The amount of property now held by such corporations, and having relations more or less direct to the national government and its service is very great. And this amount is continually increasing, so that it may admit of question whether the whole income of the property which will remain liable to state taxation, if the principle contended for is admitted and applied in its fullest extent, may not ultimately be found inadequate to the support of the state governments."

In Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 21 L. ed. 787, it is held that the Union Pacific Railroad Company, although created by Congress as an agent of the Federal government, designed to be employed, and actually employed in the legitimate service of the government, both military and postal, is not exempt from taxation by the state of Nebraska; that the taxing power of a state is one of its attributes of sovereignty; it exists independently of the Constitution of the United States, and may be exercised to an unlimited extent, except in so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal government; and that there are no constitutional implications which prohibit a state tax upon the property of an agent of the government, merely because it is the property of such agent. The distinction between taxing the agencies of the Federal government and taxing the property of such agents is thus indicated: "It is therefore manifest that exemption of federal agencies from state taxtion is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their power. A tax upon their property has no such necessary effect. It leaves them free to discharge the duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their operations is a

direct obstruction to the exercise of federal powers."

A more recent case is Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 49 L. ed. 242, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. There land which was conveyed by the United States to a corporation for dry dock purposes is held not entirely exempt from state taxation as an agency of the United States, by reason of the fact that there was a reservation in the conveyance of the right to the free use of the dry dock, and a provision therein for forfeiture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for use, or the use of the land for other purposes. Mr. Justice Holmes concludes the opinion there with this language: "Furthermore, it seems to us extravagant to say that an independent private corporation for gain, created by a state, is exempt from state taxation, either in its corporate person, or its property, because it is employed by the United States, even if the work for which it is employed is important and takes much of its time."

In Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340, and Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588, 42 L. ed. 1155, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, the taxation of cattle, although kept for grazing purposes upon an Indian reservation in Oklahoma, the land being exempt from state taxation, does not violate any right or invade the jurisdiction and control of the United States over the Indians and their lands.

In Crook, H. & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co. (C. C.) 54 Fed. 604, the question was whether a mechanic's lien could be enforced against the Chamberlin Hotel at Old Point Comfort, located upon the government reservation there. It appearing that the Virginia statute invoked did not conflict with any law. of the United States relating to forts, and did not interfere with the military control, discipline, and use by the United States of Fortress Monroe as a military post, the liens were enforced, and it was held that the general laws of Virginia, other

than criminal, are in force at Old Point Comfort, and are especially in force in those parts and places at Old Point Comfort which have been appropriated to other than the military purposes of the United States.

It appears from the records of the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, Alexandria division, that on July 21, 1923, in the case of Burke v. Texas Company, the learned judge, Hon. D. Lawrence Groner, held that the tax imposed by the state upon gasoline used as motor fuel had been lawfully collected of Burke, who had a gasoline pump upon the land owned by the United States in the county of Arlington, Va., known as the United States Military Road, extending from the south end of the United States highway bridge through the United States Experiment Farm to the Arlington National Cemetery.

That a bridge is not a building has been frequently decided, and it seems hardly necessary to say that an approach to a bridge which is a public highway is not a building.

States-jurisdiction-building defined.

It is suggested in the brief for the accused that the sole test is whether or not the land has been acquired in the manner referred to in the clause cited; that is, over "places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the state in which the same shall be." Clearly, however, this is not the sole test, because it is manifest that the land must also be acquired for one of the specific purposes which are indicated in the clause, namely, for a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

While the land of the United States upon which the station building is located is exempt from taxation by the state of Virginia, because it is the property of the federal government, neither the property of others located thereon nor the business of others conducted thereon for their private gain, can be held to be so exempt. As to these others, the state statutes have full force and effect. That this is the generally accepted rule is well indicated by the cases which we have cited, as well as by Rice v. Hammond, 19 Okla. 419, 91 Pac. 698, 14 Ann. Cas. 963, and note. The same rule is quite generally recognized. 26 R. C. L. § 75, p. 100.

