of illegal means to induce the awarding of the contract and the securing of petitions therefor. The court says: "The terms of this contract are broad enough to cover services of any kind, secret or open, honest or dishonest.' They are broad enough to cover secret interviews with councilmen and the exercise of personal and private influence with the councilmen and other city officials. The terms of the contract are broad enough to cover any act, whether honest or dishonest, legal or illegal, that might be resorted to, 'to accomplish the success' in obtaining contracts. He promised to 'do everything in his power' to succeed. Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff's compensation was contingent on his success in obtaining from the city paving contracts, and his promise to do everything in his power at all times to obtain these contracts from the public, we conclude that said contract is contrary to public policy."

A contract to pay an attorney a specified sum of money for each bridge that might be awarded the client during a certain period of time, for services already performed and to be performed by virtue of which the attorney agrees "to use his best efforts by all rightful and legal means to assist" in obtaining the contract, was held in Flynn v. Bank of Mineral Wells (1909) 53 Tex. Civ. App. 481, 118 S. W. 848, to be void as against public policy when considered in connection with the evidence as to the services actually rendered, which tended to show that the attorney had solicited a member of a banking firm to assist him in securing the contract for his employer, offerring to pay him money for such assistance; that petitions requesting the submission to a vote on the question of building bridges were circulated by the attorney in different portions of the county; that the attorney appeared before the commissioners' court on several occasions, and assisted in estimating the cost of the bridges and the resources of the county available for the purpose, and urged the acceptance of his employer's bid for the work; and further, that the

attorney appeared before the attorney general of the state, and by argument, and upon additional evidence procured by him, secured that officer's approval of bonds to be issued for the building of bridges.

So, an agreement by which the president of a corporation, "in consideration of services rendered and to be rendered," agrees to pay one engaged in a life insurance business one half of the profits on a contract for the building of a bridge, containing no further specifications or description of the services to be performed, is not on its face corrupt or illegal, despite the fact that compensation is contingent upon the event of the defendant being awarded the contract to construct the bridge; but where in such case the contract contemplates official action as a condition precedent for the payment of the compensation, and where such a huge sum is to be paid for "services" unspecified and So vaguely and generally referred to, it will look into the circumstances, consider the situation of the parties, the negotiations, and subject-matter of the agreement, and ascertain what in fact was the purpose and intention of the agreement, without being concluded by its phraseology, or by proof of what was actually done under it; and where there is testimony clearly supporting the inference that the contract contemplated the obtaining of the political influence of one regarded as a man of influence and prominence in local politics to assist the employer in getting a bridge contract and carrying it out without undue molestation, which was contradicted by other evidence, it should be left to the jury to infer whether or not the contract contemplated the use of political influence, especially in view of the vagueness of the services stated in the contract, the fact that the plaintiff's compensation depended in the first instance upon the contract being awarded and that the plaintiff was not in any respect connected with the bridge business. Chard v. RyanParker Constr. Co. (1918) 182 App. Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622.

An agreement to procure the ap

pointment of another as special counsel of the United States in certain litigated cases, in consideration whereof the agent is to receive one half the fees received by the counsel, is fraudulent and void as against public policy, it appearing by evidence of a solicitor of the treasurer that the agent had urged upon him the employment of his principal as special counsel, that at the instance of the agent he had I called the attention of the Secretary of the Treasury to the subject, and that the appointment was thus brought about. Meguire v. Corwine (1880) 101 U. S. 108, 25 L. ed. 899.

In Murray v. Wakefield (1881) 9 Mo. App. 591, it was held that money paid in consideration of an undertaking to influence the police commissioners to prevent police interference with a lottery cannot be recovered back, though the lottery was not illegal.

A contract by which a bank agreed to extend time on a note held by it in consideration of the maker procuring the county treasurer to deposit public funds in the bank for a period of two months is in violation of public policy and void, and forms no basis for an enforceable agreement to extend time for payment of the note. Boyd v. Cochrane (1897) 18 Wash. 281, 51 Pac. 383.

