not such a misuse or abuse of the granted power as to be ground for forfeiture under quo warranto, since a college of liberal arts and science, the fundamental idea of the institution, remained, with a course in agriculture as a part of the curriculum. It was further held that the admission of females as students was not such an abuse of the charter as to be ground for forfeiture. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Farmer's College (1877) 32 Ohio St. 487.

Where the trustees of an incorporated educational institution sign diplomas in blank, and leave them within the control of one of its officers, who sells them, and thus confers degrees without regard to merit, there is such a misuse of the power conferred as requires a dissolution of the corporation. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Mt. Hope College Co. (1900) 63 Ohio St. 341, 52 L.R.A. 365, 58 N. E. 799.

And see Murphy v. Luttrell (1909) 56 Tex. Civ. App. 149, 120 S. W. 905.

In Edgar Collegiate Inst. v. People (1892) 142 Ill. 363, 32 N. E. 494, where an educational corporation was formed "for the purpose of maintaining an institution of learning" in a certain town, a period of inactivity by such corporation for ten years prior to action brought, during which time all the buildings were sold and removed, and an attempt made to sell and convey all of the corporate realty, were held sufficient grounds upon which an action of ouster could be maintained to deprive the corporation of its franchise. F. G. M.

S. E. 698; Clein v. Atlanta, 159 Ga. 121, 124 S. E. 882.

A city which licenses a slaughterhouse in pursuance of its ordinance is estopped from alleging the invalidity of the ordinance.

Zimmerman v. Gritsmacher, 53 Or. 206, 21 L.R.A.(N.S.) 299, 98 Pac. 875, 1135; Martel v. East St. Louis, 94 Ill. 67.

Businesses affected with a public interest are subject to state and municipal regulation.

Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Pipe-Line Cases (United States v. Ohio Oil Co.) 234 U. S. 548, 58 L. ed. 1459, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 956; Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 228, 64 L. ed. 239, P.U.R.1920C, 574, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 131; State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102, 25 L.R.A. 504, 41 Am. St. Rep. 528, 29 Atl. 947.

Beck, P. J., delivered the opinion of the court:

This case originated in the city court of Atlanta, where J. T. Pylant filed suit against Schoen Bros., Inc., and alleged, in substance: That the defendant had damaged him in a stated sum, "for that the defendant controlled and operated in the city of Atlanta a licensed abattoir, where it engaged in the business of slaughtering beeves, sheep, and other animals for hire, and in the storage of meats, and the defendant's abattoir consisted of extensive structures, amply equipped for the handling of the business of slaughtering animals and the treatment and storage of meats for the public in Fulton county, Ga.; and that the defendant furnished offices and headquarters for the wholesale dealers engaged in buying and slaughtering animals and the vending of meats at the said abattoir of defendant; and that the hire and rates to be charged by the defendant for such services was fixed by ordinance of the city of Atlanta; that the defendant was the only licensed slaughterhouse serving the public in Fulton county, there being no other licensed public abattoir therein; and that the defendant handled all of the business of

slaughtering animals for the public in Fulton county and in the city of Atlanta; and that the defendant's business is regulated by statute under the police power of the state, and is regulated and controlled by an ordinance of the city of Atlanta which provides that every licensed slaughterhouse shall slaughter for the public without discrimination, and for the charges fixed by the ordinance; that the defendant's business was affected with a public interest and constituted the defendant a quasi public corporation with the duties and obligations incident to such a corporation; that the plaintiff, a wholesale butcher and vendor of meats in Fulton county, was arbitrarily and without cause refused service by the defendant; and that this was a breach of the defendant's legal duty toward the plaintiff."

The defendant filed general and special demurrers to the petition. The demurrers were sustained, and the plaintiff's petition was dismissed. The case was carried to the court of appeals, and the decision of that court, rendered on February 26, 1926, is to the effect that the judgment sustaining the general demurrer was erroneous, and that the petition as against the general demurrer set forth a cause of action; the court of appeals, in effect, holding that the ordinance of the city of Atlanta providing that every licensed slaughterhouse shall slaughter for the public without discrimination is valid, and that the city of Atlanta has the charter power to enact such ordinance under the general welfare clause in its charter. The plaintiff in certiorari excepts to and assigns error upon so much of the decision of the court of appeals as holds that the ordinance of the city of Atlanta which provides that every licensed slaughterhouse shall slaughter for the public without discrimination is valid, and that one who operates a licensed slaughterhouse for the slaughter of animals, for hire, within the limits of the city of Atlanta, and who arbitrarily and

without cause refuses to slaughter for a member of the public, is liable in damages therefor, and that the petition set out a cause of action and was good as against a general demurrer. The rulings upon the special demurrers were not excepted to in the application for certiorari.

We are of the opinion that the ruling made by the court of appeals upon the question now under review was correct and stated sound and established doctrine. The ruling made by that court is not elaborated. Doubtless the judge writing the opinion deemed it unnecessary to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the question involved because of the large number of adjudicated cases dealing with the same or similar questions. The full decision of the court of appeals (— Ga. App.

132 S. E. 461) upon that question, which was rendered by Judge Stephens, is as follows: "The general welfare clause in the charter of a municipality authorizes the passage of reasonable ordinances for the protection, comfort, and good government of all the people of the municipality. Crum v. Bray, 121 Ga. 709, 49 S. E. 686, 1 Ann. Cas. 991. Under the authority of the general welfare clause a municipality may, in the interest of the public health, regulate or even perhaps prohibit entirely, within its limits, the business of slaughtering animals for food. Since a municipality might find it to be in the interest of the public health to discourage or even prohibit entirely within its limits the private slaughter of animals, it is a reasonable regulation to provide that those slaughtering for the public do so without discrimination. An ordinance of the city of Atlanta which provides that 'every licensed slaughterhouse shall slaughter for the public without discrimination,' is a reasonable regulation in the interest of the comfort and convenience of all the people of the city, and is valid under the general welfare clause in the charter of the city. It follows, therefore, that the owner and proprietor of a li

being a suit against the operator of a licensed slaughterhouse within the city of Atlanta, by a plaintiff who alleges that he was a butcher and vender of meat in the community, and that the defendant, arbitrarily, and without just cause, refused, to the plaintiff's damage in the destruction of his business, to slaughter animals offered by the plaintiff, in violation of the Parties-acprovisions of an or- tion for refusal dinance of the city to obey ordiprohibiting such discrimination, the petition set out a cause of action and was good as against general demurrer."

nance.

For a learned and authoritative discussion of the principle underlying the decision which we have under review, we turn almost instinctively to the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the year 1872. Those cases grew out of an act of the legislature of the state of Louisiana, entitled, "An Act to Protect the Health of the City of New Orleans, to Locate the Stock Landings and Slaughterhouses and to Incorporate the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company.'" The first holding in those cases was that "this grant of exclusive right of privilege, guarded by proper limitation of the prices to be charged, and imposing the duty of providing ample conveniences, with permission to all owners of stock to land, and of all butchers to slaughter at those places, was a police regulation for the health and comfort of the people (the statute locating them where health and comfort required), within the power of the state legisla