The state appears to have ceded no right or jurisdiction as to this land except such as are inconsistent with ownership of the property by the United States, and this imposition of a merchant's license tax is entirely consistent with the federal right and power.

Our conclusion then is to affirm the judgment.

While it is settled beyond question that a state has no power to tax the means and instrumentalities of the Federal government (see 26 R. C. L. 95, § 71), a state may, nevertheless,

impose a personal property tax on property situated on government reservations within its limits, not belonging to the United States or to tribal Indians or otherwise exempt from tax

ation. 26 R. C. L. 100, § 75. The question presented by this annotation is whether a state may impose a license tax on the business of an individual being conducted on land owned by the Federal government. The reported case (NIKIS v. COM. ante, 219) appears to be the only decision dealing with this power. In that case the court holds to be subject to a state license tax, a business carried on in a railroad station situated on land ceded to the Federal government for an approach to an interstate bridge. This decision is placed on the somewhat technical ground that a bridge approach is not

a "building" within article 1, § 8 of the Constitution (10 Fed. Stat. Anno. 838), giving the Federal government exclusive jurisdiction over lands ceded for "forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." Being outside this provision, the court points out that the only other available source of exemption, the act exempting property of the United States from taxation, is not applicable to property of an individual on land belonging to the United States. Related and analogous holdings and an unreported decision of the Federal district court are set out in the reported case. W. A. S.

V.

re

the insured to obtain should be preferred. construction Insurance, § 156 solving ambiguity against insurer. 4. If, by omitting an exception from an accident insurance policy, the insurer has couched the policy in such terms that reasonable men could reasonably contend that it applied to and covered a situation for which the insurer is sought to be held liable, the ambiguity will be resolved against the insurer.

[See 14 R. C. L. 926; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 316; 4 R. C. L. Supp. 931; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 787.]

46 A.L.R.-15.

Argued before Buffington and Woolley, Circuit Judges, and Clark, District Judge.

Messrs. F. W. Wheaton, P. F. O'Neil, and John P. Kelly, for plaintiff in error:

The policy having been written by the defendant company, the construction of it must be that construction most favorable to the other party to it, the insured and his beneficiary.

Depue v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (C. C.) 166 Fed. 183; Burkhard v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 102 Pa. 262, 48 Am. Rep. 205.

Any accident that originated through the insured riding in an automobile which is the proximate cause of the injuries should entitle the insured to the benefit of the double indemnity clause.

King v. Travelers Ins. Co. 101 Ga. 64, 65 Am. St. Rep. 288, 28 S. E. 661; Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Muir, 61 C. C. A. 456, 126 Fed. 926; United States Mut. Acci. Asso. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 33 L. ed. 60, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755; Primrose v. Casualty Co. of America, 232 Pa. 210, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 618, 81 Atl. 212.

The whole trip down the mountain side, with the driver unable to control the speed of the car, the insured in apparently great peril, his jumping or falling from the automobile, were all part of the accident and part of his riding in an automobile. Although the actual injuries were received when he struck the roadway, they were nevertheless due to his riding in the automobile.

Tooley v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co. 3 Biss. 399, Fed. Cas. No. 14,098; Gibson v. Casualty Co. of America, 156 App. Div. 144, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1045; Barber v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 165 Ill. App. 239; Bohaker v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 215 Mass. 32, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 543, 102 N. E. 342.

Messrs. James P. Harris and W. A. Valentine, for defendant in error:

Under the plain language of the double indemnity clause, double liability was imposed if, and only if, the decedent sustained injuries by accidental means while riding in an automobile.

Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Vandecar, 30 C. C. A. 48, 57 U. S. App. 446, 86 Fed. 282; Anable v. Fidelity & C. Co. 73 N. J. L. 320, 63 Atl. 92, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 117; Van Bokkelen v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 34 App. Div. 399, 54 N. Y. Supp. 307; Wallace v. Employers' Liability

Buffington, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 9, 1907, the Etna Life Insurance Company, in consideration of the payment to it of a premium of $25, issued to Thomas A. Wright an accident insurance policy for $5,000, insuring him "against disability or death resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means." The policy continued in force until the death of the insured under circumstances hereafter noted. Suit was brought on such policy and recovery of the full amount had in the court below. The company conceded its liability therefor, so that with that policy we are not concerned.

On October 31, 1910, the company in consideration of the payment to it of a premium of $10 issued to the insured an additional policy-in form an automobile indorsement or rider on his foregoing policy-for indemnity against "bodily injuries through external, violent, and accidental means, while he is riding in, operating, or carrying for a private automobile," and for "an additional principal sum of $5,000." On this latter policy the beneficiary declared in the same suit. A verdict and judgment in favor of the insurance company was entered for plaintiff on the first policy and for de

fendant on the second. Thereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of

error.

The facts in the case, which are undisputed, are these: On September 27, 1921, the insured was riding down a mountain road of steep grade in the private automobile of a friend, who was driving. In the descent the driver, in attempting to change gear, for the time being lost control of the car. When he finally got it under control, he found the deceased had disappeared, and, going back, found him lying face down on the road. He was unconscious and so fatally injured that death ensued the next day. No one saw how or when he left the car, and, other than the fact that when the car got out of control he was in it, and when control was regained he was not in it, everything was speculative. Did the policy cover such an accident? That the physical injury suffered by the deceased was inflicted when he struck the road, and not when he was in the car, is clear, and therefore, adhering to the literalism of its policy the company contends the deceased, when injured, was not "riding in the car," and therefore, looking at the injury and accident as occurring at the instant his head struck the roadway the situation was one not covered by the policy. On the other hand, it is contended that the real accident was losing control of the car, and if the deceased was then riding in the car, and one of the natural and to be expected results of that lost control was that he might leave the car, then the policy covered the situation.

The trial judge regarding, but wrongfully, as we shall see, the case as one of double indemnity, sought to find a middle course by writing into the policy the motive or absence of motive of the deceased in leaving the car, and held that, if the deceased was thrown from the car, then the injury was inflicted while he was "riding in" the car; but, if he jumped from the car to save himself, the injury was inflicted when he was not "riding in" the car, and

so instruct the jury. But the policy nowhere makes such a distinction, the parties did not so contract, and to write motive or absence of motive in leaving the car as one of the terms of the contract is to make a contract for the parties which they neither made nor wrote. This contract dealt with facts, not motives. It specified a situation in which alone the company was to be liable. It did not insure when another situation arose, no matter how that change of situation came about, and if the deceased was not injured "while he is riding

a car, then the policy, measured as it must be by its mere literalism, simply does not cover an injury suffered when he is not riding in the car, no matter what the circumstances or motive that got him out of the car; for it makes no difference to our mind, so far as the literalism of the contract is concerned, whether the change of situation was a physical stress caused by the uncontrolled car throwing him out, or a mental stress constrained by the instinct of self-preservation which resulted in his jumping out.

Trial-insur

duty of court.

Taking, then, the removal most favorable to the company, namely, a leap by the insured from the car to save himself, we have the question whether such a case is covered by this policy. The facts are undisputed, and it is therefore the duty ance-construcof the court to con- tion of policystrue the policy and decide whether it applies. Assuming, then, that the car got beyond control on this steep road, that the deceased was then sitting in it, and before control was regained leaped from the car to save himself as the jury found he did, is such a situation covered by the policy?

Addressing ourselves to the court's duty to construe the policy, we note that this is not a case of double indemnity on a single premium, but one of double or additional premium for an additional original indemnity; for the indemnity in this case is, as the policy recites, for "an additional original principal sum of