V. Contracts for professional services.

As in the case of lobbying contracts, one may legally enter into an agreement to prepare and present petitions. Valdes v. Larrinaga (1914) 233 U. S. 707, 58 L. ed. 1163, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 750.

And one may legally employ an attorney to appear before a departmental official, and advocate some action on the part of the latter. Stanton v. Embrey (1877) 93 U. S. 548, 23 L. ed. 983; Bergen v. Frisbie (1899) 125 Cal. 168, 57 Pac. 784. See also Mulligan v. Smith (1904) 32 Colo. 404, 76 Pac. 1063; Houlton v. Nichol (1896) 93 Wis. 393, 33 L.R.A.166, 57 Am. St. Rep. 928, 67 N. W. 715.

Contracts to pay for professional services in advocating just claims against the United States government, before officers of the various depart

ments thereof, are legal if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness, notwithstanding that the compensation is not fixed. Stanton v. Embrey (U. S.) supra. The court states: "Professional services to prepare and advocate just claims for compensation are as legitimate as services rendered in court in arguing a cause to convince a court or jury that the claim presented, or the defense set up against the claim presented by the other party, ought to be allowed or rejected. Parties in such cases require advocates, and the legal profession must have a right to accept such employment and to receive compensation for their services; nor can courts of justice adjudge such contracts illegal if they are free from any taint of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfairness."

So, a contract whereby the services of an attorney are engaged for the purpose of having certain timber entries pending before the Secretary of the Interior in Washington ratified and declared valid, but containing no stipulation for the use of improper means or methods, is valid upon its face and enforceable, notwithstanding that the compensation is contingent upon success, inasmuch as the employment of persons to influence decisions of the Land Department is perfectly. legitimate in the eyes of the law, unless the means and methods resorted to are improper. Bergen v. Frisbie (1899) 125 Cal. 168, 57 Pac. 784.

So, there is no objection to employ. ing a lawyer to procure a draft of a proposed resolution of the board of aldermen of a city which would give the defendant permission to erect an iron railing, to present the resolution to the board, see the various aldermen and explain to them the reasons of necessity for favorable action on the resolution, and explain its purport to the mayor so that it would meet with his approval, and a recovery may be had for these services. Eisenstein v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co. (1909) 113 N. Y. Supp. 967.

It is competent for a paving company to employ attorneys and agents to give legal advice, to collect and

present the facts as to the character and peculiarity of paving material which it proposes to use in grading and paving the streets, to make arguments, and openly and honestly endeavor to convince the reason and judgment of both the property owners and the members of the city council that the interest of the owners and the public will be best served by the use of such material; and where their capacity is stated and well known, their representations and arguments openly and candidly made, and no secret or sinister influence exerted, nor any improper means employed to obtain the contracts for paving under their employment with the company, they are entitled, upon full performance of their work, to the contingent compensation agreed upon. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Botsford (1896) 56 Kan. 532, 44 Pac. 3.

And a contract to pay a lawyer a certain sum to appear before the state commissioners and advocate the laying of a street through land of the promisor, and to get as much as he could in damages therefor, is not against public policy, but is a valid contract which will not be invalidated by evidence tending to show the subsequent use by the lawyer of his personal influence as chairman of the city committee of a political party in fulfilling his part of the contract; the political position of the promisee and what was done are only evidence of what was expected, not conclusive. Barry v. Capen (1890) 151 Mass. 99, 6 L.R.A. 808, 23 N. E. 735.

The fact that one employed to present to the Secretary of the Interior the legal status of public lands, with a view of having them thrown open to settlement, was not a member of the legal profession, makes no difference with the legitimate character of his services in face of the undisputed fact that such services required special knowledge and training, and that the person employed, by years of study and experience, had qualified himself to render them. Houlton v. Nichol (Wis.) supra.

VI. Contracts to procure pardon. Early American and English cases

uniformly held that contracts to pay for services rendered in procuring, or attempting to procure, a pardon, were void on the theory that the contract contemplated interference with the pardoning power, which should be as free from bias or improper influence, as the trial of the convict before the court; but the rule has been modified by more recent decisions to the extent that the contract will be declared valid or invalid according to the character of the services contemplated; if the contract provides for the rendition of purely professional services, such as the drafting and presentation of the petition, the collection of information regarding the convict, his former course of conduct, his deportment, and generally the preparation and submission of arguments addressed to the judgment of proper officers and services of like character, it will be upheld; but if the contract contemplates the introduction of personal influence and solicitation as elements in procuring favorable action from those in authority, then it will be condemned as contrary to good morals and sound public policy. See Spaulding v. Maillet (1920) 57 Mont. 318, 188 Pac. 377.

And so, it is fairly well settled that a contract entered into by an attorney to procure a pardon or parole of a convicted prisoner by the proper use of legitimate means is not illegal or against public policy. Formby v. Pryor (1854) 15 Ga. 258; Meadow v. Bird (1857) 22 Ga. 246; Gordon v. Gordon (1916) 168 Ky. 409, L.R.A. 1916D, 576, 182 S. W. 220, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 886; Moyer v. Cantieny (1889) 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060; Chadwick v. Knox (1855) 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329; Bremsen V. Engler (1883) 17 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 172; Newbold v. McCrorey (1916) 103 S. C. 299, 87 S. E. 542, 1103; Moore v. Hyde (1917) 39 S. D. 196, 163 N. W. 707.

Such a contract is not rendered illegal because the compensation is made contingent on success. Moyer v. Cantieny (1889) 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060.

It would not embarrass the operations of the governor to have a statement of the facts of the case prepared,

affidavits prepared and verified, and the circumstances presented to him to show that the prisoner is a proper subject for executive clemency, and there is no reason why a contract to do these things should be declared void as against public policy. Bremsen v. Engler (1883) 17 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 172, supra.

"A

Such

from

As said in Chadwick v. Knox (1855) 31 N. H. 226, 64 Am. Dec. 329: person imprisoned can do little to aid himself in bringing his case to the consideration of the executive. For everything that must be done without the walls of the prison the convict is compelled to rely on the assistance of those who have their liberty. assistance may be afforded motives of charity and compassion, or the motive may be in part kindness and in part an expectation that the party relieved will be ready to afford a suitable compensation for the services and expenses; or the party in prison may employ another to do such acts as may be rightfully and properly done for his relief, and contract to pay him for his services and to repay him his expenses. Such a contract, if the parties contemplate only a resort to legal and proper measures, is free from any just exception, and binding upon the parties."

And a contract to aid in securing the parole of a prisoner, which does not contemplate the use of illegal means, but merely the presentation to the board of parole of the necessary papers and evidence, is not against public policy, although a statute imposes a penalty on any person who shall for reward aid or assist in procuring a pardon from the governor. Gordon v. Gordon (1916) 168 Ky. 409, L.R.A.1916D, 576, 182 S. W. 220, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 885.

In Moyer v. Cantieny (Minn.) supra, the court, after stating that there are considerations which properly might be brought to the attention of the governor and influence his action in the exercise of his constitutional power of granting pardons, and which suggest the propriety of employing professional services of attorneys for that purpose, goes on to say: "For in

stance, it would be proper, and often expedient, that an attorney at law examine the case upon which the conviction was based, to see whether, notwithstanding the final judgment of the law, the case may not be of such a nature as to justify the exercise of the extraordinary power of pardon. He may direct investigations to the discovery of facts bearing upon the question of guilt not discoverable at the time of the trial. . . . Whatever considerations may properly affect the action of the executive may be urged upon his attention."

In Meadow v. Bird (1857) 22 Ga. 246, the supreme court of Georgia held that a note given for professional services rendered by an attorney on an application for a pardon to the legislature, explaining to the members legal principles, and explaining testimony, and arguing its legal effect in such language as one gentleman would use to another in discussing the merits of the subject, was not illegal because contrary to the public policy.

There is nothing necessarily immoral in an application for a pardon; a person may therefore be legally employed to prepare a petition, collect evidence showing the right to a pardon, and submit the same, with proper arguments addressed to reason and judgment, to the governor or other officer or department having authority to grant pardons; contracts for the performance of such services, carried out in the manner contemplated, are valid. William Deering & Co. v. Cunningham (1901) 63 Kan. 174, 54 L.R.A. 410, 65 Pac. 263.

But it has been held that a distinction should be made between an employment of an attorney and a contract to secure a pardon made by a person who is not an attorney; the latter, it is said, would be objectionable because it would not appear on its face that the means to be employed were not influence or personal solicitation or some other equally objectionable means, while an employment of one to perform services in the line of his profession would not be objectionable. Bremsen v. Engler (N. Y.) supra.

And according to the South Dakota

courts services which may be lawfully contracted for in connection with an attempt to secure a pardon are such services only as are performed by lawyers, and compensation is not recoverable for services performed, even by a lawyer, beyond those which are strictly professional; therefore, any contract looking towards rendition of services by others than lawyers in procuring a pardon is invalid. Moore v. Hyde (1917) 39 S. D. 196, 163 N. W. 707.

Likewise, the Tennessee court has held in Moore v. Benson (1915) 6 Tenn. C. C. A. 178, that, while an attorney may legally contract, for compensation, to present an application for pardon to the pardoning powers, and make an oral or written argument before such powers, a contract between a father desiring the pardon of his son, and other persons making no pretense that they are attorneys at law, to secure a pardon, is void as against public policy; especially if it appears that there is no humanitarian idea involved in the employment, which was purely a selfish one.

On the other hand, there is an express holding that there is no law which restricts the employment of persons to secure a pardon to attorneys at law. Bird v. Breedlove (1858) 24 Ga. 623.

Obviously, if the contract contemplates the use of personal influence and solicitation, it is void. So, an attorney employed by one convicted of crime in the Federal court, to aid in securing a pardon, after an original petition for a pardon had been sent to the President, which apparently had not been acted upon because it was not accompanied by a favorable recommendation of the United States district judge or district attorney, who contracts to use his personal friendship with the assistant district attorney as a means of obtaining the desired recommendation, and who as a matter of fact secures the recommendation, not because of the merits of the application, but as a personal favor, cannot recover the compensation agreed upon, since the contract clearly contemplates the employment of per

sonal influence and solicitation, and is forbidden by public policy. Spaulding v. Maillet (1920) 57 Mont. 318, 188 Pac. 377, supra.

Likewise, an agreement, for a pecuniary consideration, to make an effort to secure a pardon for one confined in a penitentiary under conviction of crime, to withdraw remonstrances and letters against the securing of the pardon, and to visit the judge who sentenced the imprisoned person and try to have him sign a petition for the pardon, was held void in William Deering & Co. v. Cunningham (Kan.) supra. The court states: "The consideration of the notes in this instance was personal influence and lobby services, not by anyone skilled in such work, but because they had been instrumental in securing the conviction, and of their opposition to the granting of the pardon which had been applied for. The purchase of personal influence to obtain a pardon or to control the operations of any department of the government is immoral and pernicious in tendency, and cannot receive the sanction of courts."

In Norman v. Cole (1800) 3 Esp. (Eng.) 253, it was held that an action would not lie to recover money deposited for the purpose of being paid to one who had access to persons of influence, for his services in using his influence to procure a pardon for one sentenced to death, by representing in favorable terms the case and character of the one so sentenced. The court remarked that if a person interposes his interest to secure a pardon, he should do so gratuitously, and not for money; that the doing of an act of that description should proceed from pure motives, and not from pecuniary ones.

As suggested above, the earlier courts refused aid to parties to contracts to procure pardons, without reference to the services rendered or contemplated. McGill V. Burnett (1832) 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 640; Brown v. Young (1886) 7 Ky. L. Rep. 664 (abstract); Wildey V. Collier (1854) 7 Md. 273, 61 Am. Dec. 346; Adams Exp. Co. v. Reno (1871) 48 Mo. 264 (dictum); Hatzfield v. Gulden